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ABSTRACT 
Rural areas in much of sub-Saharan Africa access needed health care from untrained 
and often poorly regulated drug vendor shops with concerns over the quality of 
products and services provided and their public health implications. The thesis 
undertook to understand market relationships in a rural retail drug market in the light 
of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and isolate opportunities for potential 
policy interventions for improved access to quality and safer medicines. 
Data was collected from a sample of patent medicine vendors and drug purchasers in 
Katsina-Ala Local Government Area of Benue State, north central Nigeria, over 9 months in 
2012. Information from drug vendors and drug consumers was generated through semi-
structured questionnaires, in-depth interviews and systematic business transaction 
observations. Key state and national drug regulatory officials were also interviewed in-depth 
and related documentary data collected and evaluated. Data analysis focussed mainly on the 
relationships between market structure, provider conduct, consumer behaviour and the nature 
of regulation, with the aim of understanding market performance in relation to access to 
medicines and their rational use. 
The study established that patent medicine vendors were an important source of medicines 
for inhabitants of the local government for ambulatory primary health care. Drug retailers 
were said to be a reliable source of a wide range of drugs provided at relatively more 
affordable prices and in a convenient way that satisfied consumer expectations. However, a 
number of market failures existed: low quality of treatment due to poor provider knowledge 
of diseases and drugs and therefore inappropriate prescription and dispensing practices. 
Ineffective regulation was also demonstrated by way of inappropriate and inadequate 
regulatory regime, occasioned by wide spread regulatory infractions. 
To attain the desirable public health objective of sustained improvement in the quality of 
products and services obtainable at patent medicine vendor outlets, regulatory strategies 
must be contextually relevant, providers must be trained and offered financial and business 
incentives and consumers must be empowered by accessible and timely health information 
for informed choices against the backdrop of strengthened and better incentivized 
inspectorate unit in a systematically intertwined approach.  
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CHAPTER 1:  THESIS BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Health is central to human existence and a critical determinant of value of human 
life, as evidenced in the millennium pool in which all peoples of the world 
consistently ranked good health a top priority. This pool was the largest public 
opinion survey ever, and sought to know global hopes and expectations about the 
role of the United Nations in the future (UN 2000). In the same line of thought, good 
health is adjudged the most basic element for personal and economic development, 
poverty reduction and an indispensable cornerstone (with education) for human 
beings to develop intellectually, emotionally and physically (WHO 2000). For 
societies broadly, improved population health status has been shown to positively 
correlate with economic growth and sustainable development. It is not therefore 
random occurrence that most of the classical breakthroughs in economic history too, 
have closely followed major breakthroughs in disease control, health technological 
advances and improved nutrient intake (WHO 2000). In pragmatic terms, the 
industrial revolution in Britain and Europe in the nineteenth Century, the 
phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy and the meteoric rise of the Asian 
tigers in the twentieth Century, all exemplify the instrumental role of improved 
population health to sustainable social and economic development.  
Ill-health on the other hand imposes considerable costs on individuals and societies: 
it narrows annual incomes of societies, diminishes life-time incomes of individuals 
and households and jeopardizes the prospects of economic growth and development 
(CMH 2001). These losses are particularly large in low income countries (who 
harbour over 25% of the global burden of disease), and contribute substantially to 
erosion of GNPs annually (CMH 2001). The psychological impacts of ill-health, 
mortality and morbidity are less understood, but certainly contribute quite 
considerably to the overall losses.  
Ill health does not only impose financial and psychological impacts, it breeds social 
instability. Poor health status of peoples has been identified as a key predictor of 
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state failure through civil wars, military coups or other means (CMH 2001). 
Conflicts reciprocally impose deleterious consequences on health by causing 
premature deaths and lifelong disabilities through disruption of economic and social 
infrastructure deployed to meet health needs, and the forced diversion of economic 
resources preferentially to defence instead of health (MacQueen and Santa-Barbara 
2000; Wossen 2011). Disease agents are invested with borderless potentials: they 
permeate social class boundaries and diffuse national and continental borders without 
let. 
Therefore, disease control efforts now occupy top priority in all societies and world 
leaders have in diverse ways and at different times acknowledged this 
interdependence in various declarative instruments. One such declaration is the 
recent Millennium Development Goals (UN 2000; WHO 2010a). The initiative 
encapsulated an unprecedented commitment by heads of governments to 
comprehensively address peace, security, development, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms the world over (UN 2000).While focusing on poverty 
reduction generally, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) embed a series of 
health goals. These are MDG4, which seeks a reduction of under-five mortality by 
two-thirds of 1990 level by 2015; MDG5, targeting a three-fourths reduction in 
maternal mortality levels of 1990 by 2015 and MDG6, which purposes to halting and 
begin reversing the rising prevalence of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other major 
disease no later than 2015. 
Evaluating progress made towards achieving the MDGs following a decade of 
implementation, world leaders unanimously expressed lack of satisfactory progress 
(UNDP 2011; WHO 2010a). They noted that majority of goals will not be met by 
2015 and that progress was unevenly distributed across countries and regions. The 
meeting especially observed that slow progress had been made towards some goals 
and indeed a few goals were on a regressive trajectory particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Congressional Research Services 2010; WHO 2010a). More recently, the 
UNDP (2013), has also reported progress in all health care dimensions of the MDGs, 
noting however insufficient gains in some other areas mostly in Africa. Two themes 
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dominated these related analyses, the notions of health systems weakness and 
constrained access to health care services.  
All countries at all levels of development are striving towards universal health care 
coverage as an end (Atun et al. 2013; Evans et al. 2012; McKee et al. 2013; Palmer 
2014; WHO 2011), with varying degrees of successes. Sub –Saharan Africa, which 
harbours about 25% of the world’s disease burden, is estimated to achieve only 5-
10% health care services coverage (WHO 2010b). This low population coverage of 
essential health care services also reflects Africa’s score card when viewed through 
the MDG benchmarks. This state of affairs has been attributed to health systems 
weakness of the component countries (WHO 2010b). In particular, Nigeria, Africa’s 
most populous and one of the most influential member country, continues to bear a 
heavy disease burden and serves a typical illustration.  
Assessing Nigeria’s health metrics against the MDGs benchmark one notes that the 
country has generally not made significant progress (FMOH 2013; WHO 2010a). 
Nigeria has under 5 mortality rate of 201per 1000 live births, which exceeds for 
example, the African average of 145/1000 live births (AWFO 2008; World Bank 
2012). This level is even higher than its own score on the same variable of 189 per 
1000 live birth in 2003 (WHO 2006b; WHO 2010a). The country has in real terms 
regressed on this target. Maternal mortality has not changed from its year 2000 value 
of 800 per 100,000 live births (UNDP 2013). That nothing has changed on this 
indicator despite the over ten years of implementation means that more has to be 
done in relation to MDG5. This also puts the country in the league of countries in the 
world with the largest number of maternal deaths, second only to India globally 
(UNFPA 2011).  Appraisal of progress on MDG6 reveals that the prevalence of HIV 
among adults age 15-49 is 3.7%, down from a level of 5.4% in 2000 (World Bank 
2012; WHO 2006b). However, less than 20% of infected patients are able to access 
antiretroviral medicines. In addition, tuberculosis has remained prevalent at 546 
cases per 100,000 of the population compared to 491 per 100,000 population in 2000 
(AHWO 2008; WHO 2010a). The country has not made clear progress with the non-
health related MGDs either. Taking MDG1, which seeks to eradicate poverty and 
hunger for example, Nigeria is categorised among countries that have made 
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insufficient-progress on the continent. The indicator for this goal reveals that 28.7% 
of her under-five population are moderately to severely malnourished (WHO 2010a). 
This value does not significantly deviate from year 2000 level of 29% (WHO 
2006b), and 26.7%, reported by the World Bank (2012) for 2008. 
This evidence supports the conclusions that Nigeria is not making a steady progress 
towards meeting the MDGs, which portends severe implications for its population 
health status by 2015. The irony of this low health sector score card is the rapid 
economic development that has occurred in the country over the same period 
examined. Economic development and by extension wealth, is the singular most 
important influence in health care provisioning (Musgrave et al. 2002). Since the 
1980s, oil production has grown in leaps and bounds and has attained commanding 
heights in Nigeria’s economic arena. To date oil sales account for more than two-
thirds of the gross domestic product and the resultant high profits provide over 80% 
of government’s total revenues (AHWO 2008). Similarly, the period 1999-2003, saw 
the government vigorously implement a policy of privatization of public enterprises, 
targeted at helping to create an enabling economic investment climate and yielding 
additional revenues for provision of social services (Zayyad 2007). This policy 
direction has led to improved performance of the domestic economy, as reflected in 
the steady rise in GDP from a level of 2.7% in 1999 to 5.3% currently and its 
subsequent re-classification as lower middle income country (World Bank 2013). 
Impact of this enhanced economic performance of the economy on health 
expenditure saw a nominally increased sectoral budgetary allocation, which 
marginally increased the health budget as percentage of national budget. Practically, 
this has seen the health budget increase from 3.2% to 4.1% of national budget in 
2003 and 2010 respectively (FMOH 2011). There is however, no empirical evidence 
to conclude that this additional budgetary allocation has impacted positively on the 
health status of Nigerians. Admittedly, the government had implicitly underscored 
this position, but stressing that the key obstacle to improved health outcomes in the 
country remains a weak health system incapable of sustaining adequate access to 
needed health care services for all Nigerians (FMOH 2011). Understanding the 
dynamic undercurrents that have shaped the country’s health landscape as profiled 
requires a detailed description of Nigeria, its population health status and the health 
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system development, from earliest available records to date and is undertaken in 
section1.2 below.  
 
1.2 Nigeria: Background information 
Nigeria is located between longitudes 40
o
 and 140
o
 north of the equator and latitude 
30
o
 and 140
o
 east of the Greenwich meridian. It is bounded in the north by Niger and 
Chad Republics, and sits on about 800 kilometre stretch of the Atlantic Ocean in the 
south. The Republics of Cameroun and Benin defines its eastern and western 
frontiers respectively. The country has an area of 923,768 square kilometres and a 
population of 140, 431, 790 million, projected to reach the 240 million mark by 
2015, at current growth rate of 3%. About 70% of this population is rural and 30% 
urban (National Population Commission 2006).  
 
Fig 1: Nigerian map showing key towns and international boundaries. Source: 
Google Maps. 
Nigeria is endowed with vast natural and human resources which have remained 
largely untapped. The major revenue earner is crude oil export, though about 70% of 
its population are rural farmers. The discovery of commercially viable deposits of 
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crude oil in 1970 marked a watershed in the economic life of the country, which 
ranks as the world’s sixth largest producer and to date it has raked about $340 billion 
in revenues (McKinsey 2010). This unique resource endowment has naturally 
conferred on Nigeria, a dominant advantage over and above its West African league 
of countries, accounting for over 50% share of the West African economy (Club du 
Sahel 2001), yet poverty still plagues about 50% of the population (World Bank 
2013).  
Similarly, these vast natural resource endowments have also not translated into a 
commensurate improvement in the health levels of the larger population. The 
country’s health care system remains weak and incapable of providing needed 
services (FMOH 2011; WHO 2008). This weakness has persisted despite five 
attempts to reform and realign the national health system towards enhanced 
productivity (Asuzu 2004). The health terrain is characterised by a heavy and 
increasing disease burden (old, new and re-emerging), and ill health remains 
widespread. The country has total health expenditure per capita of  US$80(World 
Bank 2013), which makes it one of the lowest in the world and over 95% of private  
health care purchasing is out-of-pocket type (World Bank 2013; WHO 2010c). This 
form of health care purchasing is known to impose catastrophic consequences on 
households. It is also unfair, inequitable and exclusive (World Bank 2006; WHO 
2010b). In this challenging circumstance, the poor and vulnerable have fared worse, 
bearing disproportionately high burden of the costs of health care (WHO 2010b). 
They thus have become the least healthy, with the most need, yet least able to access 
health services (O’Donnell 2007; WHO 2001; Castro-Leal et al. 2000; Filmer 2004). 
The gap between public supply of health services and the population’s needs for 
health care has resulted in a highly pluralistic health system, with private and non-
governmental organisations filling up the health services demand lacunae (Bloom et 
al. 2008; Bustreo 2003; Smith et al. 2004; Federal Government of Nigeria 2007a). 
Private health markets are a rising phenomenon in Nigeria (and across most of 
Africa)and are widely used even by the poor (Arnab et al. 2008). The private sector 
provides 80% of health care services in Nigeria (Federal Government of Nigeria 
2007a). The most basic unit (micro-anatomy) of the private health sector is 
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represented by individual medicine sellers and a particularly important 
pharmaceutical entrepreneur in this respect is the retail drug vendor, popularly 
referred to as patent medicine vendor who own and run static drug shops on profit 
basis.  These small non-prescription drug merchants have become important primary 
sources of most health care services in rural and even urban areas in Nigeria 
(Oladepo et al. 2005; Salako et al. 2001).  This general picture does not however 
account for how or why the health sector in Nigeria has developed in this way. 
Understanding these evolutionary trends in a clearer and systematic way mandates a 
historical analysis of the national health system development, which follows in the 
subsequent section. 
1.3 History of the Nigerian Health Sector 
This section undertakes a detailed historical review of development of the national 
health system in Nigeria. The period is chronologically divided into two distinct but 
naturally overlapping eras of colonial times and independence and self-
determination. Broad overviews of the relevant social, political and economic 
influences that combined to shape the health landscape of the country are 
highlighted, while key issues are explored in-depth. 
1.3.1 Pre-independence era 
This era spans the period beginning from the informal pre-colonial slave trading 
along the coastal areas (about middle of the nineteenth century), to independence in 
1960. 
Available documents argue that the arrival of Western type health care in Nigeria 
paralleled the advent of the slave trade in the 19
th
 century (Schram 1971). European 
slave masters included health personnel on board slave ships, who provided health 
care for their staff on board. The ship doctors offered exclusive services to expatriate 
ship staff and valuable commercial slaves held in transit fortresses along the Nigerian 
coast. The indigenous populations inhabiting these coastal areas were not allowed 
access to this orthodox health care. 
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The end of slave trade witnessed a burst of interest and influx of European religious 
missions and trading organizations into the coastal fringes of Nigeria. While the 
latter traded along the coastal areas, the missionaries ventured deeper into the 
hinterlands and along with proselytizing, built hospitals, clinics and dispensaries in 
their host communities. However, it was the pecuniary activities of European traders 
that caught the attention and interest of the Government in London, culminating in 
the establishment of formal colonial administration in Nigeria in 1861. With the 
unfolding of these events, came the formal commencement of a western-type health 
care system development in Nigeria: Missioners on one side and the Colonialists on 
the other. Colonial efforts to provide health care began in the coastal areas and 
specifically, the administrative epicentres of Lagos and Calabar. Access to the health 
services provided by the colonialists were for many years restricted to Europeans, 
and later expanded to incorporate African staff of European organizations, which 
contrasted the community focussed efforts of the Missionaries.  
Comparatively, both the missionaries and the colonial administration had 
conceptualized similar health services development strategy in colonial Nigeria: 
health care services following institutional interests of religious conversion and 
government respectively, but the latter being community focussed. Since the only 
possible portal into the country then was the sea, the coastal regions of Nigeria were 
first beneficiaries of this new health care paradigm.  
To provide needed health care services on a sustainable basis, both the missionaries 
and the colonial government required well trained workforce for the facilities that 
were being developed. Therefore, medically qualified mission staff members 
recruited and trained local people to run their health facilities and later went further 
to build several hospitals and institutions to formally train low skilled health related 
manpower, like nurses and paramedical personnel as health attendants, community 
health inspectors, laboratory staff and pharmacy assistants. 
The British colonial government which ventured into health care services in the 
twilight years of the 19
th
 century moved quite quickly in the early period of the 
administration to construct specialist health institutions to train its health manpower 
requirement. In the initial time however, it recruited and trained specialised cadres of 
9 
 
health personnel overseas to render services at its health institutions, which were 
located exclusively in cities. To meet the continuously growing manpower needs, 
training institutions (including teaching hospitals) were established to produce 
sufficient levels of the health workforce spectrum. A landmark addition to the 
evolving health system was the creation of the Ministry of Health in 1946, with the 
mandate to coordinate national health services throughout the country. The creation 
of the ministry was a fall out of the first colonial development plan of the 1940s. The 
national health system at this time had a unitary command structure, but by the 
1950s, it was reformed and decentralized to allow regional governments to run 
independent health services (Asuzu 2004). This remained the structure of the 
Nigerian health system up until independence on October 1, 1960. 
 Though the just over one hundred year period reviewed (1850s-1960) is sparsely 
documented, it is discernible that both the missionaries and the colonial government 
played complementary roles in establishing the initial health system, comprising a 
mix of public and private (non-governmental) elements. The pubic system was 
unitary at onset, but later decentralized to regional governments and located 
preferentially in major cities and the scope of services was narrow, mostly curative. 
The missionary health facilities and services were spatially closer to the people than 
those of the colonial government’s. Consequently, at independence, Nigeria inherited 
a national health system that was largely technocentric, urbanized and subsidiarized 
to the political economy of the colonial administration. The thesis will proceed to 
evaluate the subsequent development of this health system in post-colonial, 
independent Nigeria. 
1.3.2 Post-independence health system development 
Independence ushered in the imperatives of rapid social, political and economic 
development of the newly independent state. The paramount preoccupation of the 
nascent government therefore, was the articulation of a comprehensive growth and 
developmental ideology, capable of meeting the collective aspirations of all 
Nigerians. Beginning from 1962, the country formulated and implemented four 
yearly developmental plans (Anyanwu et al. 1997; Asuzu 2004), and by 1990, 
Nigeria had implemented four national development plans. Thereafter, the country 
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adopted a two yearly rolling plan, ending in 1999.  It has run a yearly fiscal policy 
regime since then. These plans failed to capture health system development 
encapsulated as distinctively cohesive agendas and hence acknowledgement of the 
central role of health in the economic development of the state. Few national health 
initiatives were formulated and implemented during this period and health care 
organization and management continued in the relics of the Western model of health 
care, anchored on costly technology approach and urbanized (Shcram 1971). Nigeria 
has maintained this pattern of public health system development into the present 
despite several reforms to create a more inclusive and effective health care system 
(Asuzu 2004 WHO 2008). The thesis will proceed to examine the administrative 
structure of the system, health laws and policies and conclude with a review of the 
health sector reforms, to better understand current health system weaknesses and to 
provide rationale and justification for this study. 
1.4 Administrative structure of Nigerian health system 
The Nigerian health system is pluralistic and organized along public and private 
pathways. Public health administration in Nigeria is undertaken by all tiers of 
governance; Federal, State and Local Governments. The constitutional and functional 
relationship between these tiers of government is implicit, but the federal 
government is responsible for overall national health policy formulation and 
provision of tertiary health services, state governments provide secondary care while 
local governments are saddled with the important task of delivering primary health 
care services (Federal Government of Nigeria 2007b; HERFON 2006). 
The private health sector is equally pluralistic, with non-governmental not- for- profit 
and for- profit private providers all actively engaged in health care delivery (Bloom 
et al 2008; Bustreo 2003; Smith et al. 2004). Collectively, the private sector provides 
about 80 % of health services (HERFON 2006). 
There exists an overarching national council on health care whose task is to 
streamline the activities of all actors in health and optimally channel their efforts to 
avoid duplication of interventions and waste of scarce health system resources. 
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Despite the establishment of this central coordinating mechanism, intra-sectoral 
collaboration and linkages have remained weak (Arah 2002; Asuzu 2004). 
1.4.1 Health laws and policies in Nigeria 
Despite the plural nature of the Nigerian health system, there has been no clear 
delineation of roles or responsibilities explicitly articulated in any of its three 
constitutions since independence.  The 1999 constitution is the currently operational 
version, and is in the process of a second amendment. Hopes have been expressed 
that the on-going amendment would incorporate the National Health bill pending 
presidential assent (Erinosho 2012). The bill addresses a range of health issues not 
covered in previous constitutions. Otherwise, in all versions of the constitution, 
health is always embedded within the ‘concurrent list’, implying that all three tiers of 
government be involved in health care planning and implementation, without 
specifying definite roles for each. Not placing particular levels of health care firmly 
under the responsibility of a particular arm of government has often resulted in 
redundancy, duplication and wastage of scarce health resources (Magnussen et al. 
2004). Exploiting the current constitutional flaws, the political leadership at all levels 
have often opted to fund and provide the politically more attractive higher level care, 
to the detriment of basic and essential primary health care delivered closest to the 
point of need 
Primary Health Care (PHC) formally commenced in Nigeria in 1986 as a 
comprehensive strategy to addressing the most basic health challenges of the 
country, particularly in rural areas. The implementation was underpinned by the 
tenets of the WHO model of primary health care (WHO 1978) and the 
implementation was highly successful in the early part, achieving up to 80% intended 
immunization coverage of under- 5s by 1990 for example, a feat yet to be surpassed 
to date (Pate 2010). However, this initial success was punctuated and the momentum 
to sustain it deflated in the mid-1990s, when international donor organizations, as 
key financiers of the policy-trust withdrew from the country due to the dictatorial 
posture of then military head of state, General Sani Abacha. At the advent of the 
current democratic dispensation on 29
th
 May 1999, primary health care in Nigeria 
was riddled with a range of challenges bordering on inadequate funding at one 
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extreme, to weak health information management system at the other. In between the 
spectrum lay poor and inadequate state of physical infrastructures, frequent stock-
outs of essential drugs and critical human resources shortages. This mix of 
limitations resulted in a situation of low to out-right non-utilization of primary health 
care facilities across the country, with most points of this level of care moribund 
(Asuzu 2007; Omoleke 2005). It has been decried that the current democratic 
governance seem to be doing little in the way of halting or reversing the decay, as 
resources meant for primary health services at local government areas continue to be 
misappropriated in other ways by officials at both state and local government levels 
(Asuzu 2007). However, the primary health care paradigm has remained the bedrock 
of virtually all health policy frameworks since then and in the present.     
1.4.2 Health sector reforms 
Health sector reform is a fundamental and sustained process of change in health 
policies led by government, focusing on the building blocks of the system and aimed 
at improving its workings and performance (WHO 1995). This should create new 
systems that offer accessible quality health care services equitably through cost-
effective approaches to achieve maximum population health outcomes. 
The period from 1960 to 1985 produced four national development plans, each 
embedding a national health development policy.  Although these policies were 
intended to position the health system for improved performance, they were 
premised on the thinking that massive investments in curative services and physician 
training were a most viable approach for achieving improved population health 
levels. For example, the 1975-1980 development plan captured this philosophy quite 
aptly in this manner, “…a shortage of doctors continues to be a major problem. 
While the target set by the World Health Organization (WHO) for this part of the 
world is a doctor/population ratio of 1:10,000, the current stock of doctors in the 
country has not significantly increased beyond the ratio of 1:22,000 recorded in 
1972. To achieve the WHO target, we need more than double the present number of 
doctors by 1980.” The same document goes further “…, steps will be taken in the 
plan period to undertaken accelerated expansion of medical colleges and the 
associated facilities for clinical training.” 
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This plan appears to over stress improving numerical strength of physicians and high 
level infrastructure development rather than a holistic national health system 
development that also incorporated primary and preventive health care. It would also 
appear naive to realistically attain the WHO’s physician density level referred to, 
within the ambit of the plan period, given that physician training requires longer 
years of education.  
 The fourth development plan of 1980-1985 differed from its predecessors and 
marked a watershed in the history of Nigerian health system development. The plan 
articulated for the first time, a framework for comprehensive health care services, 
embedding health promoting, preventive, restorative and rehabilitative strategies. 
The initiative was bound-up in the concept of Basic Health Service Scheme (BHSS), 
and sought to provide comprehensive health centres, primary health centres and 
health clinics at the community level. The functional relationship between these 
facilities was supervisory and complementary at the same time. The comprehensive 
health centres were meant to oversee and support the primary health centres, which 
in turn provided support to the health clinics. Promising as it looked, the programme 
was prematurely truncated by the military coup of 31
st
 December 1983, toppling the 
elected government that proposed it.  
The military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida (1984-1993) was the first 
to pragmatically demonstrate commitment towards a comprehensive primary health 
care delivery system. The administration crafted the fifth national health policy based 
on the principle of primary health care, incorporating explicit strategies that 
presented realistic scope for full integration and universal coverage of rural 
communities within the framework of the public health system. Adapted from the 
WHO template of Primary Health care services in 1988 (FMOH 1988), the model 
was seen as an attractive alternative approach to the delivery of public health care in 
ways that engendered equity in access to quality and affordable health services. 
Primary Health Care (PHC) emphasizes prevention and management of health 
problems in their natural social settings, in ways that meet people’s basic health care 
needs through comprehensive community based strategies rather than disease 
focused approaches (WHO 1978). It also envisions the deployment of clear strategies 
14 
 
that would respond equitably and effectively to basic health demands of people, 
while concurrently addressing social, economic and political causes of ill health. 
Underpinning the model is universal access, needs based service coverage and health 
inequity mitigation. Primary health care also stresses health promotion, disease 
control, community participation, self-reliance and partnerships (Tarimo and 
Webster, 1994). Even though the Nigerian model contained all these appealing 
elements, the policy failed to make the much desired difference in health status of 
rural citizens it primarily targeted. It suffered a major drawback reflected in the non-
mobilisation of the dominant private health sector which had being growing in size 
and mix over this historical period. This included the faith based organisations 
(Christian and Muslims), private organizations (profit and not-for-profit), and private 
individuals, including patent medicine vendors who from available data, could have 
been on the scene of health service provision as early as 1936 (PCN 2008) in its 
design and implementation (FMOH 2004).  
The lessons from the implementation of the fifth national health policy provided the 
appropriate experience for the sixth plan, with a focus on strengthening and 
repositioning the system for effective, efficient and equitable health care services 
provisioning (FMOH 2004). This revision of the national health policy in 2004 was 
rigorous and enriched by fresh perspectives from the important but previously 
neglected non-public actors. The generative process involved series of   review 
meetings from 1995 to 1997 and the production of a final policy document, which 
was endorsed by government in 2004.  A National Strategic Health Development 
plan (NSHDP) 2010-2015 detailing implementation guidance was also developed 
thereof to harmonize and align the activities of all implementing partners in order to 
achieve the overarching policy objectives of universal coverage with quality and 
affordable health care services (FMOH 2010). Though this policy was adopted in 
2004, the operational framework was only designed 6 years later in 2010 and after a 
year’s experience with it; the conclusion is that “Health indicators remain below 
acceptable levels at national and sub-national levels” (FMOH 2011). Although the 
review period might have been too soon to make any valid inferences, the conclusion 
of health system weakness as undermining government’s ability to attain targets was 
plausible given the historical deficits in the system the thesis has aptly demonstrated. 
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The review further recommended improved harnessing of all health care resources at 
the disposal of government (public and private) to improve health care access for all, 
especially for people in underserved area. 
Non state actors have been highly active in health and health care delivery in Nigeria 
right from the beginning of orthodox medicine in Nigeria as evidenced, although not 
optimally exploited by government. The missionaries were first to establish health 
clinics and dispensaries, before government responded to the challenge of health care 
provisioning and to date the private sector still looms large in the health arena 
(SHOPS Project 2012). It provides about 70% of health services and accounts for 
65% of total health expenditures, much of which is out-of-pocket expenses (NDHS 
2008; NHA 2003-2005; World Bank 2013). The dominant role of the private sector 
in health is further underscored by the pattern of health care utilization, as about 40% 
of individuals in the poorest wealth quintile purchase health care from private for-
profit providers (Arnab et al. 2008). Private health facilities cluster preponderantly in 
southern Nigeria relative to the north (Dutta 2009), and cover the gamut of tertiary, 
secondary and primary health care facilities, as well as pharmacies, patent medicine 
vendors, itinerant drug sellers and traditional practitioners. Also, the private-for-
profit facilities tend to locate in urban areas, where the willingness to pay for services 
is higher, even though 50% of the rural populace also use for-profit-private health 
facilities routinely (IFC 2008). The preference of facility based private health care 
providers to locate in urban centres has often left a rural gap which is readily filled 
by the smaller health entrepreneurs comprising patent and proprietary medicine 
vendors, itinerant drug sellers and traditional practitioners, however, the former 
appear more significant.  
1.4.3 The private health sector in Nigeria 
Even though the private health sector represented by the Christian missionaries were 
the first to introduce allopathic style health care delivery in Nigeria way back in the 
mid-19
th
 Century, it has enjoyed limited research. This has been attributed to rapid 
growth of public provision and the perception by policy makers of private actors as 
competitors rather than partners (Ogunbekun et al. 1999). Whilst public provision 
grew with expanding colonial activities, private institutional health services 
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maintained their dominance of the health care terrain up to independence in 1960. 
The public provision of health care grew even more rapidly in post independent 
Nigeria following the aggressive developmental drive of the new administration. 
Expectedly, greater public focus was paid to the evolving state, while the private 
health sector became ignored by the research community. Public health care 
development post-independence was not accorded its deserved importance and as 
such, public supply of health services never grew sufficiently to match demand for 
health services at any time during this time period. Then, the economic downturn and 
the structural adjustment programme of the mid 80s with its associated squeeze on 
public spending offered scope for another surge of activity of the private health 
actors on the health terrain and has remained critically important to this point. This 
development resulted in meteoric rise of the private health sector, with health care 
resources increasingly going to private health markets amidst deteriorating public 
supply. The private health sector in Nigeria which was uniquely institutional and 
faith based has gradually became pluralistic with private individuals and non-faith 
based organizations competing in the market and offering the whole range of 
possible health care services. The individual component ranged from full-fledged 
hospitals with ownership cutting across organizations, group practice and individuals 
to small entrepreneurial outlets exemplified by the patent medicine vendors   
1.4.4 Patent medicine vendors and their regulation 
Patent and Proprietary Medicine Vendors (more commonly referred to as patent 
medicine vendors) are non-pharmacists individuals licensed by Pharmacy Council of 
Nigeria to stock and sell simple over-the-counter medicines. They constitute an 
important component at the retail level of drug distribution chain in Nigeria, which 
also include pharmacists, general goods shops and itinerant vendors. 
Patent medicine vending is wide spread in Nigeria, legalized by the Pharmacy Board 
since the Poisons and Pharmacy Ordinance of 1936, to bridge the pharmacy human 
resource gap then, and has persisted to the present (PCN 2008). The regulation of the 
practice of patent medicine vending is undertaken jointly by the Pharmacy Council 
of Nigeria of Nigeria (PCN) and the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC). NAFDAC regulates the drug supply chain 
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from point of manufacture or importation to the last point where it reaches the final 
consumer. Its mandate is to ensure the quality and safety of pharmaceutical products 
in transit through the entire distribution channels. The Pharmacy Council is 
concerned principally with the practice of pharmacy in all its ramifications, which 
includes patent medicine vending under its purview. For patent medicine vendors, 
the Council sets practice standards, licensing requirements, inspection, supervision 
and enforcement of sanctions which are detailed out in a practice guideline (appendix 
1).This group of small pharmaceutical entrepreneurs are intended to leverage access 
to basic medicines in rural and underserved areas. Their scope of practice is however 
constrained to non-prescription drugs only (over-the-counter) and has simple key 
licensing requirements in ability to read and write English language, a minimum age 
of 21 years and clean, well ventilated business premises (PCN 2003). The drug stock 
restriction is displayed below. 
Patent medicine vendors have been shown to act as important sources of a wide 
range of health care services for both urban and rural areas in Nigeria (Oladepo et al. 
2007; Salako et al. 2001; Brieger 2002), and act as first point of consultation for an 
array of common diseases and services, such as fevers, diarrhoeas, acute respiratory 
diseases (pneumonias),  oral contraceptive devices and condoms  (Dutta et al. 2009; 
Oladepo et al. 2007; Oye-Adeniran et al. 2005; Omotade et al. 2000; Salako et al. 
2001). Particularly in the treatment of malaria, medicine vendors provide the vast 
majority (70%) of case management in Nigeria (ACTwatch 2013). In rural areas 
especially, consumers rely largely on the established network of patent medicine 
vendors for access to needed medicaments (Oladapo et al. 2007).  However, despite 
their rising profile and seeming importance, the market is said to be poorly regulated 
and fraught with unethical practices and regulatory infringements (Adiku 1996, 
Alubo 2001). 
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Table 1.1: Official list of drugs for patent medicine vendors  
1. Analgesics and Antipyretics   17. Disinfectants 
2. Antacids      18. Wound dressings 
3. Antidiarrhoeal drugs    19. Dusting powder 
4. Antidotes     20. Fungicides 
5. Anti-infective drugs    21. Inhalers 
6. Antipyretics     22. Keratoplastic drugs 
7. Antiseptic (throat) preparations   23. Keratolytic drugs 
8. Anthelmintics     24. Minerals and vitamins 
9. Antimalarials     25. Mouth washes 
10. Antiseptic and Disinfectant solutions   26. Non-specific (General) 
antidotes 
11. Anti-anaemia drugs    27. Nutritional drugs 
12. Anti pruritic and astringent drugs  28. Pediculicides 
13. Cold relief preparations    29. Purgative drugs 
14. Contraceptives     30. Rubefacients and 
inhalers 
15. Antiseptic soaps    31. Scabicides 
16. Cough relief preparations   32. Throat antiseptic 
preparations 
17. Dermatological(anti-infective) drugs   
 
Source: Pharmacist Council of Nigeria (2003) 
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The thesis now examines the structural composition of the Nigerian health system in 
comparison to the World Health Organization’s model for building, strengthening 
and sustenance of a robust health system (WHO 2007), so as to more clearly 
understand the inherent functional weaknesses in the system and isolate areas for 
potential policy interventions. The recipe presents a menu of six critical components 
of a health system which enables it to provide needed services, allows universal 
access to services and guarantees universal coverage of health care benefits as 
stipulated in the PHC Chatter.  
1.5 Nigerian Health System Assessment 
The WHO’s framework for evaluating a health system’s capacity to provide 
universal health coverage for the population balances a mix of health financing, 
leadership, health workforce and leadership and governance. Others are health 
information system, medical products and service delivery. These are analysed 
succinctly below. 
1.5.1 Health care financing in Nigeria 
Funding mechanisms are a good starting point of inquiry into a health system 
analysis: it provides insights to the relative size of the system and the role of 
government and therefore type of system, whether public or private (Blank and 
Burau 2007). Health financing is also a key determinant of access to care. Health 
financing function of a health system aims to collect funds to purchase health care. It 
also aims to provide financial risk protection and delivery of services fairly and 
equitably on a sustainable basis (WHO 2000). Sources of health care financing in 
Nigeria include government (including social health insurance), households, firms, 
private health insurance and international donor agencies. 
Government funding of the health system in Nigeria has been grossly inadequate, for 
example health has consistently received just about 5% of the national budget, which 
represents a far departure from the 15% level agreed upon by African heads of states 
in the Abuja declaration (FMOH 2000; WHO 2007). This level of health 
expenditures are relatively low compared with other African countries, for example, 
Tanzania, Malawi or South Africa who spend 6.8, 7.2 and 7.5 of their GDPs on 
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health (Soyibo 2005). A disaggregation of total health expenditure pattern shows that 
the public health component is 36.7%, while 63.3% is funded privately (World Bank 
2013). Intra-sectoral budgetary expenditure analysis reveals that about 70% of the 
budget is expended on personnel costs and just 30% is spent on provision of health 
care services. 70% of the health care services budget is allocated to secondary and 
tertiary level health services, leaving primary health care with just 30%, even though 
tertiary facilities cover less than 25% of the health problems of Nigerians (Anyene 
2012). Therefore, the opportunity for significant contribution to population health 
outcomes derivable from the proven primary health care approaches that yield 
greater public health outcomes is perpetually lost. Furthermore, an important 
determinant of health care access and health outcomes is the payment mechanism for 
services. The consensus is that price barrier lowers access and prepayment 
mechanisms improve health care access. About 70% of health service purchases in 
Nigeria are paid for by individuals in households, and this mode of payment for 
health has catastrophic impact on health care consumers (WHO 2012).  
The potential for financial protection for households offered through health insurance 
schemes is vitally important in determining health care access and appears grossly 
under-exploited in Nigeria. Private health insurance provides less than one percent 
coverage of the population and the national health insurance scheme was only 
recently launched in 2005. Together, they now cover about 4 % of the population 
financially (NIHS 2010). 
The decree establishing the Nigerian National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was 
enacted in 1999 by the military government of General Abdusalami Abubakar, but 
launched by President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2005, even though the idea of a public 
health insurance scheme for Nigeria had been muted way back in 1962 (Anyene 
2012). Currently, the scheme covers only Nigerians in the formal sector, and has 
about 4 million enrolees made up of federal civil servants and their dependants. This 
number of enrolments is only about 3 % of Nigerians meaning that only one in about 
30 persons in the population enjoys financial coverage when seeking health care. At 
this slow pace of progression, it looks impossible to cover all Nigerians by 2015, as 
targeted in its design. Regrettably, the NHIS does not yet cover the rural areas; 
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neither do the private health insurance providers. Therefore, the marginal impact of 
the scheme to improve health care financing remains unpredictable, and with the 
performance of the public financing system elaborated above, this new arrangement 
may probably entrench further inequity in the health system. 
Donor funding for health in Nigeria adds little (4%) to the overall health care 
expenditure, but has been on the increase since the advent of democratic governance 
in 1999. However, the impact of donor partner funding of health is unclear, due to 
fragmented coordination and implementation of programmes and interventions 
(National Planning Commission 2008).   
1.5.2 Human resources for health in Nigeria: the health workforce. 
At the heart of any health system is the stock of human capital and evidence has 
revealed a positive association between health worker numbers and their quality to 
improved health outcomes (WHO 2007; WHO 2006). Health workers function as 
gatekeepers in the health system and are pivotal to the efficient or wasteful 
deployment of health system resources. Nigeria has one of the largest human 
resource for health in Africa, surpassed only by South Africa and Egypt (WHO 
2006), with above average scores for both physician and nurse/midwife densities for 
Africa (WHO 2010c). Despite the impressive statistics, its population health levels 
remain one of the worst in sub-Saharan Africa (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2007b).  
Shortages of critical health professionals, inappropriate skill mix of health teams, 
mal-distribution of available work force, and persistent exodus of health 
professionals abroad and into the private sector as well as dual practice all stubbornly 
plague the system (WHO 2006; FMOH 2007a). Equally linked to the human 
resource for health dilemma is the production of health professionals out of 
alignment with the health care needs of the country, and limited capacity for health 
policy formulation and plan implementation (FMOH 2010).  According to the 
government of Nigeria, it has a doctor to population ration of 30 per 100,000 
populations which is greater than the African average of 15 doctors per 100,000 
populations and also boasts  of 100 nurses per 100,000 populations, compared to the 
African average of 72 (Federal government of Nigeria 2007a). These densities 
though consistent with those from the WHO (2006; 2010c), obscure inherent severe 
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mal-distribution of the workforce within the system: there is one doctor to four 
primary health clinics, five doctors to one secondary level facility and 62 doctors per 
tertiary level centre. This picture depicts that in Nigeria, doctors, pharmacists, nurses 
and laboratory scientists are concentrated more in urban areas where secondary and 
tertiary care facilities are located, than in rural primary health centres (Adetokumbo 
2005; WHO 2006). Mal-distribution of health personnel between the different states 
and regions of the country also exists. There seem to be no precise information 
related to the distribution of nurses and midwives and other cadres of health 
personnel across the range of health facilities in Nigeria.   
Inappropriate mix of health personnel production is another debacle of the system, 
evidenced by mismatch between need and supply of different cadre of health 
workforce. It occurs in the form of shortages of one category of staff or a surplus 
production of another. Dearth of critical competence in public health and health 
policy compounds the Nigerian context (HERFON 2006).  
The world economic recession of the 1980s and the reactive Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) that followed resulted in massive exodus of highly skilled health 
professionals from Nigeria to the West and Arabia. These locations are said to 
offered better pay packages, improved working conditions and prospects of career 
development. According to the government, these dynamics further mystified 
Nigeria’s health workforce puzzle (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004). It is argued 
that the Nigerian health workforce crisis will deepen as demand for health 
professionals will continue to escalate, driven by demographic and epidemiological 
transitions, the unfinished agendas of infectious diseases, health professional 
migration, HIV/AIDS epidemic and the imperatives of meeting the MDGs continue 
to impact the system (WHO 2006). 
1.5.3 Health system leadership and governance 
Health system leadership and governance also called stewardship, is said to be the 
most complex but a central building block of an effective health system (WHO 
2007). It defines the role of government in national health, specifying the relational 
interactions between all other entities whose activities influence health outcomes. 
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Functionally, this entails overseeing and directing the health system holistically by 
reconciling varied competing demands on limited health resources, in order to 
achieve public health goals. 
The two key health system functions of health financing and service provision 
require effective oversight and underpin the role and importance of health system 
governance. The Federal Ministry of Health plays a leading role in the overall 
management of health in Nigeria. This stewardship entails an oversight role in 
shaping, managing, regulating and controlling the diverse health system actors 
highlighted earlier in the chapter. The ministry also provides policy guidelines for all 
actors in the health care arena. However, as argued earlier, the government has not 
fully exerted its stewardship role especially with regards to coordination and 
productive engagement with the private sector. This sector is a major source of drugs 
and other medical commodities in addition to the provision of health care services. 
This weak functional relationship with the private sector has severely constrained the 
overall system performance as seen in inadequate health care access and poor health 
outcomes of Nigerians (Erinosho 2012). Other leadership challenges corruption, poor 
communication and enforcement of health policies, inadequate legal and 
constitutional framework for key policy thrusts and lack of health governance 
management capacity (FMOH 2004b). 
1.5.4 Health products and service delivery 
Good services delivery is a desirable objective for any health system working 
towards universal access. Crucial to successful service delivery are the contextual 
configuration and content of the services, but broadly, a well-functioning health 
system must be characterized by a network of service delivery points,  which have 
the following attributes; people centeredness, accessibility, comprehensiveness, 
continuity, coordination, accountability and efficiency (WHO 2013). Another 
desirable quality of successful service delivery is coherent approach where the first 
level of contact with the system is the driver of the entire health services delivery 
system (WHO 1978). For Nigeria, the primary health care facilities are much of the 
time comatose, or when functional, are inundated with challenges as erratic supplies 
and availability of drugs, tools, and health support infrastructures. Diagnostic and 
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investigative equipment at most facilities are out-dated and dilapidated. Logistics that 
get supplies of medicines, vaccines and technologies to where they are needed are 
poorly managed (Erinosho 2012). These have seriously eroded the trust of the public 
in primary health facilities and poorly utilize them. 
1.5.5 Health information system 
The role of accurate, up-to-date and robust information for policy and management 
decision making in any effective health system cannot be over stressed. Nigeria’s 
health information system is rudimentary and poorly developed, making reliable and 
timely information on health determinants, health levels and health systems scarce 
(Federal Government of Nigeria 2010; AHWO 2008).       
The chapter has chronicled the Nigerian health system beginning from the first 
arrival of the missioners and colonial government in about the mid ninth century to 
the present. The early structure of the health system consisted essentially of curative 
hospitals, clinics and dispensaries located mostly in administrative cities and around 
mission fields. Rural coverage with public health services was poor and preventive 
and primary health care was ignored. The post-colonial indigenous government 
towed the same model of high technology, curative and urban based health system 
development until 1986 when the primary health care was adopted as the blueprint 
for health system development in Nigeria and strategy to expand coverage of the 
farthest communities. The post-independence health system development era was 
especially dotted with multiple challenges, the continuum of which encompasses 
inadequate financing, inadequate and inappropriate work force, weak health system 
leadership, poor services delivery and a rudimentary health information system. The 
series of military coups and accompanying frequent leadership change also adding to 
the list as an important factor. These collectively have severely compromised the 
capacity of the system to provide Nigerians with full coverage of the population with 
effective, safe and affordable health care products and services. These failures have 
leveraged the emergence and rapid growth of private health markets to bridge the 
demand and supply gap in public supply. Today, health markets provide about 80% 
of health services and 70% of payments are out of pocket, putting the private sector 
at the centre stage of the Nigerian health care arena. Patent medicine vending is the 
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smallest recognised unit of the health market in Nigeria, with extensive network of 
providers across the country. They are hugely popular and patronized highly in urban 
and rural area and in the latter in particular, they are sometimes the only source of 
access to essential health care services.  
This review of the Nigerian health system has highlighted the inherent weakness of 
all its functional parts and the repeated attempts at its reformation and the intractable 
challenge of inadequate access to health care in Nigeria, particularly in rural areas so, 
the search for the right formula persists. 
1.6 Statement of the Problem 
Health is now viewed as a fundamental human right to existence and health care 
debates have become very sensitive and highly emotive issues among individuals and 
remain keenly contested agenda within political circles. 
In Nigeria, public health care access is inadequate and complemented by private 
health care markets. In this pluralistic health landscape, empirical evidence show that 
the non-governmental players are not only producing a larger share of the overall 
health system output and are in fact leveraging wider access to health care by reason 
of their geographical spread and networks across the country, in temporal 
functionality and availability terms (Barnes et al. 2008; SHOPS Project 2012; 
Ogunbekun et al. 1999).  
In particular, private-for-profit health care provisioning is wide spread and assuming 
increasingly important roles in the national health system. It has therefore been 
generally argued that for major shifts in population health gains to occur, 
governments must look beyond the public sector, and develop creatively functional 
collaborations with the private sector, which has the potential to deliver up to70% of 
needed health care capacity (FMOH 2006a; Mills et al. 2002; WHO 1998). This 
thinking has given rise to the on-going debate on strategic partnerships with private 
health care providers to strengthen the national health system and improve health 
access for a wider population (Bloom et al. 2008; Breiger et al. 2004; Palmer et al. 
2003; Centre for Global Development 2009). Patent medicine vending in particular 
has assumed distinctive importance in the Nigerian health market, due to their spread 
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to every nook and cranny of the country. They are a major and in some situations the 
sole source of health care for most rural and underserved communities (Duttta et al. 
2009; Salako et al. 2001; Breiger 2002; Oladepo et al. 2007; Omotade et al. 2000).  
Despite their rising profile and seeming importance, very little is known about this 
group of retail medical entrepreneurs and the market they operate in (Oladepo et al 
2007). A few studies and anecdotal evidence reveal deep rooted unethical practices, 
entrenched regulatory infringements and weak regulation and regulatory enforcement 
(Adikwu 1996; Alubo 2001; Breiger 2002). Widespread consumer dissatisfaction has 
also been reported. These studies were simple descriptions of observed phenomena 
which failed to explore interactions and therefore explain the main influences and 
their impact on observed market outcomes and their implications for health care 
access. The authors also failed to adopt the perspective of retailers and consumers as 
economic agents, facing a multiple of financial and non-financial choice sets and 
motivations. Therefore, the use of an economic framework to analyse this retail 
health market is essential for closing the knowledge gaps and gaining new useful 
insights into this market. Furthermore, even though regulation was described as 
notoriously inefficient, understanding the challenges of regulating retail drug shops 
was not systematically studied. This knowledge is critical if government is to design 
effective policies and develop actionable interventions that can expand access to 
effective, safe and essential medicines for patent medicine retail consumers, 
particularly in rural communities. 
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1.7 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study therefore is to analyse and understand a segment of the retail 
pharmaceutical market; the patent medicine vendors, in Katsina-Ala, a rural area in 
north central Nigeria and make policy recommendations to improve access to 
effective and safe health products in the market. 
 
Specific objectives are to: 
I. Describe and understand the organization of the pharmaceutical 
market which patent medicine vendors operate in. 
II. Understand the nature of competition in the market through analysis 
of market structure, price and non-price competitive strategies. 
III. Describe treatment seeking of drug consumers and evaluate the 
appropriateness of services purchased. 
IV. Identify inhibitions and facilitators to health care access and model 
the market. 
V. Make specific recommendations for regulatory interventions that will 
improve market performance and consequently, access to effective 
and safe services.   
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CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
Peer reviewed and unpublished literature was systematically searched guided by the 
thesis topic defined as an economic analysis of retail pharmaceutical market in 
Nigeria: Towards access expansion and policy. Published literature used was 
obtained from data bases as Science Direct, Scopus and PubMed, applying controlled 
vocabulary and key terms and limiting the review to studies published in English. 
Standard economics, health economics and health system related books were also 
consulted for relevant information. No time bounds were imposed because of the 
need for broad search strategy adopted. Unpublished materials used came from 
reports and documents of reputable and popular international organizations available 
on World Wide Web such as World Health Organization, World Bank, USAID, PSP-
one, ACTwatch and DFID. The bibliographies of selected articles were also 
examined for additional literature. 
Key search words were “patent medicine vendors”, “retail drug stores”, “drug 
shops”, “pharmaceuticals”, “self-medication” and “consumer behaviour”. On 
completion of the search and retrieval of information sources, article titles, their 
abstracts, introductions and conclusions were read and relevant sources selected 
based on specified criteria: Studies that evaluated the characteristics, behaviours and 
performances/outcomes in retail drug markets in sub-Saharan Africa; articles that 
investigated interventions to improve performance in retail drug market. Published 
literature that explored informal private providers in low and middle income 
countries, or that reported strategies for expanding access to healthcare or essential 
medicines were also included in the review. Economic theories related to markets, 
price theory, regulation and industrial organization reviewedwere culled from 
standard economic text books and provided the framework for data collection, 
analysis and discussion for the thesis. 
The review of related and relevant literature was organized along key concepts and 
themes that directly follow from economic theories and their supporting assumptions. 
The concepts and themes identified were guided broadly by the topic of this thesis 
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and specifically by the evaluative framework, which provided the basis for variable 
definitions and data collection approaches, as described in Chapter 3. It focuses on 
the relationship between market structure, provider conduct and consumer behaviour 
in determining health related outcomes in the market. These three concepts formed 
the core of the review, with each theme giving rise to sub-themes that are further 
reviewed in relation to standard economic theories that have explained these 
phenomena. Therefore, concepts as market structure, provider conduct, market 
concentration types and market failures have robust economic theoretical 
underpinnings. These formed the starting points for the review. 
Other thematic areas reviewed such as economic theories of government regulation 
and health care access where empirical literature presents different aspects of an 
issue, the divergent perspectives are compared and contrasted and the general utility 
of conclusions evaluated. 
Overall, sources of information reviewed fall under theory or empirical literature and 
the degree of fit with specific concepts or themes of the research topic and 
conceptual framework provided the basis for organising the literature under relevant 
categories. 
The history of voluntary exchange of goods and services between people through the 
market mechanism dates back many centuries, stretching from the era of trading by 
barter to modern use of currencies and other financial instruments as exchange 
media. Today, markets have been argued to provide the most efficient mechanism for 
allocating scarce resources, and governments throughout the world, now tend to rely 
on them to achieve socially desirable economic outcomes, through actions as 
privatization, deregulation, commercialization and re-regulation policies. 
Understanding the workings of markets therefore holds great potential for improving 
social welfare. There are two major approaches of understanding markets: 
descriptive approaches which provide general overviews of market organizations and 
the use of microeconomic theories of markets and price. These provide conceptual 
frameworks for analysing and explaining the dynamics of market interactions and 
quantifying solutions at the demand and supply interface.  
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The chapter is organized in three main sections: the first reviews the economic 
theories of markets and price and their impacts on market outcomes and also 
considers health care markets comparing and contrasting them with the classical free 
market. The second part examines the economic theory of governments and 
regulation, and the chapter ends with a review of the concept of health care access 
and provides a working definition of access for the thesis. 
2.2 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Model 
The model postulates a deterministic relationship between an industry’s market 
structure (the number of sellers and buyers, entry and exit barriers, product 
differentiation, vertical integration and growth rate of market demand), market 
conduct (advertising, research and development, pricing behaviour, plant investment, 
product choice, collusion, mergers and contracts), and market performance (prices, 
profits, efficiency, equity, product quality and technical progress and growth). It 
explicitly posits that the market structure under which a firm operates will determine 
its conduct (behaviour), and the firm behaviour will in turn influence the market 
performance (Clarke, 1985).  Markets therefore have been traditionally classified 
into four broad categories (perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition 
and oligopoly), according to the degree of competitiveness of firms in the industry, 
measured in terms of market Concentration and consequently market power over 
price. The varied forms of market concentration exhibit differentially discrete 
patterns of competition, ranging from the theoretically ideal least concentrated 
perfect competition to the most concentrated scenario of monopoly. Tucked in-
between these extremes are the relatively low concentrated monopolistic competition 
and the high concentrated oligopoly. These intermediate forms are sometimes 
collectively referred to as imperfect competition and the vast majority of markets in 
the real world fall under this broad category (Varian 2006). This notwithstanding, it 
is worthwhile understanding the two extreme forms of market organizations, because 
they serve as useful reference frameworks within which to explore real markets in 
action. In reality, some industries structurally align more towards perfect 
competition, while others incline more towards the monopoly model, generating 
market outcomes predicted by the competitive and monopolistic models respectively. 
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A detailed review of the range of market structures found in the economic literature 
on industrial organization and their predicted performances are presented (Clark 
1985; Martins 1999; Samuelson and Nordhaus 2001; Tirole 1985; Varian 1992; 
Varian 2006). 
2.2.1 Market Structure 
The main components of market structure are the number of firms in the market, 
which determines the market concentration, entry and exit barriers, product 
information characteristics and regulatory framework, which are reviewed further 
below. 
2.2.1.1 Market concentration 
Market concentration measures the number of firms in the market and their relative 
market sizes reported in terms of horizontal concentration or vertical integration 
(Clarke 1985). Low horizontally concentrated markets are competitive, while high 
concentrated markets are uncompetitive. A number of approaches have been used to 
measure horizontal concentration in the literature, but lots of empirical and 
methodological flaws have been associated with these approaches. A simple count of 
the number of sellers in a market place for example, fails to specify their relative 
market shares. Commonly used absolute measures of market concentration are the 
concentration ratio and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, both of which incorporate 
the number of sellers in the market and their relative market shares (Clarke 1985). 
Vertical integration describes the degree to which a firm is involved in the successive 
stages of production and distribution of its product. Integration has been categorized 
as backward (upstream) or forward (downstream) integration. In the former case, the 
firm gets involved in the production of its raw materials and other inputs, while 
forward integration refers to where a firm is involved in the distribution of its 
finished products as well.  
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2.2.1.2 Market entry and exit barriers 
Market entry barriers refer to any factors that allows firms in an industry to earn 
excess profit in perpetuity and which may disadvantage new entrants into the market. 
These may arise from cost advantages of incumbent firms to produce at lower 
average costs, significant economies of scale and product differentiation. Other 
barriers may include entry regulatory patents, licensures and permits (Djankov 
2002). Heavy capital investment may act as an exit barrier, because of potential huge 
losses arising from the re-sale of plant and machinery and consequently a deterrent to 
entry too.    
2.2.1.3 Product information characteristics 
The ability of consumers to judge the quality of a product has important implications 
for market competition. Goods have been broadly grouped as search, experience and 
credence goods (Nelson 1970). Search goods have to be inspected for quality before 
purchase is made, while experience goods on the other hand have to be firstly 
purchased before quality is judged. Credence goods are products that consumers 
have to rely on third party information to judge their quality, in which case providers 
often act as experts who determine consumer need for the product. The implication 
of experience and credence goods for competition is that where a consumer cannot 
observe quality, they are less responsive to quality signals and market failure occurs. 
2.2.1.4 Regulatory framework 
The array of market regulatory frameworks can be vast and include entry and exit 
regulations, product quality specifications, pricing policies, production process 
standards, conduct codes, taxes, subsidies and accreditations. The impact of 
regulation on market competitiveness depends on market structure, provider conduct 
and enforcement capacity. Generally public regulation aims at improving market 
efficiency for maximum social benefits (consumer protection). 
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2.3 Provider Conduct 
This represents all the activities of sellers to shape market outcomes or influence 
market structure, and the set of behaviours that are crucial to understanding market 
conduct include price fixing, product differentiation, imperfect agency, concentration 
enhancing practices and response to regulation. Their main features are reviewed and 
how they impact on competition is highlighted.  
2.3.1 Price fixing 
Price fixing is observed predominantly in imperfect markets, where providers have 
some market power and are therefore, able to set prices above their marginal costs of 
production. In perfect competitive markets, firms are not able to raise prices above 
marginal costs, because doing so results in customer losses. Strategies used to gain 
market power and consequently price sovereignty by providers include product 
differentiation, imperfect information relationships, entry barriers and collusion.  
Often prices are not explicitly calculated based on price elasticities of demand, but a 
reliance on rules of thumb, for example, mark-ups or copying the market price 
leader. Price sovereignty of dominant firms manifests in the form of discriminatory 
pricing strategy of either first, second or third degree. In first degree price 
discrimination, prices vary between units of output and also between individual 
buyers, while in second degree price discrimination, the price variation is observed 
only between units of the output. Third degree price discrimination occurs when the 
price of a product varies from one individual to another. 
2.3.2 Product differentiation 
This phenomenon is observed when consumers prefer one rival product over another 
due to their observable quality differences, ancillary services packages, or spatial 
segmentation. Product differentiations are product innovations that enhance a firm’s 
competitiveness and profitability and a product can be either horizontally or 
vertically differentiated. In a horizontally differentiated product market, consumers’ 
tastes determine product differences whereas in vertical differentiation, some product 
has more desirable qualities than others and there is general consensus among 
consumers concerning preference ordering. It has been argued that where quality 
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signals are difficult to observe, buyers may be more price sensitive and quality 
insensitive. Under this condition, at equilibrium, market quality of a product will be 
low and additional signalling by sellers may be needed to maintain quality in the 
market (Akerlof 1970). In professionally based markets for example, this may mean 
signalling via gaining additional qualifications or use of more sophisticated 
equipment and procedures. However, if buyers are price insensitive (for instance, 
insurance users), quality competition may emerge with over-investment in high 
technology equipment and other observable signals of quality. This has a tendency to 
drive up prices, against predictions of economic theory of a fall in price. 
Product advertising and promotional activities as a way of product differentiation 
may convey information to consumers which mitigates market power arising from 
product differentiation attributable to information asymmetry. In some cases the 
information asymmetry between providers and buyers is such that the former relies 
wholly on the latter for their demand and consumption decisions. This nature of 
principal-agent relationship may be economically exploited in situations to create 
and maintain Supplier Induced Demand and precipitate market inefficiency (McPake 
and Normand 2008).   
2.3.3 Market concentration enhancing strategies 
These sets of practices are aimed at increasing market concentration and market 
power and include such practices as mergers and acquisitions. They may also be 
driven by desires to reduce transaction costs, tax avoidance, guaranteeing product 
input supplies, securing output markets or barriers against new entrants. There can 
also be explicit collusion or implicit understanding between firms to limit price 
competition or the setting of production quotas. 
2.3.4 Provider response to regulation 
It has been argued that not all the time is government regulation focused on social 
welfare improvement as the process and implementation of rules have tended to be 
hijacked by private interests (Peltzman 1976). Regulation may thus work 
systematically to the advantage of vested interest, instead of general interest. In 
health markets for example, professional associations try to influence regulators to 
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tighten registration and licensing requirements of their professionals (Folland et al. 
2010). Approaches employed to influence regulation are lobbying, campaigns, 
litigation or through informal interactions, and in some cases deliberate information 
concealing.   
 The interplay of structural with conduct components of the market together create 
the nature of competition that characterizes it and defines its social performance, and 
these are discussed in the subsequent section. 
2.4 Types of Market Competition 
The spectrum of market competition embeds perfect, monopolistic, oligopolistic and 
pure monopoly variants. Their distinctive features are highlighted below. 
2.4.1 Perfect Competition 
The perfect competitive model of market structure is an idealized construct that is 
rarely seen in any real world market and derives on the following assumptions: 
1. Very large number of buyers and sellers in the market, so that no individual 
buyer or seller has dominant power over price 
2. The good is homogeneous, that is all producers are producing exactly the 
same good to the extent that product segmentation on the basis of difference 
between goods is nonexistent. 
3.  Perfect information on all relevant market variables as prices and qualities 
are available to all buyers and sellers. 
4. No entry or exit barriers are present. New entrants into the industry are not 
disadvantaged in any way, but face equivalent economic options as those 
already in the market. 
These assumptions ensure that the market equilibrium in the short run is represented 
by the intersection of the demand and supply curves. Under these assumptions of 
perfect competition, the demand curve facing the firm is flat horizontally, that is, 
perfectly elastic demand, and all the firms and buyers are price takers. Also, under 
these set of assumptions, the demand curve of the firm, its marginal revenue, as well 
as the current market price all converge at a point of equality. The profit maximizing 
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output for a competitive firm occurs when its marginal revenue (price) equals 
marginal cost.  
The free entry and exit assumption offers further insights into the workings of the 
perfectly competitive market model. Theory predicts that attractive short run profits 
of the market will stimulate new producers to enter the market. This will increase 
market supply and drive down market prices, persisting into the long run when prices 
would have fallen enough to eliminate all economic profits. In the competitive model 
therefore, the long run market equilibrium profits tend to zero, and prices will be at 
their lowest point. However, if economic barriers to entry exist which disadvantages 
new entrants into the industry, such as government regulations, licensures, patent 
rights, economies of scale and other restrictions, the self-adjustments in the market 
stated above would be impeded, and firms would earn economic profits in perpetuity. 
Under this situation, the market is not supported within the framework of perfect 
competition, even though the market prices are still determined by the forces of 
demand and supply. In evaluating a market structure therefore, it is important to 
establish the extent to which the basic assumptions of competition are satisfied. 
Generally, perfect competition is canvassed as producing socially desirable market 
outcomes and that the more perfectly competitive an industry is the better; this is on 
account of its unique ability to produce socially optimal levels of outputs at 
minimum average costs and firms making only normal profits. This form of market 
organization is therefore described as economically efficient. 
2.4.2 Monopoly 
Monopoly describes a situation where only one firm exists in an industry. This 
definition though simple, the actual classification of an industry as monopoly may 
not always be clear, depending on how broadly or narrowly it is defined. In the 
textile industry for example, a firm may have monopoly in the production of a type 
of fabric, but does not monopolize fabric production in general. It is therefore argued 
that the boundaries of an industry may be arbitrary and not bring much meaning in 
economic analysis as the firm’s market power does and considered more important in 
defining the concept. An industry’s monopoly power is dependent on the availability 
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of close substitutes produced by rival industries or firms, thus, a monopoly situation 
can be created and sustained only where rigid entry barriers exist. Some protective 
instruments in a monopolist’s arsenal may include economies of scale, economies of 
scope, product differentiation and brand loyalty, regulation and legislation. Other 
weapons the monopolist firm may deploy to its advantage are ownership or control 
over key inputs or outlets, mergers and takeovers, low cost advantage of established 
presence and aggressive pricing and advertising tactics.  
In some cases if a monopolist’s cost keeps declining up to the socially desirable 
output level this may create a market situation that is naturally not capable of 
supporting additional producers and a natural monopoly emerges. Under such 
scenario, theory postulates that new entrants will find the market unprofitable as the 
monopolist who is experiencing economies of scale can fix prices below the cost of 
the new entrant, thus forcing it out of the market. Similarly, a large firm producing a 
range of products, by sharing its strengths across its product lines, enjoys low costs 
and is able to make it difficult for mono-product new entrants to the market. Also, an 
established monopoly firm is more likely to have acquired particular competencies in 
production and marketing processes and may be better informed of the most efficient 
techniques, most reliable and cheapest sources of inputs and financing. These all add 
up to place the monopolist’s operating cost curve much lower relative to any new 
entrant attempting to embark on price competition. 
Other than these cost factors which sustain a monopoly structure, dominance over 
vital inputs, client preference for an inventor’s product even when the patent right 
has lapsed, legal patents, ability to absorb sustained losses, massive advertising, 
attractive after-sale services and product innovation are non-price strategies a 
monopolist can apply to further amplify and consolidate the status quo. 
The equilibrium price and quantity of the monopolist has implications for the 
individual consumer and society in general. Since there is a single firm in the market, 
the firm’s demand curve corresponds to the industry demand curve, and theory 
predicts that the demand curve is relatively inelastic. This confers power on the 
monopolist over market price to the detriment of the consumers and is referred to as 
price setter. Whilst still constrained by the demand curve, the monopolist is still able 
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to choose what price to charge on his product and demand will respond inversely to 
price increases. In the short run, a monopolist maximizes supernormal profit where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, which are not competed for in the long run 
due to barriers to entry. 
It is intuitive that the monopolist will produce different output at quite different price 
from the competitive firm, because they each face a distinctively different 
environment. However, given the assumptions of identical costs and demand curves 
for both monopoly and perfect competition, the latter would produce a higher level 
of output at a lower price at any given point. Therefore, all things being equal, 
perfect competition better serves the consumer than monopoly does. Under perfect 
competition, a firm’s long run survival hinges substantially on adopting the most 
efficient technologies and potential innovations, while the monopoly firm is hemmed 
in on all sides by protective barriers and guaranteed supernormal profits in 
perpetuity, even if it does not use the most efficient techniques. It has been argued 
therefore that, the monopolist has less incentive for being efficient and it incurs a 
higher cost of production than the firm in a competitive environment. On the other 
hand, it has also been debated that monopolies may in fact achieve significant 
economies of scale due to their large plant size, centralized administration and 
elimination of redundancy that results from duplication. Furthermore, a monopoly 
has a greater capability to become efficient than a small firm, by investing its 
supernormal profits into research and development activities. 
2.4.3 The Theory of contestable markets 
Economists now argue that another important consideration in determining price and 
output behaviour in a market is not whether an industry is indeed a competitive firm 
or a factual monopoly, but if a real potential for competition exists (Baumol 1982). 
In other words, the threat of competition alone is a sufficient condition to cause a 
monopoly firm for instance to behave in much the same way as a competitive firm 
would. Embedded in the theory of contestable markets is the concept of perfectly 
contestable markets, representing a market situation when entry and exit costs for 
potential entrants are zero or when such entry may occur quite rapidly. The theory 
predicts that the supernormal profits of monopoly should act to attract new firms and 
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drive down profits, so the sheer threat of this possibility the theory argues, will 
compel the monopoly firm to keep prices down to just make normal profits, taking 
advantage of economies of scale and technical progress to be efficient. If this does 
not occur, potential competition will assume actual competition in the sense of entry 
occurring, but costless exit is a critical factor in determining firm entry in a 
monopolistic industry. Contestability of a market may therefore be as important as 
actual competition in shaping firm price and output strategy to favour consumer 
interest. 
2.4.4 Imperfect market competition 
Beyond perfect competition, the rest of market organizations can be viewed as a set 
of heterogeneous structures characterized by variable ability to exert market power 
over market prices by individual firms, differing only to what extent.  In practical 
terms, very few markets can clearly be placed within the fringes of the perfectly 
competitive or monopoly models. Most markets lie between these extremes, 
constituting the transition zone of imperfect competition. It comprises monopolistic 
competition and oligopoly and their sublime variants and the key components are 
discussed in further details.    
2.4.4.1 Monopolistic competition 
Monopolistic competition is best understood as a situation where many firms are 
competing, but each firm employs discretionary pricing strategy, that is, each firm 
has some degree of market power. Monopolistic competition is located nearer the 
perfectively competitive end of the market structural continuum, and conceptually 
also, shares the assumptions of independence and free entry of firms as in the 
competitive model. It detracts from the perfect paradigm however, only to the extent 
that each firm produces an output that differs somehow from rival firms. This 
strategy of product differentiation leverages a particular firm to charge its unique 
price without losing all its clients. In this sense, it approximates monopoly behaviour. 
Because this market organization incorporates large numbers of firms, the firm and 
industry confronts a downward sloping demand curve that is relatively elastic. 
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In the short run, profit maximization output occurs where marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue, in a similar manner as obtains in any other market structure. Just 
as with prefect competition, monopolistically competitive firms are also able to make 
supernormal profits in the short term. These profits are dependent on the strength of 
demand for the firm’s output: the further to the right the demand curve is relative to 
the total average cost curve of the firm, the greater are the profits. In the long run, the 
entry phenomena of new firms perpetually lower profits until normal profits are 
attained and maintained as the long run equilibrium. This is because at this point, the 
firm’s demand curve is tangent to the lowest point of the U-shaped long run average 
cost curve. 
The static demand and supply, equilibrium output and price analysis described above 
do not incorporate the full range of decision options the profit maximizing firm under 
monopolistic competition faces practically. It will also need to preoccupy itself with 
the scope of products to produce and the extent of advertising expenditure, which 
together form the basis of the firm’s non-price competitive behaviour in the market.  
The concept of non-price competition incorporates product development and 
advertising activities of a firm. Product development aims at creating products that 
will appeal to many consumers and differ from rival products, by targeting products 
that will have inelastic demand due to absence of close substitutes. In a service 
industry, product development embraces provision of services that are better and/or 
at least different from others and may take the form of provision of personal services, 
long opening hours, or stocking particular product lines. Advertising informs people 
of the existence and availability of a product as well as attempting to persuade them 
to make actual purchases of the product by stressing its specific qualities over rival 
products. This way, the firm intends to improve sales and make its demand curve less 
elastic. 
The social implication of monopolistic competition is that it results in inefficient 
allocation of societal resources by producing less at higher cost and prices, relative to 
perfect competition. Firms under monopolistic competition can therefore become 
more efficient by moving to a lower point on their long run average cost curves. That 
monopolistically competitive firms can be more efficient through higher output 
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levels suggests they possess excess capacity. A firm in this market faces a downward 
sloping demand curve which can still be highly elastic because of the large number 
of substitutes in the market. This may benefit the consumer by presenting a wide 
variety of substitute products to exercise the power of choice. Supernormal profits in 
this market also dissipates in the long run as prices fall and firms produce at 
minimum efficiency scale, with associated welfare improvement.    
2.4.4.2 Oligopoly   
An oligopoly market structure represents a situation where there are a number of 
competing firms in the market, but not in large enough numbers to regard each firm 
as having negligible effect on price. Consequently, a few firms become dominant 
firms in the industry.  
Under oligopoly settings, there are significant differences in the structure of 
industries and correspondingly there are also an array of ways in which firms may 
behave, for example, firms may produce almost identical products like metals, 
chemicals, sugar, petrol and so on, but most of the time they produce differentiated 
products and much of the competition then hinges on brand marketing. While there is 
no one grand model of oligopoly observable in much of the world, there are however 
remarkable commonalities. These peculiar features of oligopolies are the existence of 
entry barriers which vary from relatively easy to virtual impossibility and strategic 
firm interaction within an industry. 
Strategic firm interaction under oligopoly underscores the fact that with only few 
firms in an industry, each firm will naturally take interest in the actions or inactions 
of the other firms. This means their behaviours are mutually dependent or 
interdependent: a change in any of the key dimensions of competition (price, product 
specification, and advertising) by one firm in the industry will affect sales of rival 
firms, who will in turn respond by modifying their strategies also. In these conditions 
therefore, it is difficult to predict with reasonable certainty the market performance 
of say a particular firm’s change in price without making assumptions about the 
reactions of its rivals at the same time. Different assumptions will yield different 
strategies and this explains the lack of one grand model of oligopoly. 
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The key oligopolistic features of entry blockade and interdependence may guide 
oligopoly firms along two dichotomously antagonistic pathways of collusion or 
competition, subject to specific circumstances. Drawing on their interdependence, 
firms may club together and cooperatively act as monopolies to maximize industry 
profits. Alternatively, they could choose to betray each other and compete ruthlessly 
to gain larger share of the overall industry profits. The following section examines in 
detail both forms of oligopoly, firstly collusive and then non-collusive oligopolies. 
I. Collusive oligopoly 
Any competitive strategy embarked upon by an oligopolistic industry always drags 
total industry profits in the downward direction. Firms in an oligopoly environment 
may therefore agree on prices, market share and advertising expenditures to 
minimize the uncertainty they individually encounter and increase overall industry 
profits. Such arrangements manifest expressly as formal collusive agreements called 
cartels or as sublime tacit collusion. Cartel formation effectively transforms an 
oligopoly into a monopoly, setting price and output levels and divide the market 
between its members. This sort of market collusion is also called a cooperative game. 
In most countries, cartels have been legislated against, because they have come to be 
understood as not serving public interest. However the giant oil cartel, Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), illustrates well the challenges of 
collusion and understanding why we see so little of collusion in industries where one 
would otherwise expect more of it. 
Profit maximizing Cartel operation requires getting all members to co-operatively 
produce a fixed output level. Following this is getting the firms to agree on the two 
related issues of setting output quotas and a profit sharing algorithm. Typically, 
every firm desires as large a share of the revenues as possible and so there is the 
constant incentive for each firm to exceed its production quota. OPEC finds itself in 
this dilemma. OPEC does not have an effective quota enforcement mechanism in 
place and in particular, no way exists of stopping an erring member from dumping 
more than its quota into the oil market. So nearly all its members are said to cheat on 
quotas and almost all countries overproduce, motivated by the drive to earn more 
money. The outcome of these unregulated behaviours of individual countries is that 
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oil is over produced and prices driven downwards, well below that which the 
countries would have received had they stuck with their quota allotments. OPEC has 
experienced occasional success as a cartel, only when Saudi Arabia, the dominant 
country in the lot, threatens to flood the market with its excess capacity, if members 
continue to breach quota ceilings. 
Therefore, cartels innately have mutually incompatible properties: They act co-
ordinately to create monopoly profits and at the same time provide strong perverse 
incentives for firms to cheat, thereby eroding the effectiveness of the cartel.  
Even though open collusion is unlawful in most countries of the world, firms may 
tacitly collude by either watching each other’s prices or following in a similar way, 
or the firms may tacitly avoid price wars and/or aggressive retaliatory advertising. 
Tacit price collusion is expressed in two forms; the dominant firm price approach, 
where the largest firm in the industry sets its price and the remaining firms simply 
follow and the barometric firm price approach. In the latter case, the price leader is 
the firm that has had the best predictions of market conditions in the past. In practice 
however, any firm may take the initiative to increase its prices and the other firms 
who may only just be waiting for one firm to take the lead, especially where costs 
have risen, to act quickly by keeping theirs similar.  An alternative to the price 
leadership approach highlighted is the tacit adoption of a simple rule of thumb that 
guides every firm. Under this arrangement, firms simply add a certain percentage as 
profit on average cost price. For example, if average costs rise by a certain per cent, 
prices will automatically be raised by the same per cent. The policy is particularly 
useful during periods of inflation, when all firms may be experiencing similar cost 
movements. Another approach to the use of rules of thumb is in establishing price 
benchmarks. When production costs increase, all firms just raise their prices to the 
next benchmark.  
II. Non-Collusive Oligopoly  
Collusions may crash sometimes because of lack of an enforcer of quotas or price 
agreements, or firms just choose to compete from the outset. In such case, each has 
to make assumptions about other firms’ prices and quantities in order to make a 
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sensible decision of its own strategy. This interaction approximates a simultaneous 
game situation, where a firm takes account of its rivals’ likely response while 
considering their own strategy. The vast range of non-collusive oligopoly models 
mirror the rich array of interrelationships observed under competitive oligopolies. 
Three best known models based on differential assumptions of rivals’ decision 
parameters occur in economic literature and are reviewed below. 
 The Cournot Model 
Under the Cournot model, the simplified case of a duopoly is considered. This model 
permits us to capture the key characteristics of strategic firm interactions, excluding 
the details that complicate models with a larger number of firms. Also, the model 
limits its analysis to firms producing identical products as a way to avoiding the 
issues associated with product differentiation, thus allowing a focus purely on 
strategic firm interactions. The defining assumption of the model is that the rival 
would produce a particular quantity of output, given a stable past production history 
and similarly a stable market environment. Then, the strategic task for the oligopolist 
is the optimal choice of its own price and output in view of the forecasted output of 
the competitor. The Cournot equilibrium is attained where each firm finds its 
prediction about the other firm confirmed. The model predicts lower industry profits 
relative to a monopoly or cartel (because of lower prices in duopoly), but higher 
profits compared to perfect competition. 
 The Bertrand Model 
In the Cournot model described above, it is assumed that firms picked the quantities 
to produce and let the market to determine the prices. In the Bertrand competition 
model, the oligopolist fixes the price and lets the market determine the quantity to 
produce. It posits that an oligopolist would assume a fixed price on the part of its 
rival and then determine its own price and quantity. The model which also fits 
oligopolies with more than two firms, predicts an outcome of intense price 
competition between the firms until all supernormal profits are competed away. This 
turns out that the Bertrand equilibrium is in a way similar to the competitive 
equilibrium, where the price must equate marginal cost, a curious conclusion in an 
45 
 
oligopoly situation. The outcome of such a price competition among firms that 
cannot collude may thus result in much lower prices than can be obtained through 
any other means.  
The equilibrium outcome in both the Cournot and Bertrand models is not in the best 
interest of the participating firms. Under each of the models, industry profits are 
lower than under monopoly or cartel. The equilibrium of these strategic interactions 
is jointly referred to as the Nash equilibrium. 
 The kinked demand curve model 
This theory is perhaps the most popular of all the oligopoly theories, and explains 
why prices remain stable even when there is no collusion between oligopolies. The 
theory has two asymmetrical assumptions at its roots: if one oligopolist firm cuts its 
price, its competitor will match the cut to stem the loss of customers to its opponent, 
but a price hike by one, on the contrary, fails to cause a similar response in the 
competing firm, which keeps its price static. On the basis of these assumptions, the 
theory argues that at any given point in time, attempt by one firm to raise price will 
induce consumers to switch patronage to the rival whose prices become relatively 
cheaper. This realization will cause this firm to be reluctant about a price rise. That is 
to say the firm faces an elastic demand curve at current price level. On the contrary, a 
fall in price will only cause a modest increase in sales, since the other firm will also 
cut it price too, and is unlikely to lose its clientele. A firm therefore, will be less 
inclined to lower its present price, as it encounters a relatively inelastic demand 
situation below the current price. Overall, each oligopolist encounters a kinked 
demand curve at current price and output, thus keeping price stabilized, despite 
incidence of considerable cost changes at any point. 
The equilibrium implications of the numerous models of strategic firm interactions 
under oligopoly and depicted by quantity leadership (Stackelberg competition), price 
leadership, simultaneous quantity setting (Cournot competition), simultaneous price 
setting (Bertrand competition) and the collusive solution vary widely. In comparative 
terms, at one end, the Bertrand model predicts a perfectly competitive price outcome, 
with highest output and lowest price, while at the other extreme of the range 
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successful collusion yields the lowest industry output and the highest prices. In 
between this range, the Cournot and Dominant firm price leadership models predict 
equilibrium prices somewhat in the middle, while the kinked demand model 
postulates that existing prices will tend to remain rigid. These market performances 
suggest that a regulator’s task of choosing an optimal strategy to regulate a market 
should reflect a fit of empirical facts to the theoretical underpinnings, not just how 
good a theory appears.  
The large numbers of market structures and an equally expansive array of provider 
conduct can often lead to complex conditions that may precipitate significant market 
failures and providing justification for government intervention in markets. Section 
2.5therefore examines market failures in details, while the aspect of regulation is 
explored in-depth in section 2.6. 
2.5 Market Failures 
Free markets are theoretically the best ways of allocating scarce resources for 
society. In the real world however, markets seldom achieve this objective, and poor 
access to health care, environmental pollution, traffic congestion on roads, littered 
streets and the poor quality of products we sometimes buy exemplify cases of market 
failure which confront societies. These also depict situations of failure of markets to 
attain socially optimal allocation of economic resources in an economy and have 
been attributed to such influences as information asymmetry, consumption 
externalities, monopoly power and slow response of markets to demand and supply 
changes. 
2.5.1 Information asymmetry 
Classically, perfect competition assumes that all market actors have complete 
knowledge of costs and prices and quality, and consumers are best makers of their 
own choices. However, considerable degree of ignorance and uncertainty occur in 
the real world of markets and consumers are not always able to know when marginal 
benefits equal marginal costs in the context of their individual utility function. For 
many goods, consumers make purchases once or a few times in a life time and are 
often ignorant of their qualities until afterwards by which time it is too late. 
47 
 
Deliberate advertorial misinformation by producers may contribute to poor consumer 
judgment of the benefits of a good. Similarly, firms may be poorly informed about 
market opportunities, costs, prices and labour productivity among other production 
variables. Therefore, many microeconomic decisions are premised on expected 
future conditions with accompanying uncertainties, and hence the critical importance 
of the value of full information for rational decision making.       
That firms and consumers may neither have perfection information about products 
nor have the capacity to judge the reliability of information they may obtain in the 
course of pursuing their self-interest, gives rise to the problem of dependence, which 
is embedded under the broader concept of the principal–agent relationship. The 
concept argues that people, referred to as principals, have to engage agents to carry 
out their wishes. It is assumed that the agent has specialist knowledge which the 
principal exploits to save him time and effort. The principal-agent relationship is 
innately ‘hazardous’ in the sense that the well informed agent may well not act in the 
overall best interest of the principal. To minimize this problem, the principal must 
devise a mechanism for monitoring the agent or the principal must attempt to modify 
the agent’s behaviour to serve his interest by including appropriate incentives in the 
agent’s contract. 
Under perfect competition, principals and agents are more likely to be mutually 
aligned, as managers risk their jobs if they fail to manage their firms efficiently to 
survive in the competitive market environment. Imperfect markets (monopolies and 
oligopolies) which are characterized by supernormal profits provide perverse 
conditions where the principals and agents interest may diverge, and an appropriate 
incentive mechanism may serve well to bridge the gap. 
2.5.2 Externalities 
Externalities are costs or benefits incident on other people not directly involved in a 
production or consumption activity.  Whenever other people are affected in a 
beneficial way, there are said to be positive externalities and if the impact is an 
adverse one, there are said to be negative externalities. So, we speak of the social 
cost of production of any good or service in terms of the sum of private cost faced by 
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firms and any externalities (positive or negative) of production. Likewise, the full 
benefit to society of consumption comprises the sum of the two elements of private 
benefit and any externalities of consumption (positive or negative). When a chemical 
plant dumps its waste into a river or emits noxious gases into the atmosphere, the 
community bears additional cost to those borne by the firm: in this case, marginal 
social costs exceed private marginal cost. In another way, when a forest company 
plants new woodland, it yields benefits not only to the company, but the community 
benefits through a reduction in atmospheric carbon dioxide. Under this scenario, 
marginal social benefit exceeds marginal private benefit. Negative externalities of 
consumption occur where for example people use their cars and other people suffer 
from their exhaust, the effects on other people of noisy radios in public places, 
cigarette smoke and litter. The marginal social benefit of a person consuming a good 
is less than the marginal private benefit enjoyed. External benefits of consumption 
happens in instances of rail travel for example, where marginal social benefit is 
greater than the marginal private benefit to the rail passenger relating to less 
congestion on the roads, less exhaust and fewer accidents. More examples include 
the beneficial effects for others of deodorants, vaccinations and attractive clothing. 
The presence of external costs and benefits associated with the twin economic 
activities of production and consumption has profound implications for markets: 
where there are external benefits, too little will be produced or consumed of the good 
or service and on the flip side, whenever external costs occur, too much will either be 
produced or consumed. Either way, the market will fail and marginal social benefits 
will not equate to marginal social costs.   
2.5.3 Monopoly power 
All imperfect markets will fail to attain the state where marginal social benefits equal 
marginal social costs, even if externalities do not occur. This is because they do not 
produce at the socially optimal level so as to make supernormal profits. This 
weakness most characterizes monopoly and imperfect market organizations and 
typically generates the deadweight welfare loss phenomenon (a net loss in total 
surplus). 
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2.5.4 Slow response of markets to changes in demand and supply 
The property of immobility of factors of production and therefore time lags in 
response to changes in demand and supply makes markets incapable of producing at 
socially optimal levels. Labour for instance, may be so immobile occupationally and 
geographically in the short run that changes in market equilibrium prices and 
quantities never really get to settle down before further changes in demand and 
supply conditions happen again. The consequence is a series of cascading changes 
which places the economy under constant state of disequilibrium. Firms and 
consumers keep adjusting in response to market signals and moving towards an 
elusive equilibrium point that never produces the socially optimal output in what has 
been referred to as the cobweb phenomenon (Rosen et al. 1994).  
Market failure can be said to be an inevitable feature of all real world markets and 
provides the only condition under which all economists have consensus opinion for 
government intervention in the market, and the thesis will considers the role of 
regulation in correcting market failures next.  
2.6 Economic Theory of Government Regulation 
Regulation may be defined generally as the continuum of legislative and regulatory 
oversight over a system and regulatory instruments used in economic regulation have 
broadly been classified as market enhancing and market displacing strategies (Rice et 
al. 2000). There are two main theories of regulation found in economic literature: the 
public interest theory which argues that government actions aim at consumer 
protection and achieving optimal wellbeing across the population and the private 
interest theory (also called public choice theory), which tows the contrast path. Both 
are presented in their details in section 2.6.1. 
2.6.1 Public Interest Theory of Regulation 
Microeconomic theory prescribes justification for government intervention in 
markets only on account of market failure, and for the purpose of improving market 
performance and efficiency. Potential means of intervention include use of economic 
instruments such as taxes, or deploying regulatory standards and sanctions. 
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Assumptions that underpin this theory are; existence of market failure, regulators that 
have sufficient information and capacity to optimally promote public interest and 
regulators that are benevolent individuals pursuing public good (den Hertog 
2010).This theory has been criticized because it focuses on achieving equity 
objectives other than economic efficiency (Joskwo and Noll 1981). It has also been 
pointed out that when regulation is used for equity purposes, the evaluation of social 
efficiency is difficult because of lack of general standards of justice. This has 
rendered the empirical testing of public interest theory of regulation difficult, so most 
studies have concentrated on their effectiveness rather than their efficiency (Joskwo 
and Noll 1981). The theory has come under criticism also for failure to specify how 
the various actors in the political process interact to maximize economic welfare 
(Posner 1974). Furthermore, it does not appear to make predictions that can be tested 
empirically (Stigler 1971). Hence, most mainstream economists are critical of the 
public interest theory of regulation (den Hertog 2010).      
2.6.2 Private interest theory of regulation (Public choice theory) 
Another tradition of regulation reasons that governments have political interests 
other than public interest to pursue, which vested private interest groups capitalize on 
to influence government policies in their favour (Stigler 1971). Therefore, political 
decisions tend to sway in relation to the electoral importance of the diverse interest 
groups in terms of weights of their votes and financial and non-financial 
contributions to the electoral process. Understanding these political behaviours in an 
economic perspective forms the core of economic theory of regulation (Peltzman 
1989). The theory conceptualized regulation as marketable, where demand comes 
from interest groups to enhance their wellbeing and supply comes from the 
government seeking to maximize political support or other private interest. Under 
these assumptions, the theory argues that regulation may not necessarily arise from 
market failure and need to protect public interest, but as a result of the interplay of 
the private interests of pressure groups and government regulators, with the latter 
demanding and often capturing regulation from the former.  Governments can restrict 
or ban entries, grant exemptions and subsidies, maintain price floors, or restrict use 
of substitutes and support for complements. Under group dynamics for regulatory 
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capture, the theory explains that smaller groups have comparative advantages over 
larger ones, because they are cheaper to organize, free-riding is minimized and from 
expected benefits, the average revenue per member is larger. The theory concludes 
therefore that regulation is not targeted at correcting market failure, but favouring 
firms in return for political support or other private interest of regulators. 
The application of both approaches around the world is varied. A lack of consensus 
over explanatory dominance in practice between the two theories has been reported 
in economic literature (Tanguayet et al. 2004). Both theories thus enjoy widespread 
acceptance in the areas of industrial organization and public choice discourse and 
practice, and will provide a basis for evaluative insights of regulatory policies and 
strategies in this study. 
The thesis will shift focus to a review of health care markets in the context of the 
generic market structures and price perspectives discussed above, highlighting their 
similarities and differences   
2.7 Health Care Markets 
The efficiency of markets in dealing with the social issues of production and 
consumption has been proposed by economists since the times of Adam Smith 
(Wells et al., 2007) and reviewed above. Health markets serve the same purpose and 
just as conventional markets often fail to deliver socially optimal outcomes, health 
care production and distribution poses particularly acute problems for the market 
mechanism also. Health markets display a range of peculiar distortionary properties: 
they are often concentrated and organized professional association regulation may 
bar members from engaging in competition (Arrow 1963; Detsky 1978; Feldstein 
1973).In terms of differences from the competitive model of free markets, where 
firm owners are assumed to be profit maximizers, maximum profits may not always 
be the only motivation in health markets. Health care organizations for example may 
take up not-for-profit status and pursue improved individual health outcomes and 
overall social wellbeing. Also, even where profit maximization objectives are 
expressly specified, this may be tempered by considerations of care quality, health 
outcomes and professional codes of conduct. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
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health workers may target satisfactory levels, rather than maximum health outcomes 
as their objective (Palmer and Mills 2003). It has also been argued that organizations 
may not use market power or particular advantage to hike prices or induce demand 
unduly, even where the scope for such behaviour exist. In view of these arguments 
therefore, it is a reasonable expectation that the relationship between structure and 
conduct in health care markets might vary considerably from that under standard 
economic models. Despite these differences, the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm remains a most useful approximation for the analysis and understanding of 
health care markets.  The framework provides the basis for understanding the nature 
of competition in the market: the object of competition, competitive strategies and 
the intensity of competition and prediction of market outcomes. Understanding these 
relationships is to understand the means and ways of improving health market 
performances through regulatory instruments.  A review of health care markets 
against the assumptions of the competitive model follows.  
The consumer sovereignty conditions of efficiency which require  that patients be 
fully aware of cost and benefits of health care purchased, bear all the costs and 
receive all benefits exclusively and maximize their utility in the process are non-
existent in many cases. Often, patients are neither sure of the benefits of available 
treatment options, nor certain if cure of a medical condition was the result of a 
particular medical intervention or some other extraneous factor.  Health care 
consumers rely on health care providers to guide them in making decisions about 
their health care needs. Health care providers by doubling as suppliers may not act in 
the best interest of patients. In this sense, health markets do not respond to demand, 
but rather create their own demand (Detsky 1978; McPake and Normand 2008).  
The notion that patients bear all their health care cost does not hold true, as health 
insurance schemes provide financial cover for health care consumption. Similarly, 
health care consumers do not always incur health care benefits in that cure of say an 
infectious disease conveys benefits to the wider community. The condition that 
people exercise choice over their preferred treatment is also disputed, as instances 
when patients are incapable of self-choice abound in most of medicine, for instance 
unconscious patients, or anxiety associated with ill-health may sometimes negate 
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rational thinking and choice. These arguments would suggest quite significant 
limitations on patient sovereignty under health care markets. Furthermore, while 
health and health care may not be public goods, public health services possess non-
rivalry and non-excludability properties. For example the consumption of a unit of 
medication leaves one unit less of medication for others to consume, but malarial 
control through fumigating a pond of water to rid it of mosquitoes, benefits every 
member of the community equally. 
Health markets also manifest monopoly behaviours. In some disease conditions no 
real alternative to orthodox medical treatments are known, for example, the condition 
appendicitis is treatable only by surgical intervention. Also, health professional 
licensing, and pharmaceutical patents constitute entry barriers in health care markets. 
Health care providers are however not usually considered natural monopolies, except 
in a rural practice where travel to alternative health service centres may be 
prohibitive: such a local facility effectively becomes a monopoly supplier in the 
locality. The existence of professional bodies in health would suggest collusive 
practices such as price fixing, restricting output of new graduates and negotiating 
higher salaries for health workers than there would be under perfect competition. 
Scarcity of hospitals in rural areas might have implications for services to be 
artificially priced very high (except perhaps if providers are not-for-profit 
organizations). Some health professional cadre has acquired monopoly powers of 
practice, as for example, in some countries only medical doctors are legally 
permitted to recommend the use of prescription-only drugs.  
Health care production and consumption activities generate a number of externalities. 
When a patient is cured of a disease, he derives benefit which is not confined to the 
individual alone, as the entire community benefits by way of risk reduction 
occasioned by the cure. In addition, relatives and friends also benefit by the ill being 
fit again and where productively employed, work disruption is reversed. On the 
contrary, many other production and consumption activities may impose external 
health costs. An example is the consumption of cigarettes, which has been positively 
shown to harm health of non-smokers by way of passive and involuntary inhalation 
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of cigarette smoke, while smokers consider only their own benefits and costs in 
making their consumption decisions.   
Information asymmetries exist to a very large extent in health care markets. Health 
insurance markets often provide a sub-optimal level of insurance for the twin malaise 
of moral hazard and adverse selection. In the former, the insured who has knowledge 
of his true state of health before buying an insurance policy, thereafter, behaves in a 
way that disadvantages the insurer. People who are insured sometimes see it as an 
incentive to behave recklessly in the exercise of their health choices and cause the 
insurer to suffer financial losses. The case of adverse selection on the other hand, is 
where the better informed exploits this advantage at the transaction stage of an 
insurance process. The general tendency in health insurance practice therefore, is for 
individuals who believe they are low risk to be less likely to subscribe to insurance 
than high risk people, so that high risk cases predominantly select themselves to be 
insured (Feldstein 1973).  Health insurance markets generally, because of the strong 
profit motives, may employ favourable patient selection approaches also: healthier 
enrolees by insurance firms and healthier patients by providers. This will erode the 
cross subsidization tenet of insurance: from the wealthier to the poor, and from the 
healthier to the sick (Rice et al. 2000).   
In general, people place high value on their health and are willing to pay a lot for 
health treatments, rather than foregoing critical health care. Also, the majority of 
people believe that everyone should have access to basic health care, irrespective of 
ability to pay. Thus, other than individual factors causing market failure, collective 
provisioning of medical care is justified by society’s definition of what is just and 
fair in a free social structure and not guaranteed under free market may also explain 
health market failure (Gubb and Meller-Herbert 2009).  
Analysis of the case for government intervention in health markets is rooted in the 
seminal work of Kenneth Arrow (1963), who recognized uncertainty in disease 
incidence and treatment outcomes as well as informational asymmetries between 
patients and physicians. Arrow subsequently argued that without a non-market input, 
competitive equilibria may never be reached in health care markets and 
recommended government regulation, medical liability, taxation and medical ethical 
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codes as best strategies to fill the gap (Arrow 1972;Jacobson 2001; Rice et al. 
2000).Therefore, health care regulation is becoming increasingly an important tool 
for most health care systems funded from general taxation (Saltman 2012). In most 
countries an array of regulatory bodies exist, applying a wide range of regulations to 
the extent that health care has been described as over-regulated (Blank and Burau 
2006; Curtis and Schulman 2006; Field 2008). For the drug market in particular, 
government regulation is wide spread aimed at ensuring quality, safety and 
affordability of drugs for consumers through strategies such as drug registration and 
patents, product differentiation and entry barriers that may confer market power on 
some competitors over others. In Africa, government regulation of pharmaceutical 
market has however failed to guarantee these (Ensor and Weinzierl 2007; Goodman 
et al. 2007a, Goodman et al. 2007b)    
2.7.1 Pharmaceutical markets 
A large body of literature exists on pharmaceutical markets in high-income countries, 
but research on this topic in sub-Saharan Africa is limited. In the West, analyses have 
focused on such issues as patent protection for pharmaceutical innovations, the role 
of generic drugs, drug prescription re-imbursement by insurance companies and the 
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry (Ferrandiz 1999; Maynard and Bloor 2003; 
Walley and Mrazek 2004; Scott-Motton 2000). Studies from Africa mostly 
concentrate on the problems of availability of quality drugs, their costs, and practices 
of retail pharmaceutical outlets (Breiger et al. 2004; Goel et al. 1996; Goodman et al. 
2007; Kamat and Nyato 2010; Nakandaet al. 2002; Smith et al. 2009; van der Geest 
and Whyte 1988). Like markets in general but mirroring health care markets in 
particular, pharmaceutical markets are not perfectly competitive, with products that 
are close substitutes of one another abounding. Demand is said to be generally 
inelastic and the market is highly regulated (Curtis and Schulman 2006; Maynard 
and Bloor 2003; Mossialoset al. 2004). The market structure consists of the big drug 
development companies, generic producers, wholesale outlet chains and the retail 
outlets (Scott-Morton 2000). The market performance is as predicted by the 
imperfectly competitive model. Regulatory enforcement is observed to be weak and 
demand and supply approaches are recommended as best strategies to improve 
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market performances (Goodman et al. 2007; Ensor and Weinzierl 2007; 
Kumaranayake 2000). Furthermore, retail prices have been found to be high and 
determined largely by local margins than by cost of drugs (Russo and McPake 2009).  
2.7.1.1 Drug retail markets in Africa 
This section of the literature review undertakes a description of retail drug shops in 
Africa, guided by the research conceptual framework of Structure-Conduct-
Performance Paradigm. No particular study addressing this phenomenon specifically 
was identified in economic literature, however, the related phenomenon of general 
retailing of goods and commodities in Africa based on industrial theoretical 
underpinnings has been studied. Publications were included if they provided 
information on retail drug market structure, provider characteristics and operations 
and price mark-ups. All studies included in this review relied on qualitative methods 
of structured or semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and 
documentary reviews for data generation. Fafchamps (1994), in a study of industrial 
structure and microenterprises in Africa, observed that Sub-Saharan Africa is 
characterized by a high proportion of people that are self-employed in their own 
small businesses driven by entrepreneurial incentives. He also reported that these 
microentreprenuers are so numerous and easily evade government regulation. In 
another study characterise African commodity and product markets, Jerome and 
Ogunkola (2000), noted that retailing is highly diverse and dynamic, changing 
considerably in response to social, economic, political and environmental factors. 
The authors also showed that entry barriers into retail markets are few with minimal 
technical constraints. They further identified weak infrastructural support for this 
market in terms of transportation, communication and access to finance as 
constraints to their optimal performance in what otherwise is a near-perfectly 
competitive market model 
Both studies are conceptually similar to this study, though focused on general 
retailing of non-health care products and commodities. Nonetheless, they provide a 
good starting point to understanding retail drug shops. 
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Drug retailing shops have been argued to play important roles in the supply of 
pharmaceutical products and services in most of sub-Saharan Africa (Patouillard et 
al. 2010; Valimba et al. 2014). This importance is reflected both in their market share 
and population coverage of essential medicines: for example, the retail sector of 
private healthcare market accounted for about 45% of all household care seeking for 
malaria in south eastern Nigeria (Onwujekwe et al. 2008), whilst in Tanzania about 
40% of all antimalarial drugs sold in three districts where purchased from retail 
outlets (Goodman et al. 2009). In particular, patent medicine vendors alone 
accounted for 70% of all antimalarials distributed in Nigeria (ACTwatch 2013). 
These studies provided some insight into structure of malarial market in Africa, 
however, they did not systematically investigate the markets based on any theoretical 
conceptualization. Therefore, these findings provide partial insights into the complex 
interrelationships of the market structure.  
Other studies have attempted to characterise the range of retailing entities operating 
in these markets and include pharmacies, static drug shops general shops, itinerant 
sellers and periodic market vendors, who vary substantially in their attributes. Retail 
providers may thus be pharmacists, persons with health related qualifications, trained 
drug dispensers or even illiterate as reported by Goodman and colleagues (2007b). 
Pharmacies operated by trained pharmacists are said to be scarce all over Africa, are 
permitted to stock the entire stock of drugs available in a country and cluster in cities 
(Adikwu 1996; Tavrow et al. 2003). General shop vendors sell few over the counter 
drugs along with other consumer goods and are especially important source of drugs 
in remote rural communities. Itinerant vendors are a common phenomenon in West 
Africa, but rarely observed in Eastern and Southern Africa. Specialized drug shops 
are by and large the most important entity of the retail drug merchandise particularly 
in East and West Africa and vary widely in their characteristics and framing. For 
example in Nigeria, they are called patent medicine vendors, chemists in Ghana and 
duka la dawa baridi (now referred to as ADDOs) in Tanzania (Adikwu 1996; 
Valimba et al. 2014). Specialist drug shops may be locate in both urban and rural 
areas and are operated by anyone who can read and write in English at a minimum, 
however, some expertise may be required in some settings, particularly in eastern 
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Africa. They are allowed to retail over- the-counter drugs and limited number of 
prescription drugs.  
While these studies set out to either characterise retail drug sellers in malaria markets 
or evaluate interventions to improve their practices, the authors did not relate 
particular characteristics with particular provider behaviours, neither were 
interventions evaluated in the long run, which limits the reliability of conclusions. 
Providers’ conduct in relation to price mark-ups in retail markets are said to be high 
and vary widely across outlet type, location and product characteristics (Goodman et 
al. 2009). Mark-ups have been reported to vary from 3% to 566% for pharmacies, 
29% to 669% in drug shops and oscillate between 100% and 233% in general shops 
(Clinton Foundation 2008). The study also reported higher mark-ups in rural 
compared to urban areas, when products are generics rather than branded and where 
tablets were loose relative to blistered. These studies however, failed to explore 
factors that influence pricing decisions in these markets. Furthermore, Fafchamps 
(1994) concluded that consumers in the general retail market respond more to price 
changes than quality indicators, because of generally low income levels. The studies 
failed to explore the cost structures of sellers and factors that influence pricing 
behaviour of retailer. 
The market performance has been reflected in a number of concerns bordering on 
low qualifications of providers who seldom have pharmacy education, most having 
some health related background at best and incapable of matching specific disease 
with it appropriate medication (Abuya et al. 2007; Marsh et al. 1999; Nshakira et al. 
2002). Also decried has been the stocking of counterfeit/sub-standard drugs or 
beyond allowed remits. 
In sum, the review has presented the literature on structure, conduct and performance 
of retail drug shops in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the studies did not set out to 
explore these markets based on any economic theoretical framework, they 
nonetheless have provided useful insights of structure, conduct and performance 
elements in the retail drug shop market across much of Africa: a plural structure, 
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high price mark-ups and low market outcomes. This warrants a case for government 
intervention, which is examined in the following section. 
2.7.1.2 Drug retailing and drug shop regulation in sub-Saharan Africa 
Drug retailing is wide spread and a rapidly growing phenomenon and drug sellers are 
becoming important actors in the health care arena of low-income countries. They 
engage in activities such as procurement, storage and distribution of drugs, 
particularly at community and rural levels (Breiger et al. 2004; Goel et al. 1996; 
Goodman et al. 2007a; Hughes et al. 2013; Kamat and Nyato 2010; Smith et al. 
2009; van der Geest and Whyte. 1988; WHO 2007). The appeal of their geographic 
access has ignited recent efforts to use them to expand access to essential health 
services and strengthen health system performance through such initiatives as the 
Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria and performance targeted interventions 
(Smith et al. 2009; Wafula and Goodman 2010). Drug shops are popular and highly 
patronized among citizens in most African countries because they are said to offer 
easy access to drugs in a quick and convenient way, ensure drug availability, provide 
quality of services (no opportunity cost of waiting and convenient hours of opening), 
are cheaper, drug quantity options in purchasing and sometimes flexible payment 
terms (Goodman et al. 2007b; Igun 1987; Kamat and Nichter 1998). They are 
reported to offer therapies for diverse disease conditions as malaria, URTIs, STIs and 
high blood pressure (Chuc et al. 2001; Hetzel et al. 2007; Oparaet al. 2006). Almost 
any kind of drug may be purchased over the counter, which portends significant 
implications for rational use of pharmaceuticals (Kamat and Nichter 1998). This 
irrational use poses danger of for example antibiotics resistance; drug induced 
allergic reactions and drug side-effects (WHO 2000). Also, widely reported 
regulatory infringement and weak regulatory enforcement have been reported 
(Kamat and Nyato 2010; Mackintosh and Tibandebage 2002; Wafula et al. 2012).For 
these reasons therefore, retail drug sellers now occupy a prominent position in health 
policy discourse in sub-Saharan Africa and also one of important regulatory interest 
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2.8 Rationale for Regulating Drug Shops 
Consumers are willing to spend on drugs because of the potential of drugs to save 
lives, restore health, prevent diseases and halt epidemics. To accomplish these goals 
however, drugs must be effective, safe, of good quality and appropriately used, 
otherwise, drugs are poisonous. This provides the rationale for the regulation of the 
development, production, and final distribution to end users in accordance with 
prescribed standards (Ratanawijitrasin and Wondemagegnehu 2002). Problems 
related to drug efficacy and safety generally include the use of drugs contaminated 
with toxic substances or other impurities, drugs with dubious or unverified efficacy 
claims and medicines with unknown adverse reactions, with substandard 
preparations and counterfeit products completing the list. Besides their dangers to 
health and lives of consumers, ineffective and unsafe drugs are a waste of money, 
particularly in resource poor settings. It has been argued that it is possible to solve 
these problems sustainably through an effective drug regulatory system. In sub-
Saharan Africa however, effective regulation of drugs is particularly weak, especially 
of drugs shops in remote areas (Ensor and Weinzierl 2007; Goodman et al. 2007; 
Wafula et al. 2013). Regulatory approaches deployed in regulating drug shop 
retailers have included standard setting restrictions, provider training and education 
and consumer information strategies, and their successes have been limited in 
improving market performance  (Kamat and Nyato 2010; Kumaranayake et al. 2000). 
In summary, the evidence base on drug shop regulation in sub-Saharan Africa has 
revealed a public interest perspective in conception, but enforcement processes are 
weak and tend to be captured by private interests (Blevins 1995; Graddy 1991; 
Wafula et al. 2013).    
Markets in general and their associated failures have been reviewed. Health care 
markets in particular have been examined in-depth and their unique distinctiveness 
which contrasts them from conventional markets highlighted. The review will now 
define the concept of access to health care and lay a framework for understanding 
health market interactions in the light of their implications for access to quality 
health care and improved population health outcomes. 
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2.9 The Concept of Health Care Access 
Inadequate access to health care remains a major challenge for public health systems 
in most low and middle income countries, attributable to factors as inherent 
weakness in health systems, underutilization of effective health care interventions 
and inappropriate public health policy and planning (Khan and Bhardwa 1994; 
WHO, 1999). An amalgam of these is what has been aptly described as the access 
problem (O’Donnell 2007). Despite sustained research activities on this topic, no 
consensus seems to exist regarding the definition of the concept or its measurement. 
Implications for this is failure of health systems and health policy makers to attain 
effective health sector reforms that maximize population health outcomes (Goddard 
and Smith 2001; Gulliford et al. 2002; McIntyre et al. 2007; O’Donnell 2007; Oliver 
and Mossialos 2005). This section attempts to formulate an operationally useful 
definition of the concept of access and develop a comprehensive framework for the 
understanding and measurement of barriers to health system access. 
A range of definitions of the concept of access to health care exist in the literature, 
yet, the meaning remains elusive (Chuma et al. 2010; Khan and Bhardwa 1994, 
McIntyre et al. 2007; O’Donnell 2007). The fuzziness around the explicit meaning 
and hence a uniform interpretation of access has been linked to the multidisciplinary 
diversity of the individual authors in the field, which varies across sociologists, 
anthropologists, psychologists, epidemiologists, health economists and other 
disciplines. Also contributing to the ambiguity is the regular transformations in our 
demographic, social, technological and geographical landscape of health care 
delivery. This has often meant frequent shifts in focus on specific dimensions of 
access (Khan and Bhardwa 1994). The lack of clarity and consensus on the meaning 
of access, the authors argue has hampered the work of health policy makers and 
impaired meaningful health care reforms, especially in low income countries. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it is imperative to review some of these definitions and pin 
down observable and measureable indices. 
Parker (1974) defined access as, “the ability to reach, obtain or afford entrance to 
services.” This definition is not lucid because the term ability connotes barriers that 
an individual must overcome to access services, which were not specified. Access to 
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health care has also been conceptualized in terms of production and consumption 
related barriers encountered in a bid to obtain needed health care services (Lewis 
1977). Even though Lewis alluded to barriers in his discourse, he too failed to 
capture them systematically. Elsewhere, Donabedian (1972) and Penchansky (1977) 
argued that how well the health system and the population in need of services fitted 
together was the core of access concept. In other words, the authors thought 
compatibility of demand and supply sides was crucial for access to be achieved. 
Understood from this perspective, the concept implies an interaction between the 
characteristics of potential users of the system and the health system, but they too did 
not comprehensively define the dimensions of that must match for effective access.  
Aday, Andersen and Fleming (1980), looked at access to include the variables which 
describe “the potential and actual entry of a given population group to the health care 
delivery system.”By their dichotomy of potential and actual entry, they argued that 
systems and population characteristics defined potential access, while utilization and 
satisfaction determined the dimensions of actual access. Access defined in terms of 
either ability to obtain needed services or understood from potential and actual entry 
into a health care system is not directly expressible in measureable terms, and therein 
lies the weakness of these definitions. 
Others have interpreted the meaning of access as an entirely supply phenomenon 
related to availability of services, also referred to as spatial accessibility in the 
literature (Goddard and Smith 2001; Guaghardo 2004; Perry and Gesler 2000; 
Rosero-Bixby 2004).  However, simply situating a service in an area of need does 
not translate to improved access, as individuals in need may not be able to afford the 
service or find it culturally unacceptable to use. Another school of thought argues for 
a demand approach in defining access (Falkingham 2004). Affordability is generally 
considered to be positively correlated with income or ownership of the means to pay 
for provider services at the point of delivery. Also, affordability on its own is not 
sufficient dimension that will ensure that people will use services (Birch and 
Anderson 2005).  Therefore, a group has further defined access to mean the use of 
health services (Wang and Luo 2005). Equating access with utilization of services 
has inherent problems of variations in use by individuals with the same or different 
levels of needs and therefore, measurement of access (Finkelstein 2001; Goddard and 
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Smith 2001; Vilhjalmsson 2005; Waters 2000). Different levels of use of health 
service may also represent different attitudes, beliefs or preferences, and not just 
ability to pay (McIntyre et al, 2007). The concept of cost has also featured in the 
explanatory models of access. Cost is commonly taken to encompass price at the 
point of delivery and additional costs of seeking care, waiting for services and other 
costs associated with obtaining services. For example, Goddard and Smith (2001) 
have highlighted quality of care and information as supply factors contributing to 
health care costs. This broadening of the definition of cost has been said to 
incorporate the notion of shadow price (Katz and Hofer 1994; Mooney 1991). The 
expression of access in terms of shadow price for services provides a platform to 
further define access in terms of opportunities forgone by using a service (Le Grand 
1991).  Implicit in this framework is the notion of opportunity sets individuals face in 
health care utilization, is a synthesis of supply side and demand side influences 
(availability and affordability respectively)  with other dimensions of access, not 
generally given consideration in the access literature. Factors like culture may have 
profound roles in determining access. For example, medical examination of female 
clients at a service by male doctors may not be allowed, therefore, availability and 
affordability of such services will still impose a significantly unacceptable 
opportunity cost on potential female users. Birch and Abelson (1993) and Grytten et 
al. (1995) seem to concur with the LeGrand’s paradigm, by adopting opportunity 
cost as the meaning of access. The dilemma however, of this framework, is the 
inherent difficulty of empirical measurements. 
A regular theme across the plethora of definitions is the common recognition of 
access as an eclectic variable, determined by a multitude of dimensions. The 
common access dimensions variously identified were availability, affordability, 
accessibility and acceptability. Penchansky and Thomas (1981) were first credited 
with articulating all four dimensions in their definition of the concept, and included a 
fifth of accommodation. Recently however, McIntyre and colleagues (2007) have 
streamlined Penchansky and Thomas’ model by combining the accessibility, 
availability and accommodation dimensions in to a more comprehensive definition of 
availability. Their framework explores access based on availability, affordability and 
acceptability, evaluating the characteristics of the health system in tandem with 
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attributes of individuals, households or communities within each dimension, and 
ultimately isolating the root causes of deficient access in an area.   Their availability 
component addresses issues of appropriately locating health services in the right 
places, and at the right time. It also explores factors like relationships between the 
spatial distribution of health care services and service users, temporal fit between 
service providers and service users, as well as the interrelatedness between the type, 
range, quality and quantity of services and range of health needs of the population 
being served. The affordability dimension focuses on the compatibility between the 
full costs of services (that is opportunity cost) to users and their ability to pay, 
against the background of specific household circumstances or experiences for 
example, sources of income and their regularity, socioeconomic status and insurance 
coverage.  Affordability also looks at forms of payments that are acceptable to the 
provider like cash, credit, reimbursement or in-kind payments. The acceptability 
criterion describes the attitudes of providers and those of consumers towards one 
another and how these interact. In this framework, the provider’s attitude to the 
consumer relates to variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, cultural beliefs and 
socioeconomic status. In contrast, the consumer’s attitudes relates to the provider’s 
qualifications, competence and service organization. Furthermore, these attitudinal 
interactions are modulated by beliefs and perceptions. Central to the framework is 
the cross-cutting role of information. Information is considered a core element to all 
three dimensions of the concept and a crucially important precondition for promoting 
appropriate interactions between the health system and the individuals, households 
and entire communities. It empowers health care consumers to make informed 
service utilization choices. The thesis argues that, whilst the analyses of most authors 
reviewed on the concept were incomplete and not systematized, McIntyre and 
colleagues have proposed a framework that is comprehensive and integrative, giving 
clear identification of quantifiable determinants underlying each access dimension. 
For these advantages therefore, the thesis will adopt this framework to explore access 
in this study. 
Access to health and health care is very sensitive to people and societies, particularly 
who gets what, when, how and where? These seek to address the concerns of 
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equitable access to health services. The tenets of health care equity are discussed 
below. 
2.9.1 Health inequality and health equity 
Health and health care access discourse is incomplete without a perspective on the 
issues of health inequality and health equity. A brief discussion of the main issues 
and how they relate to public health policy is next undertaken to conclude this 
review. 
 Health outcomes of mortality and morbidity are not evenly distributed across 
socioeconomic gradients in all societies. The likelihood of a new-born dying before 
his or her fifth birthday is disproportionately higher for the poor than their 
counterparts born to parents in richer social classes (Evans et al, 2001). For example, 
studies in some European countries have shown that individuals in poorer 
socioeconomic groups are likely to die 5 to 10 years earlier than individuals in 
wealthier groups (Whitehead2000). Similarly, children in the poorest households in 
Ghana, have being shown to experience about 50% increase in the risk of death, 
relative to the least poor households (Gwatkin 2000). These differences in health and 
health outcomes between groups within populations underpin the concept of health 
inequalities, as aptly captured in the definition of the concept.  
Margaret Whitehead (1992), concisely defined health inequalities as differences in 
health that “are not only unnecessary and avoidable, in addition, are considered 
unfair and unjust.” Implicit in this definition are the notion of subset difference that 
adversely affects disadvantaged groups within a nation. In another definition of 
health equity, the International Society for Equity in Health (ISEqH) (WHO 2005) 
puts it as “the absence of systematic and potentially remediable differences in one or 
more aspects of health across populations or population subgroups defined socially, 
economically, demographically or geographically.”  This definition is attractive 
because of the emphasis on the important concept that differences relevant to equity 
are systematic as against being random or sporadic. Most other commentators have 
also viewed these differences as constrained, rather than a matter of choice and have 
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referred to them as inequities instead of inequalities (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
2000). 
The second issue is that of health equity or equity in health. Again, Whitehead 
(1992) defined health care equity as “equal access to available care for equal need, 
equal utilization for equal need, and equal quality of care for all.” Mooney (1983; 
1987) distinguished two components of health care equity; horizontal equity and 
vertical equity. Horizontal equity referred to equal treatment for equal need, and 
vertical equity referred to different treatment for different need. Other commentators 
on the other hand have constructed health equity in terms of equal utilization, equal 
access, distribution according to need and equal health outcomes (Culyer and 
Wagstaff 1993). The consensus among these authors is that these observed 
socioeconomic related health inequalities arise from material inequality and 
behavioural differences  
2.9.2 Equity implications in health policy 
Equitable access to health care has recently gained eminence as a public health 
policy (resource allocation) objective the world over, with a purpose of universal 
health coverage at its basis (Cookson et al. 2009). Equity considerations address the 
question of fair or just distribution of health and health care in the population. 
However, two questions of what exactly is a fair distribution or what makes a health 
system fair arises. Several ideological approaches (theories of social justice) to 
incorporating health equity into public health interventions have being proposed 
Utilitarianism, Rawlsianism and Liberalism, but none commands general acceptance 
(Follandet al. 2010). However, whatever ethical theory of equity a society adopts, 
end-stage equity (equality of health) appears impracticable; rather process equity 
seems a more pragmatic goal of health systems to attain. Process equity in public 
health care may be seen as equal treatment of people with equal need (horizontal 
equity) or people with different need health needs are treated differently (vertical 
equity).  
It has been observed that health equity is a key health policy consideration globally, 
and valuing society’s overall health care output is best not expressed solely as a 
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function of per capita health share (efficiency), but also as its distribution across the 
social gradient in the population (Cookson et al. 2009). Economic evaluation of 
public health interventions has however continued to tilt heavily towards efficiency 
quantifying; a trend arguably linked with the development of standardized 
measurement tools for efficiency such as the QALY (Williams and Cookson 2006). 
Health equity studies on the contrary are still at the developmental stages. 
Controversies still rage about what equity objective to set and methodologies of 
developing equity weights have not being laid to rest (Williams 2005). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, equity concerns are being increasingly 
incorporated into public health decision processes, though in less explicit ways.  
To put the arguments so far in perspective, health inequalities do not mean a generic 
difference in health of individuals, but a systematic difference in the health of 
disadvantaged social groups in the society that could be possibly reversed by public 
policy. Health equity or equity in health on the contrary means the pursuit of policies 
targeted at the elimination of health inequalities.  A clear understanding of these 
issues is of crucial practical importance for the purpose of health care resource 
allocation decisions to improve health care access (Braveman 2006).  
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CHAPTER 3:  METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Study Design 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the interactions between health market 
structure, provider conduct and consumer demand, all superintended by regulation 
and understand how these influences shape competition and determine patent 
medicine vendor market outcome in terms of access to quality and safe essential 
medicines and services in a rural setting. The study adopted an exploratory 
descriptive approach, employing the economic analytic framework of the Structure-
Conduct – Performance paradigm to critically investigate the research market. 
In generating qualitative data for this thesis, the author was constantly mindful of the 
influence of the researcher at every step of the research process. For example, this 
researcher’s medical background might be assumed to affect choice of what to 
investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods adjudged most appropriate for 
this purpose and findings considered most adequate (Malterud 2001). Therefore due 
diligence was observed to maintain objectivity all along the research process. 
However, the researcher’s medical knowledge was brought to bear on technical 
issues to gain clearer perspectives from research participants. The researcher was 
aware of the deep rooted mistrust of patent medicine vendors for formal health 
workers (seen as competitors); he therefore introduced himself in a more neutral 
fashion as a researcher, in order to avoid creating barriers to open communication 
and engender more trust. Data interpretation was guided by economic theory, 
empirical literature and research questions and objectives. 
 
3.2 The structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCPP) framework 
To undertake to answer the research questions and ultimately attain the specific 
research objectives, the researcher drew substantially on insights from neoclassical 
economic theory of industrial organization, narrowing down particularly on the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Clarke 1985). The framework offers useful 
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analytical concepts and provides tools for exploring and understanding this market 
and has been used in the analysis of a health market for fever in a low income setting 
(Goodman 2004a). In its most basic form, the model argues that market structure 
determines provider conduct, which in turn determines the various aspects of market 
performance. However, it has been argued that the relationship is not a simplistic 
unidirectional one as structure and conduct can be reciprocally constituted (Martins 
1994; Tirole 1988). In order words, the simple linear causality assumed is not always 
the case in reality; rather a more complex interaction exists. The interactive model 
further extends the argument by adding that strategic conduct of firms does 
reversibly determine structure also. In this model, market structure consists of 
relatively stable factors that influence rivalry between buyers and sellers in the 
market environment and include variables as numbers of buyers and sellers, barriers 
to entry, product information, vertical and horizontal integrations, diversification and 
supporting regulatory framework. Market conduct of firms refers to provider 
behaviours and includes advertising, pricing, product choices (their quantity and 
differentiation), collusion, and research and development activities. Performance of 
the market is assessed in terms of social welfare or efficiency gains.  This research 
proceeded by redefining market performance in terms of access to quality and safe 
essential health care products and services, and hypothesized that the interaction of 
market structure, provider conduct, and consumer demand, moderated by 
government regulation will determine the nature of access to health care services in 
the researched market. This conceptual framework is illustrated below.  
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Figure 3.1: Structure-Conduct-Performance framework: Adapted from Goodman 
(2004a).  
 
Guided by this evaluative framework, detailed variables representing each market 
component were explored and measured as depicted in Table3.1 below. The rationale 
to use a single measurement instrument to collect data or to triangulate methods was 
determined by the objective or subjective characteristic of a variable. For example, 
the set of variables that make up the concept of demographic data are fairly stable 
and a single measurement approach was deemed sufficient for gaining credible data. 
Knowledge and practices as individual characteristics however, vary widely from 
one person to another and even in the same individual in different contexts, hence, 
data falling in these categories were triangulated in order to ensure rigorous data 
generation to support robust analysis.  
Consumer demographic characteristics could best be elicited from consumers 
themselves from questionnaires, whereas variables as search strategy, choice of 
provider and knowledge of diseases and drugs are deemed to be most 
comprehensively obtainable through the combination of questionnaires, interviews 
and observation of behaviours. 
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Conduct variables comprising knowledge of diseases, rational drug use and 
competitive strategies are to be obtained through multiple channels, considering that 
providers acting strategically to maximize profits may not completely divulge 
information they have about the market at one particular moment, using a single 
instrument. 
Market structural factor of seller concentration require facility count and relevant 
data will best be generated through observation of shop outlets. Other structural 
determinants of market structure like products and services differentiation will be 
studied via interviews, questionnaires and observational approaches to understand 
their role in the market, while information on regulation will be obtained from 
interviews, questionnaires, observations and review of secondary data.  
In sum, the fit of variables to the data collection instruments was determined by the 
order of phenomena they represented and are summarised in Table 3.1 below.  
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Table 3.1: Research variables and corresponding measurement instruments 
Variables Data collection instruments 
Consumer Behaviour 
 
Demographic information( population 
distribution by age, sex, socioeconomic status) 
Questionnaires,  
Attitudes Search strategy and choice of 
provider 
Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations 
User  information about disease prevalence Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations 
User information about pharmaceutical 
products                                                                                           
Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations 
 
Provider Conduct  
Knowledge about common diseases treatment Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations 
Knowledge about pharmaceutical products Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations 
Understanding of users’ preferences Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations 
Competitive strategy (pricing, payments & 
dispensing practices) 
Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations 
Market structure  
 Market Concentration  Observations 
(Seller concentration)  
Products and services  Observations, interviews, questionnaires 
Barriers to entry/exit Questionnaires, Interviews,  Observations, 
Secondary data 
Relevant regulations Questionnaires, Interviews,  Secondary data 
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Specific applications of data collecting instruments in respect of each market 
component are undertaken in section 3.3.   
3.3 Methods of Data Collection: 
To ensure content validity of the research findings of the study, justification arose for 
the use of a range of data collecting instruments to triangulate information and ensure 
content validity of the study results (McPake et al. 1999; Goodman 2004a). To 
achieve the research objectives, sequential triangulation of information via semi-
structured questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, observations of seller-buyer 
interactions, and secondary documentary reviews were employed to obtain cross-
sectional data from sampled populations. The flexible, semi-structuring of data 
collecting instruments was preferred because of the scope it allowed for the in-depth 
exploration of new insights and leads that emerged during the research process.  
3.3.1 Questionnaire design 
Questionnaires were used to collect primary self-reported data from providers and 
consumers, and the design was guided by literature review of previous quantitative 
and qualitative work in the study area and in relation to the research question and 
study objectives (Conteh and Hanson 2003; Goodman 2004b). A set of 
questionnaires were developed for providers and clients respectively. Both 
questionnaires took the semi-structured format, consequent upon the realization that 
the data sought consisted of a mix of subjective and objective realities. 
The semi-structured exit questionnaires for the consumers covered demographic 
data, socio-economic status characteristics, knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and 
preferences on diseases and providers, as well as perceptions of the appropriateness 
of drugs obtained, based on reported symptoms.  Similarly, the provider 
questionnaire also sought information on a wide range of issues reflecting individual 
provider characteristics, outlet operations, competitive strategies and knowledge of 
government regulations and their implementation. These instruments were drafted in 
English, but were translated into local languages guided by the principle of complete 
equivalence, for non-English speaking participants. These instruments generated the 
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data used for quantitative exploration and the full complements of the questionnaires 
are attached as appendices 2 and 3. 
3.3.2 Qualitative interviews 
Several studies have demonstrated the value of qualitative methods in understanding 
the interactions of providers and consumers in retail drug markets (Adome et al. 
1996; Brieger et al. 2004; Coast et al. 2004; Hughes et al. 2013; Igun 1987; Kamat 
and Nyato 2010). The study therefore, used in-depth semi-structured interviews to 
collect a rich amount of data, the flexibility of the method allowing a free rein of 
inquiry in particular cases yet, retaining comparability of topics covered during each 
interview.  
Again, a review of the literature provided key ideas that informed the lines of thought 
explored against the economic framework of structure-conduct-performance and the 
current conceptualization of health care access. The initial domains related to supply 
side variables including provider perspectives of their roles, skills, knowledge and 
performance, regulatory framework, enforcement and compliance, and future 
business expectations. Additional issues and themes identified during data collection 
provided new avenues that were further explored in subsequent interviews. These 
specifically were relationships with formal pharmacies and the supervisory agencies, 
especially the Pharmacy Council of Nigeria and the National Agency for Food and 
Drug Administration and Control, and business problems and challenges. Demand 
side variables investigated during interviews were consumer perceptions and 
expectations of drug shop retailers and perceptions of the roles and expectations from 
government, as well as their knowledge of health issues. Although these key areas 
formed the basis of the interview guide, useful insights arising during the interview 
process were further examined in detail.  
Interviews of key regulatory officials explored mainly, the role of the patent 
medicine vendors, regulatory framework and implementation, challenges of 
regulating pharmacy practice in general and then patent medicine vendors in 
particular and the future of this pharmaceutical entrepreneurs in Nigeria. 
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All interviews were conducted in English by the researcher and recorded with a 
digital recorder, between the usual business operating hours of 8 am and 10 pm. 
Interviews lasted between one to two hours, and at the end of each interview, notes 
were made of observations made about the interviewee’s attitudes and non-verbal 
languages and clearer ways of asking questions in future interviews highlighted. 
Also, informal analysis began with the writing of post interview memos. All three 
interview guides are included in the thesis as appendices 4, 5 and 6.   
3.3.3 Provider-consumer interaction observations 
Observational studies consisted of on-the-spot assessment and documentation of 
actual processes of market interactions between drug vendors and clients, undertaken 
in purposively selected (highly patronized) drug shops, and on a systematically 
selected sample of drug buyers, recruiting every n
th
 customer until the required 
sample size of ten was attained. This activity was assumed to attain some degree of 
unobtrusiveness because it was timed at the end of other research activities when the 
researcher had become well known to the retailers and his presence regarded as 
normal. The activity entailed documenting detailed descriptions of interaction 
episodes, specifying the nature of interactions as whether the consumer consulted, 
demanded a medicine or presented a prescription and what the provider did or failed 
to do. The exercise was check-listed and supplemented with additional notes made of 
relevant observations. To maintain an atmosphere of unobtrusiveness, the researcher 
adopted the attitude of social engagement with providers alternating with moments of 
simulated reading, so that even when the researcher had to scribble down pieces of 
information in the course of provider-client interaction, the former did not see it as 
unusual. The variables observed on medicine vendors were whether there was 
questioning related to illness symptoms, duration of ill-health or drug history; 
physical examination of clients and final actions taken, such as sale  of medication, 
written or verbal advice on how medications were to be used, wound dressing, 
administration of injections, referral or health education talks. Social closeness of 
actors, client satisfaction and the practice setting were also documented. Finally, the 
duration of the transaction was noted. Both observational check-lists for the provider 
and consumer interactions form appendix 7 of the thesis.   
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3.3.4 Secondary data collection 
Secondary sources of information collected for this study related to background 
information from relevant documents like relevant health policy documents, 
programme intervention reports, evaluation reports of essential drug management 
programmes and government health reports. A search for these documents was 
undertaken in relevant ministries and extra-ministerial departments, professional 
organizations, bilateral and multilateral agencies (Conteh and Hanson 2003; 
McCombie 2002). These data were identified and retrieved from diverse places as 
the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH), World Health Organization (WHO), World 
Bank, Health Reform Foundation of Nigeria (HERFON), Pharmaceutical Council of 
Nigeria (PCN), National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control 
(NAFDAC), Consumer Protection Council (CPC) and PATHS 2 Nigeria. 
3.3.5 Sampling techniques and administration of research instruments 
The need to collect data that was representative and therefore useful for policy 
recommendation made it mandatory that standard data collection approaches and 
instruments be deployed. These are described in the section that follows. 
3.3.6 Provider questionnaires, interviews and observations 
Providers were sampled using a stratified random sampling approach, according to 
their geographical spread as documented from the outlet census above. Using the 
numeric coding of each drug outlet referred above for each NAPPMED district, the 
codes were placed in a cap, thoroughly mixed and samples picked without 
replacement to make the required sample size in each case. Therefore, in Katsina-Ala 
district, 18 outlet shops were sampled out of 56, 4 out of 12 shops sampled at Gbor, 
and 4, 2 and 2 sampled respectively at Tor Donga, Abaji and Sai districts, to make a 
sample size of 30 outlets. The outlet questionnaires were then administered to their 
owners to fill out. The questionnaires were left with the shop owners and later 
collected when fully completed. From this random sample of 30 outlets, another 
sample of 10 providers who were judged to be the most enthusiastic about the study 
was later picked conveniently for in-depth interviews and assumed unobtrusive 
observations, having become very familiar with the providers over the course of the 
research. This pattern of approach was intended to facilitate the development of a 
cordial relationship with the providers and it was believed this intention was 
achieved to the extent that the researcher’s presence came to be seen as quite 
ordinary. 
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In addition, six key informants drawn from state level NAPPMED executive, state 
and federal levels regulatory officials and policy official at Federal Ministry of 
Health were purposefully selected for in-depth interviews. 
3.4 Methods of Data Analysis 
The general approach adopted in data analysis was one of thorough familiarization 
with the data, content analysis and generation of a coding framework and data 
interpretation, all in relation to the research question and study objectives. Content 
analysis of nominal data from semi-structured interviews was undertaken to structure 
and categorize the information gathered. The interview data were transcribed and the 
transcription notes reviewed for accuracy by comparison with two reviewers. The 
contents were then re-read systematically and coded line by line into structured 
categories manually, using a two level coding approach. First, an apriori set of codes 
was generated from the conceptual framework of the research before the data was 
collected. For example, broad categorical codes as consumer behavior, market 
structure and provider conduct derived from theoretical framework, from which 
several narrower apriori sub-codes such as entry barriers, exit potential, linkages and 
regulation were framed, as reflected in Table 3.1.Inthe careful reading and analysis 
of data, new ideas, relationships and meanings emerged through inductive reasoning 
process, which gave rise to a multitude of emergent codes, some of which included 
ideas as motivation, professional expert, first aid provider and social embeddedness. 
The full complement of emergent themes is discussed in Chapters 5 through 7. The 
fit of these structuring codes to the data and purpose of the study was ensured via 
constant comparison of newly coded texts with previous similar codes. The approach 
allowed for consistency of coding and guided data interpretations and visualization 
of patterns. 
Quantitative data were double-checked and entered into Microsoft Excel version 
2010 and imported into SPSS version 19.0. Descriptive statistical analysis was 
performed on demographic data, and relationships between variables explored 
through cross tabulations. Observational field notes were coded by type of behaviour, 
and frequency counts derived. Key findings were isolated and summarized data 
described and displayed as charts, figures and tables to aid visualization of 
relationships between variables. Drawing on insights from the structure-conduct-
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performance theoretical framework, market concentration was studied based on the 
number of patent medicine vendors in the market and entry conditions explored 
through entry requirements, ease of exiting, wholesale market structure, vertical and 
horizontal linkages and tie-ins. Strategies of non-price and price competitions formed 
the items of data collection for provider conduct while consumer behavior was 
looked at from knowledge of disease and drugs, search strategies and rationale for 
the choice of providers. The final determinant of market performance in the form of 
regulation was evaluated by looking at policies, their implementation and 
enforcement approaches.    
3.5 Study Limitations: 
The sensitive nature of much of the information that was sought by the study made it 
likely that some of the research methods would not accurately measure all the target 
variables.  Semi-structured interviews though allowing for in-depth exploration of 
issues may have been biased by social appropriateness of responses and sometimes 
hazy recall. Observational studies are subject to the Hawthorne effect, and data from 
documentary sources may be fraught with errors, such as missing parts or biased 
reporting. The study design had been guided in recognition of these limitations, 
hence triangulation of data collection methods used for some variables. The small 
size of the area studied relative to the vastness of Nigeria imposes severe limitations 
to the generalizability of the findings, but the rigorous random techniques adopted 
will minimize errors or biases, and enhance the credibility of the evidence generated.   
3.6 Ethical Issues 
Ethical clearance to undertake this study was obtained from the Ethical Committee of 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh in October 2011.  Further ethical clearance 
from the Benue State Ministry of Health, Makurdi, Nigeria, was granted for this 
study in November 2011. 
All participants in the study were firstly fully informed of the purpose of the research 
and the educational institution involved. Their expected nature of participation was 
clearly explained and they were then given opportunity to ask questions where 
ambiguities lingered and needed further clarifications. Due to the nature of behaviors 
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in informal markets of this sort and potential legal implications thereof, only oral 
consent was obtained in the study, as evidence has shown that private health 
providers feel threatened and discouraged by written consent, thereby either limiting 
their participation or biasing information (Goodman, 2004a).Consent was also sought 
for recording of qualitative interviews. Written requests to key regulatory officials 
were sent through land mail seeking consent, date, time and venue of interviews. 
Participants were well informed of their rights to refuse to answer any questions, ask 
any questions at any point during the study and to withdraw voluntarily from it at any 
time. Where a participant was keen, he or she was given the full information sheet to 
read, before proceeding with any activity. Anonymity of participants was ensured by 
treating all information obtained with strict confidence, and by transcribing the data 
using code numbers, storing the interview tapes and transcribed notes in locked 
cabinets. Also, the research laptop computer holding participants information was 
secured by a personal password.  
3.7 Data Collection Activities 
3.7.1 Study site 
The study was undertaken in Katsina -Ala local government council, of Benue State, 
in North Central Nigeria, from January 2012 to December 2012. This Local Council 
is about 190 Kilometers north east of the State capital, Makurdi. The Council has a 
population of 248, 218 inhabitants, who are mostly rural dwellers. It is known in 
Nigeria for its production of yams in large commercial quantities and boasts of a 
robust yam market. This economic resource has served to attract a diverse mix of 
people (mostly Igbos, Hausas and Fulanis) from across the country to immigrate and 
take up businesses within its precincts. Katsina-Ala Local Government Area (LGA) 
is one of 23 LGAs that make up Benue State, with its administration headquarters in 
Katsina –Ala town. The LGA is divided into 12 political wards and has a population 
of 249, 219. The Tiv speaking people are the dominant indigenous group along with 
a minority Etulo speaking race. The main economic activity of majority of its 
inhabitants is small scale mixed farming. The local council has a total of 48 
government health facilities, comprising a State run general hospital and 47 Local 
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Government primary health clinics and dispensaries. These geographical 
characteristics are depicted in figures 3.2 and 3.3 below. 
 
 
Fig 3.2 Map of Benue State showing Katsina-Ala Local Government Are (Source: 
Google map). 
  
81 
 
 
Fig 3.3 Map of Katsina-Ala showing the five NAPPMED districts and corresponding 
sub-markets 
Source: Health Department Katsina-Ala Local Government Area, Benue State 
     Katsina-Ala submarket 
     Gbor submarket 
     Tor Doonga submarket 
     Abaji submarket 
     Sai submarket 
Rational for selection of study site:  
 The rich socio-cultural diversity described above was judged to present a perfect 
context for understanding cross-cultural influences on health care behaviours in 
patent drug markets and also gave the study a broad and in-depth coverage of the 
research topic. Additional consideration was the current security challenge in Nigeria 
and since the researcher is of Benue State extraction, this site appeared safest. 
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3.7.2 Preliminary activities 
Prior to commencement of actual data collection activities, all the research 
instruments (questionnaires, interview guides and observation checklist), were 
pretested in a pilot study at Ikpayongo, a small community in Gwer East Local 
Government Area, also of Benue State. This was to establish their appropriateness to 
elicit research relevant data from participants and the results helped revise and shape 
the final research instruments. Two research assistants were recruited for this project: 
One had secondary school level education and her role was to help with 
administration of questionnaires, assisting uneducated participants to fill out their 
questionnaires and follow up and collect completed questionnaires from sampled 
drug shop owners. She had been trained in this role. The second assistant held a 
Masters in English Literature, and served as alternate transcriber of interview 
recordings.   
3.7.3 Entering the field 
To effectively embark on the task of collecting the appropriate data required to 
answer the research question and attain the research objectives, the researcher 
undertook advocacy and sensitization visits to the Local Government Council 
Authority, which serves as the principal gate keeper into the area. The researcher 
held two successful meetings with the Head of Health Department, who assigned the 
Supervising Officer for Pharmacy and Immunization as my guide during the 
research. The officer subsequently introduced this researcher to the President of the 
National Association of Proprietary and Patent Medicine Dealers (NAPPMED), 
Katsina-Ala chapter. NAPPMED is a nationally and legally registered umbrella body 
of patent medicine vendors that serves to protect principally, the business and 
welfare interests of its members. It is structured along national, state and local 
government chapters. The researcher had three meetings with the local chapter 
executive members before their acceptance and cooperation on the research was 
secured. Thereafter, the researcher attended and addressed congress meetings of all 
the district chapters of the association in the local government Council. At all of 
these meetings, the researcher introduced himself fully and the purpose and 
usefulness of the research were explained and this strategy was intended to enhance 
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the researchers acceptance in the eyes of the association members. Katsina-Ala 
chapter of NAPPMED is further organized into five districts associations, located in 
Katsina-Ala Township, Gbor, Sai, Abaji and Tor Donga. The sub-districts, their 
component council wards and population served are shown in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: NAPPMED sub-districts, their council wards and populations 
NAPPMED sub-District Nos. Council Wards Population Served 
Abaji 2 36,735 
Gbor 2 43,180 
Katsina-Ala 3 65,423 
Sai 3 55,835 
Tor Donga 2 47,045 
Total 12 248,218 
 
During the period of interacting with the officials and members of the drug retailers, 
time was also taken to understand the research setting through mapping the physical, 
social and cultural terrain, as well as conducting a census of provider outlets and 
numerically coding each outlet at the same time (Conteh and Hanson 2003).  These 
activities yielded a fertile ground for the entire research process. In all, there were 93 
patent medicine vendor shops identified, 82 were registered with NAPPMED, while 
11 were not registered with the association. The distribution of these retail outlets is 
as shown in the table3.3 below. Katsina –Ala township District had 56 outlets; Gbor 
District, 12; while Tor Donga, Abaji and Sai Districts had 12, 8 and 5 patent 
medicine outlets respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Patent Medicine Vendor Shops in Katsina-Ala LGC 
District Nos. of drug shops %  Population 
 
Abaji 8 8.6  36,735 
 
Gbor 12 12.9  43,180  
Katsina-Ala 56 60.2  65,423  
Sai 5 5.4  55835  
Tor Donga 12 12.9  47,045  
Total 93 100  248,218  
 
 
3.7.4 Study Population 
The target population for the supply side of the study market was the 93 drug shops 
identified through prior outlet census, while the demand side population was all 
individuals in all households who actively made drug purchases from the sampled 
patent medicine shop. However, because of time, financial and physical effort 
constraint, samples were drawn from these populations.  
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Table 3.4: Distribution of Sampled Patent Medicine Vendor Shops in Katsina-Ala 
District 
Nos. of drug 
shops 
Nos. of shops sampled  % of sample  
Abaji 8 2  6.7  
Gbor 12 4  13.3  
Katsina-Ala 56 18  60  
Sai 5 2  6.7  
Tor Donga 12 4  13.3  
Total 93 30  100  
      
3.7.5 Consumer exit questionnaires and interviews 
30 consumers were systematically sampled to participate in the questionnaire survey 
at 10 purposively selected points of use. Two patent medicine vendor outlets were 
selected in each to the five districts of the Local Government Chapter of NAPPMED. 
Though Katsina-Ala district accounted for 60% of the patent drug shops in the entire 
Council, it serves only about a quarter of the population. Therefore population spread 
was given greater consideration in choosing outlets for consumer data collection. 
Three consumers were systematically enrolled, picking the first enrollee randomly 
and then the nth customer in each of the ten drug shops selected, making a total of 30 
adults (>16years) who came into the drug shops to make drug purchases. The 
participants completed the questionnaires at the shop premises and returned them 
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immediately at the point of purchase. Where a participant was not literate, she/he was 
assisted by the researcher or the research assistant. Again at each of the 10 outlets, a 
consumer was conveniently picked and interviewed during the round of interviews.  
3.7.6 Observation of provider-consumer interactions 
In each of the five patent medicine sub-markets, two provider outlets were randomly 
selected for presumed unobtrusive observation of sales transactions. Overall, ten 
such observations were made in the entire market as spelt out in section 3.3.3 above.   
A summary of all data collection activities is presented in table 3, below. 
Table 3.5: Summary of research activities  
S/no. Time  Activity 
 
(2012)  
 
1. Jan-Feb Advocacy, familiarization and patent medicine outlet census activities 
2. Mar-
Apr 
Provider and consumer questionnaire administration, and data entry into 
Excel and importation into SPSS 
3. May-
July 
Provider and consumer interviews and transcription using Windows 7. 
Next Generation in Africa Social Science Fellowship workshop in Ghana 
(15-21, July) 
4. Aug-
Sept 
Regulatory officials interviews and transcriptions using Windows 7 
5. Oct-
Nov 
Unobtrusive observational studies 
6. Dec Winding down and exiting the research field 
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3.8 Exiting the research field 
On completion of all the data collecting activities outlined in the research design, the 
research was wound down with informal social visits to drug shops who participated 
in the study. These meetings involved general discussions and further clarifications 
about any particular areas of the research, usually over drinks. Photographs of some 
of the participants were also taken at this time. As a group, I conveyed my gratitude 
to the executive of NAPPMED for their cooperation during the research and assured 
them of access to research findings on successful completion of my PhD. In like 
manner, thank you visits were made to the Health Department of Katsina-Ala Local 
Council and the Director of Pharmaceutical Services of the Benue State Ministry of 
Health, where again assurances were made to disseminate the research outcomes at 
the end of the researcher process. Thus the fieldwork was wound down to a close. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RETAIL MARKET STRUCTURE 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of the interaction of market 
forces of demand and supply, and their implications for access to quality and safe 
essential drugs in Katsina-Ala local government area. The result analysis approach 
adopted therefore is one of relating practice to theory, identifying areas of similarities 
and fit and differences between them, and exploring the latter in terms of their 
implications for market performance. The findings of the thesis are presented in a 
series of four chapters. In each result chapter, findings are presented and considered 
in relation to economic theory and evidence in economic literature as reviewed in 
Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
The results have been organized based on analytical themes related to the research 
question and objectives. Each chapter develops from a synthesis of evidence 
generated from the three main data collection activities, with the intention of 
presenting in-depth and cohesive insights of each key thematic area. Consequently, 
the current chapter begins with an assessment of market structure and addresses 
objective 1of the thesis, while Chapters 5 and 6 relate to objectives 2 and 3, and takes 
a close look at provider conduct and consumer behaviour respectively. Chapter 7 
reports findings on retail drug sales regulation, a cord which cross-cuts all five 
research objectives, and finally, Chapter 8 discusses and concludes from the evidence 
from all four results chapters integrated into a synopsis of the implications for 
effective access policy, thereby jointly addressing objectives 4 and 5 of the study.  
4.2 Market Structure 
The first objective of the thesis is to understand the nature of organization of the 
patent medicine market in Katsina-Ala Local Government Council, serving as a first 
step towards determining the form of competition in the market. As a prelude to the 
analysis of the market structure of the researched market and to lay a firm foundation 
for further analysis, the thesis firstly will define the market researched. A market 
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traditionally, is defined along product market and in terms of the geographic market 
over which trade in the product occurs (Morrisey et al. 1989; Kleiner et al. 2012).  
4.2.1 Definition of the market 
Market definition along product and geographical lines both require the condition of 
substitutability in demand and supply as an underpinning principle (Morrisey et al. 
1989).  The product market in the study context was taken to refer to health 
enhancing medicinal products bought and sold from patent medicine vendor outlets, 
even though medicines are heterogeneous in nature.  This definition is anchored on 
the assumption of substitution between providers and the products they sell in the 
market. It is pertinent to clarify that, itinerant medicine vendors and market-day drug 
vendors were not considered important for the purpose of the study, based on their 
distribution in the area and therefore not included in this definition. For instance, the 
researcher did not encounter a single itinerant medicine vendor all through the 
research period, though market day vendors were occasionally spotted.  In the course 
of the research process, it appeared that the market day drug vendors could have been 
the handiwork of some actual patent medicine vendors who in addition to their static 
shops might have been trying to make more sales. Also, there was just one pharmacy 
in the entire Local Council Area, located in Katsina- Ala town, which was likewise 
not deemed significant in the study either. Therefore, substitutability in supply was 
limited to shop based patent medicine vendors. Consumers substituted between 
branded, branded generic and unbranded generic products, but basically the same 
drugs. The geographic market was delimited along the geopolitical unit of the Local 
government Area. This geopolitical definition of a market though simple and widely 
used in the literature, does not enable quantification of market concentration and 
market power accurately. For purposes of anti-trust policy for example, economic 
definitions of geographical market adopting patient flow data, price and shipment 
approaches are preferred and said to be more meaningful (Dalamau-Matarrodona and 
Puig-Junoy 1998; Kleiner et al. 2012; Morrisey et al. 1989). These approaches 
employ empirical evidence on patient flow data, price and shipment patterns to 
establish market boundaries, even though these variables are subject to measurement 
errors (Morrisey et al. 1989). This researcher could not undertake to collect data on 
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any of these dimensions due to resource constraints hence, the recourse to the simple 
geopolitical delineation of the market.  For the purpose of analysis of concentration 
in the market, consideration was given to consumers’ transportation, time and 
distance costs, which informed further division of the monolithic geographic market 
into 5 sub-markets, corresponding to the 5 administrative units of the Katsina-Ala 
chapter of National Association of Patent and Proprietary Medicine Vendors 
(NAPPMED), as earlier described in Chapter 3 of the thesis. Also, this unit of 
analysis was supported by findings of very similar shop dimensions within a 
particular sub-area of the market. Observations revealed that competing drug shops 
were mostly located near each other, commonly in or around market squares. Stand-
alone drug shops located deeper in interior villages had no competitors. In spite of 
these geographical delineations, in pragmatic ways, the thesis recognises that these 
boundaries may neither be rigid nor self-contained, with some overlap in actual 
consumer drug purchase behaviour across these geographically bounded sub-
markets. The thesis will now estimate market concentration as prelude to defining 
competition in this market. 
4.3 Market Concentration 
Market concentration is evaluated on sub-market basis first, then overall in the Local 
Government Council and is considered purely as seller concentration in the market. 
Concentration estimation along product market is not undertaken, as this was defined 
in generic terms of all the pharmaceuticals sold in the geographic market and 
secondly, an audit of products sold was not undertaken as part of this study due to 
time and financial limitations. Also, gross annual turn-over of sampled retailers was 
not revealed by over 80% of respondents, and those responding documented 
questionable data compared with other evidence from interviews and observations. 
Not a single interviewee said he/she kept a sales record book, although the sensitivity 
of this information may also have accounted for this behaviour. These limitations 
therefore constrained the analysis.   
Conventionally used measures of concentration in industrial organization literature 
are the concentration ratio (CR) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Both 
measures attempt to directly capture the number of firms or sellers and their 
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corresponding market shares or indirectly by market share proxies represented by 
sales volume or reserve capacity, as variables in the computations. The HHI is 
preferentially adopted by the antitrust agency in the United States for the analysis of 
mergers and evaluation of their potential impact on competition. For this purpose, the 
guideline stipulates that a market with an HHI less than 0.1 is un-concentrated, 0.1 to 
0.18 is moderately concentrated while an HHI score above 0.18 is deemed as highly 
concentrated as defined by the US Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice (Gaynor and Vogt 2000). 
Less frequently used measures of concentration include the Lorenz curve, Gini 
Coefficient, Inverse Index and Entropy, all of which also employ market share in 
their quantification (Encaoua and Jacquemin 1980). In this research however, it was 
not possible to measure market shares of the sellers, so analysis of market structure 
for the purposes of gaining insight into the nature of competition in the studied 
market will adopt simple approaches of patent medicine vendor shops per capita and 
the inverse Herfindahl Index, with the latter making assumption of provider outlet 
symmetry. This approach is considered reasonable because it was observed that most 
of the drug shops in a particular sub-market appeared grossly similar and any 
differences in shop sizes is therefore taken not to be systematic (Encaoua and 
Jacquemin 1980). The computation of the market concentrations indices are 
presented in Table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1 Measurement of market concentration in study area 
District Nos. shops Population Shop per pop. HHI (1/N) 
Abaji 8 36,735 1:4,591 0.125 
Gbor 12 43,180 1:3,598 0.083 
Katsina-Ala 56 65,423 1:1,168 0.018 
Sai 5 55,835 1:11,167 0.2 
Tor Donga 12 47,045 1:3,920 0.083 
 N = number of shops in a sub-market 
Shop per capita for the entire Katsina-Ala market is 1:2,669 while the inverse HHI is 
0.01 
In order to interpret the findings, patent medicine shops are framed as proxy 
pharmacies in this rural context (since they represented the only sources of retail 
medicines for local consumers) and drug shop per capita determined. Drawing on 
WHO’s recommendation of one pharmacy to 2000 population (Azhar et al. 2009), 
only the market in Katsina-Ala town may be said to meet this recommendation, 
while all others fail on this benchmark with Sai market appearing to be an outlier. 
The shop per capita for the patent medicine vendor market in the overall Katsina-Ala 
local government council is also generally above the WHO recommendation. The 
implication is that there are fewer sellers in the market than is required to ensure 
proper functioning of the market and guarantee adequate access to medicines for 
optimal population wellbeing. The computed Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes for the 
submarkets indicate that Katsina-Ala, Gbor and Tor Donga all have un-concentrated 
markets, although Gbor and Tor Donga are relatively closer to the moderately 
concentrated region. The market in Abaji is moderately concentrated and placed at 
the extreme end of the spectrum is the submarket in Sai, which is highly 
concentrated. Based on the computed HHI results, there is a tendency towards 
unconcentration in the market overall, because at the sub-market level, three out of 
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five are unconcentrated while only the Sai market is concentrated in this analysis. 
This is further supported by the overall inverse HHI score of 0.01. However, that the 
sub-markets have both concentrated and unconcentrated features coexisting in them 
makes a firm conclusion of the nature of competition without further consideration of 
the other important determinants of market competition difficult, and are undertaken 
in subsequent analyses.  
The result also shows an increasing pattern of concentration as one move away from 
the local government headquarters in Katsina-Ala. For example, a movement to Gbor 
from the headquarters, the number of patent medicine outlets falls sharply from 56 to 
12 and then further precipitously to 5 in Sai, with a corresponding increase of 
population per shop distribution north-wards. Going eastward out of Katsina-Ala, a 
similar pattern may also be observed, although less explicitly. The observed trend 
may be attributable to the socioeconomic advantages of Katsina-Ala as the 
administrative headquarters and the harbouring of a tertiary institution in its precinct, 
both capable of boosting economic activities in the area: a powerful incentive for 
sales and profit maximization. Though the researcher did not acquire data on village 
or ward level shop per capita distribution gradient, this evidence would have more 
clearly measured actual access to services at the point of need. Furthermore, the 
conclusion so far also recognises the artefactual nature of the terms of analysis of the 
geographic market, which was not established with certainty.  
4.4 Entry Barriers 
Evidence for entry barriers came mostly from qualitative interviews and is evaluated 
descriptively. The most frequently cited barriers to entry were lack of knowledge of 
drug use and start-up finances. When questioned about their experiences with entry 
into the drug retailing business, respondents held these common views:  
 “Patient medicine shop is not just a business you can start like the provision shop, 
spare parts or any other business. It is all about medical care, so we go through 
several training after school, we go into practical, that is where you serve for eight 
years and gain knowledge and master everything about first aid before starting.” 
(R02). 
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“I was trained and after training, worked under Maltina Company, after sometimes, 
before I decided to set up a business of my own…” (R06) 
“You cannot do patent medicine business without training in the business. It is not 
like provision selling, where anybody can just decide today to start buying and 
selling and he start. You have to train for some time, in fact for many years before 
you can start selling medicine” (R 07)  
All these quotes stress the technical nature of drugs and underscore prior knowledge 
of drugs as an entry barrier into the patent medicine market. Lack of start-up capital 
was another barrier to entering the business. Most of interviewed participants 
confessed they started on very small scales and scopes due to financial constraints. 
Some of their experiences are borne out in the statements represented below.  
“Yeah, when I started this business newly, at that time, I did not have enough money 
to obtain drugs, sometimes I don’t have the drugs so I go to my colleagues and get it 
for them …” (R.05) 
“Generally, my problem is finance. That is my major problem, because even if I have 
enough capital, this place will be full and I will not have any problem. You see all 
those places are vacant, no medicine, that is my major problem. (R 01) 
“In this business you need plenty of money before you can start. If you no get 
enough money you cannot get customer.” (R 09) 
The challenge of financing source as an entry barrier was also brought to the fore in 
questionnaire answers. 70% (21 out of 30) of respondents in provider questionnaires 
were not aware of any formal institutions to access loans to either start or expand 
their businesses. For some, shop growth depended purely on savings accruing from 
business turnover. It is noteworthy to observe that most patent medicine vendors had 
dual businesses, suggesting that perhaps, financial surpluses from one business line 
could be ploughed back into the other business portfolio to ensure sustainability, a 
circular financing mechanism, as affirmed by this interviewee: 
“Because I am a farmer too, sometimes if I get profit here, I carry it for the farm, like 
today, I carried N 2000 for the farm, so that is how it is.” (R 03) 
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Another vendor said: 
“Oga (Sir), you see this business need a lot of money to start, and it is not easy to 
raise money to enter business. If you go to the bank, they will ask you to bring C of 
O and how many of us fit get that? That is the problem we have with the bank.” (R 
08) 
Other entry barriers identified were high cost of licensing fees, taxes, regulatory 
requirements and unofficial payments to regulatory agents. Costs of regulatory 
compliance, for example premises levies and licence renewals fees were also said to 
exist, as well as multiple informal payments to obtain business registration approval 
and police officials both on high way checks and those who regularly paid predatory 
visits at drug shops. The research did not explore whether all providers actually paid 
these charges regularly, as this was not in the scope of the study. The multiplicity of 
factors together might have constituted considerable entry conditions into the market. 
The collectivisation and coordination of sellers under the NAPPMED umbrella 
described in chapter 3 of the thesis, also portends important implications for entry 
into the market. Asked about the relationship with patent medicine vendors who were 
not registered with the union, a member said: 
“That is the reason why we inaugurate members of task force to be moving round, to 
find any person who is selling without being a member of the union. When we 
eventually find them, we ask them to get registered, and if they fail to do so, we do 
ask police to go and pounce on them.” (R 09)  
This statement implies subtle exercise of monopoly behaviour by NAPPMED 
through entry clampdown. 
These entry barriers notwithstanding, the majority of providers believed entry by 
new entrants into the business was free. The evidence presented would support a 
conclusion of low entry barriers in this market very broadly.  
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4.4.1 Exit Potentials/Barriers 
Funds management was cited as a key predictor of possible exit from the market. 
Most providers interviewed agreed that exit was not a common phenomenon, but 
identified capital erosion arising out of poor management of resources in terms of 
reckless expenditures, uncontrolled provision of credit sales and other high financial 
personal outlays as possible causes of business failures and exit from the market. 
Underscoring the role of credit as a possible exit factor, one interviewee put it this 
way: 
“I still give them, but not that I need credit because in this business, if you put credit 
forward, the business will not move anywhere, so if people are coming and you are 
giving out credit, at the end, you will be at loss, some of them will come back and 
pay, some of them will go finally.” (R 07) 
Also listed among possible determinants of exit was inability to secure loans from 
formal financial institutions like banks, to expand and sustain a business since 
demand may be weak at times: 
“I don’t have much money and I don’t have collateral security to collect loan from 
bank.”   (R 09) 
Poor sales of stocked drugs were seen as another possible way of exiting the market. 
All sellers said unsold stocks retained over an extended length of time may lead to 
expiry and loss of efficacy. Stocks falling into this category are usually destroyed, 
with the druggist incurring capital loss thereof. Repeated loses may lead to failure 
and exit from the market, as one patent medicine vendor captured it: 
“It depends on how your market is moving, because some of these drugs use to 
expire quickly, but you have short time to sell, so you have to buy small so that you 
sell before they get expired, because you will have to pack them and throw away if 
they expire and it is loss on your side.” (R 08) 
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In both the questionnaires and provider interviews, respondents mentioned the 
potential of exit by regulatory shut down, although no particular incidence was 
volunteered. 
“They walk into our shops and be checking drugs. Even if they see any drug, like 
ampiclox, they will say ampiclox is not on our list of drugs to sell, they will take it 
and carry us to lock some times, or close your shop.” (R 07) 
The ninth Interviewee also talked about regulatory closure as a result of regulatory 
infringement. 
“Eh, even when they see something like piriton, they can decide to seal your shop 
and you have nowhere to go and nobody to fall back to.” 
An official of NAPPMED, who doubles as a task-force member articulated their 
duties concerning regulation of member practices this way: 
“We don’t spare any section, because when the government agencies come in, they 
will not spare anyone and we have to have access to them if we can’t have access, we 
will make you fold up, because we can’t allow you to keep on giving a bad image to 
the union.”  
Observational evidence of entry and exit barriers might not have been robust 
however, but at the point of exiting the research field, all the initial 93 patent 
medicine vending outlets were still operational and one new patent medicine shop 
was observed to have come on stream in Katsina-Ala town. This indicates the 
existence of low entry barriers, though the duration of the study was short (9 months) 
to support firm conclusion. Exiting the business was said to be fairly easy and 
entailed either a gradual disengagement process or the bulk sell-off of stock to 
another vendor, with both approaches yielding minimal financial loses. 
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4.5 Horizontal Linkages 
Provider interviews and observational studies revealed evidence of some form of 
horizontal linkages in this market. About 70% of interviewed providers entered the 
business through the apprenticeship model, where knowledge of the business is 
acquired through understudying an experienced provider (often a family member 
already in the business), over a specified tie-in period after which the intern is given 
start-up capital to establish his/her own drug shop. The views of two interviewees 
support the assertion.    
“Any way, I started by serving somebody for some years and there I was taught more 
on drugs administration on patients.” (R01). 
The second interviewee said:  
“It is all about medical care, so we go through practical: that is where you serve for 
eight years and gain knowledge and master everything about first aid before starting. 
So I served my master after my secondary school, after eight years, we settled, I then 
opened my shop, that is how I started.” (R 02) 
Such new entrant into the business is therefore likely to hold allegiance to his 
benefactor by taking instructions from the “Master.” As an example, one of the 
questionnaire respondents in this study would not complete the questionnaire until he 
had consulted his “Master”, who gave the go ahead. This behaviour is likely to 
manifest in the real market situation and influence both price and non-price 
decisions.     
4.6 Vertical Linkages 
The wholesale market may exert considerable influence on market structure and by 
extension concentration and competition in a market below it in the distribution 
chain (Brooks et al. 2008; Gaynor and Town 2012). From questionnaires answers, 
retailers stocked from multiple sources, with majority (53%) using pharmacies while 
35% stocked through wholesalers. However, provider interviews and observations 
revealed that the commonest source for restocking used by patent medicine vendors 
was the wholesale drug market in Onitsha, located over 400 Km away, in the south 
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eastern  state of  Anambra, Nigeria. This Wholesale market also serves stockist from 
the rest of the country and therefore may be highly concentrated. Field observations 
also suggest that pharmacies might have been an alternative stocking source, but not 
a significant one. A few other patent retailers stocked from other patent medicine 
vendors occasionally. This evidence base would suggest that the concentrated nature 
of the wholesale market probably exerted some deterministic influence on the 
structure of the retail distribution chain below and it might therefore not have been 
coincidental that the majority of retailers at this study site originated from the eastern 
part of the country, even though resident in Katsina-Ala. The definite nature and 
impact of the relationship was however not explored further because of time and 
financial constraints. 
Generally the study of retail market structure has limited place in historical studies 
on retailing and it is more restricted in the pharmacy specialty, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa. The potential therefore to rigorously compare findings related to the 
elements of market structure in this study was severely constrained as only one study 
examining the structure of retail drug shops in Africa was found in prior economic 
literature (Goodman 2004a). However, several overlaps were discovered with other 
studies of the related phenomenon of retail pharmacy in the UK and the US, which 
will be used as points for general referencing.    
Economic theory predicts that low concentration market structure will be associated 
with efficient market performance and welfare enhancement.  
The evidence has demonstrated a mixed market structure in this market: 
concentration and unconcentraton. The established concentrated retail structure of 
the market would agree with the findings of Goodman (2004a) who also concluded 
that the retail market for the treatment of malaria and fever in Tanzania was 
concentrated. Brooks, et al. (2008), also found high levels of concentration in the 
related retail pharmacy market in the United States and more generally, health care 
markets, especially its retail component tend to be highly concentrated (Gaynor and 
Town 2012; Nowakhtar and Widdows 1987). The study also established that the 
patent medicine market in this research location tended to become more concentrated 
the further one moved away from the administrative and economic hub of the local 
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government council. Doucette and colleagues (1999) had also found that U.S. 
counties with higher per capita incomes had more retail pharmacies per capita, while 
those with higher poverty rates recorded decreased pharmacy per capita. They 
subsequently theorized that the local pharmacy supply in an area will be related to 
the underlying health system and socioeconomic context in the area. The finding of 
new entry into the market despite the perception of established medicine vendors that 
entry was not easy, points to potential contestability. This pattern of contestability 
also occurred in the study of retail malarial treatment market in Tanzania (Goodman 
2004a). Elsewhere too, the coexistence of concentration and the constant threat of 
potential entry by new entrants have been established (Koutsomanoli-Fillepaki and 
Staikouras 2003).The evidence that most of the patent medicine vendors restocked 
from a nationally concentrated wholesaler market had also been reported by 
Onwujekwe and colleagues (2004). Similarly, pharmaceutical wholesale markets 
have been reported to be nationally concentrated in Western economies as well 
(Brooks et al. 2008; Gaynor and Town 2012). Furthermore, these authors have also 
argued that the level of competition in the drug wholesaler market might potentially 
exert significant influence in the structure of the retail market distribution chain 
below.  
The unconcentrated element in this study is compatible with the findings of Jerome 
and Ogunkola (2000), who reported that retail markets in Africa were in general 
unconcentrated. 
The shop per capita and the HHI have been interpreted in this study based on 
notional ideals, but they fail to explicitly specify the pattern of distribution of the 
shops and therefore the nature of actual spatial access to these drug shops. For 
example, empirical evidence may show an unconcentrated market, yet shops might 
not have been accessible in real terms, because the shops are clustered in one part of 
the market as observed in this study where majority of the drug shops were cited 
around market squares, removed from where consumers actually work and live. This 
means that dwellers in distant places may still have challenges in accessing 
medicines when they have the need. The policy implication for understanding of 
access therefore is that accessibility may best be understood from the perspective of 
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distance to a service point rather than some quantification of a statistic and 
comparison to a notional ideal. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
Leading up to this point in the analysis, the thesis has evaluated the structure of the 
patent medicine market for pharmaceuticals in Katsina-Ala local government area. 
The geographical market was analysed along geopolitical sub-markets using the 
administrative boundaries of NAPPMED, as introduced above. Only the sub-market 
in Katsina-Ala town is clearly unconcentrated via both approaches of shop per capita 
and the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Whilst the markets at Gbor and Tor 
Donga are also unconcentrated by the Herfindahl index, they are concentrated by the 
shop per capita assessment scores. The sub-market at Sai is concentrated on both 
evaluative dimensions of market concentration used in this study. There are also 
findings suggestive of low entry and exit barriers, as well as elements indicative of 
both horizontal and vertical inter-relationships. Overall, it is difficult to firmly place 
this market at a specific point on the perfect competition-monopoly continuum as it 
is invested with both features of monopolistic and oligopolistic competitions, also 
meaning that it remains contestable.  
In sum, the chapter has analysed the market structure of patent medicine vendor 
market in Kastina-Ala local council area. The evidence has demonstrated that the 
market is low concentrated overall and potentially contestable.  
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CHAPTER 5:  RETAIL PROVIDER CONDUCT 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the exploration into the nature of competition in the researched 
retail drug market and complements the ideas on market structure articulated in 
chapter 4 in order to fully define competition. Conduct variables are examined 
through analysis of provider perceptions of their roles and how these perceptions are 
operationalized through price and non-price competitions against the backdrop of 
regulatory adherence. The analysis begins with reporting of the perceptions of retail 
drug shop providers, as this knowledge is essential for understanding what influences 
shape and drive behaviour of providers in the market. It is also fundamental for 
design of innovative strategies to align these micro-entrepreneurs with public health 
policy goals of improved and timely access to effective and safe remedies for basic 
health care needs.  The chapter draws substantially on provider interviews, 
supplemented by observations and questionnaire responses and results are presented 
in four main thematic lines. Provider perception of their roles forms the core of 
section 5.2, while section 5.3 explores non-price competition. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 
analyse provider response to regulation and price competition respectively. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the nature of competition in section 5.7. 
Pertinently, interpretation of findings in this chapter is facilitated by the researcher’s 
multiple competencies in clinical medicine and pharmacology.  
5.2 Provider Role Perception 
The provider perception of his role provides a good entry point for understanding of 
motivations and actual conduct of medicine retailers in the study market. Findings in 
relation to this inquiry are presented and analysed. 
5.2.1 Provider motivations 
All patent medicine vendors stated that the motivation to join the business was driven 
by the pragmatic need for a profitable means of livelihood. As custodians of 
medicines, which are associated with cures, medicine sellers distinguished and 
contrasted their trade from the more regular trading in other non-medical 
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commodities as unique.  This awareness seems to confer particular privileges such as 
respect from the community and the corresponding responsibility of gate keepers to 
curative medicines. The evidences come from notions expressed during interviews. 
One interviewee said: 
“Unlike other business, you know people don’t just walk to chemist and say they 
want to buy drugs, just like they use to buy from store. Not until somebody is sick, or 
may be having one problem or the other before they come to the chemist.” (R 01) 
In spite of profit motives of patent medicine vendors, a sense of responsibility was 
also seen to moderate the profit maximising entrepreneurial drives of providers, as 
expressed by one respondent. 
 “I consider my customers. Some of them may not have money, I can give them on 
credit, when they have they come to pay, that’s why we say that God called us to this 
line, it is not only to make money, but see it as a helping business.” (R 09) 
This reveals that patent medicine sellers are inspired not entirely by financial 
considerations; they may also be driven by the desire to render services to their 
communities and be respected and trusted.  
5.2.2 Professional experts 
Patent medicine vendors saw themselves as medical experts in the various 
communities they were located in, and consumers were referred to as patients, 
customers and clients interchangeably. They described the nature of interactions with 
their customers variously as simple drug selling, medical and health information 
counselling, diagnosis and treatment or referrals. These were observed to include 
simple selling, consultations and treatments and occasional advice encounters, no 
referrals to formal facilities were observed. Their views were captured separately in 
the following excerpts:  
“They say they are feeling like this or like that, then you have to know the problem 
and give them drugs. Sometimes if you are not satisfied with the explanations, you 
refer them to laboratory technicians, after the result is out, they will get prescription 
and they will come to chemist and buy the drugs.” (R 01)  
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“I do both by the discipline I have, and that has helped me a lot, it has also attracted 
people to come to me, because I will see their conditions, prescribe and dispense, 
where I don’t even get drugs, I recommend them to where they can easily get it and 
they will get it.” (R03) 
Other providers also expressed their opinions of what they thought about themselves: 
 “First of all, we have labs, where I direct people to go run test and bring me results 
so when I get these results I now use these results and the prescription with me to 
compare with what is on the ground, and I give accurate prescription.” (R 07) 
 “… then we are in the interior, here illiteracy is everywhere, so we still talk to them, 
teach them and show them what to do and we are getting results like that.” (R 10) 
 “Well, as trained personnel, whenever they come, I don’t just carry drugs 
distributing to them or dispensing just like that. When they come, I have to find out 
the cause of sickness, how long the sickness has taken before the issue of 
prescribing, because when they come, first I investigate to find out the cause of the 
sickness, I use to diagnose, find out before I give drugs to them.” (R 04) 
Some respondents also reported overriding clients’ demand for medicines, where 
professionalism and clients’ best interests were reckoned more desirable rather than 
profit maximization. 
 “When they refuse my advice, I tell them I know what I am doing, so let them abide 
by what I have told them. If they don’t have that money for full dose, let them go and 
find it before they come. Some of them will go, some will say they will go and buy 
in another place.” (R 09) 
Although patent medicine providers viewed their role as expert custodians of 
medicines and customers as inadequately knowledgeable about drugs, consumer 
autonomy was fully recognised in purchase decisions. There was no consistently 
observed procedure for the sale of any drugs. Products were dispensed on request. A 
transaction failed to take place only in instances when the vendor had a stock out. 
Consumer autonomy was explicitly upheld as borne out in the following statements. 
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“What I meant by environment is not that here is a villager with N20 and you tell 
them that that N20 medicine will not help them, they will insist telling you that that 
is what they have and the drugs should be given to them, no matter what you say, 
would fall on deaf ears. As a place in the local area with people who are not well to 
do, like farmers etc. so even if you tell them the right thing, they will still insist on 
their opinion, so that is what I meant by environment, and the financial 
insufficiency.” (R 02) 
This practice reflect the exercise of free choice by consumers and supply responding 
to demand, and on many occasions led to sale of under doses of medicaments and in 
some cases inappropriate treatments.  
5.2.3 First aid providers 
Most interviewees described their practice as providing first aid before full care was 
sought at a later time, or at a higher level of care.  
“..., so I started gradually, improving up to this time, so in patent medicine business, 
even if someone brings N20, you can still find some medicine as first aid and give to 
the person.” (R 04) 
 “For instance in Benue State today, there are local governments that you will find 
less than two pharmacy shops, in these places. It is the patent medicine vendors that 
bring in little first aid.” (R 10) 
The notion of first aider role held by patent medicine vendors in this study further 
supports the argument in section 5.1.1, that vendors may also value altruism other 
than financial incentives in making choices of their market behaviours. 
5.2.4 Meeting need and complementing the public system 
Patent medicine sellers identified gaps in the formal health system in terms of 
financial barriers and poor availability of drugs, and thus viewed their role as 
providing cheaper alternatives for consumers and improved proximity to products, 
provided at extended and flexible work hours. Patent medicine sellers felt they 
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played complementary role to the formal health systems by emphasizing referral of 
serious cases, and receiving prescriptions from them in turn.  
“It is not that so, one good thing is this, the grassroots is where the population of the 
entire local government is based. The general hospital here is the only general 
hospital around this place, and it has no drugs, they are either on strike or not 
functional and that one alone cannot meet the needs of the entire people. So 
sometimes, we get the drugs to ease the pains of the masses.” (R 03) 
“When you talk of the issue of malaria, you see that some of the anti-malaria, we are 
allowed to sell, but our license do not cover it, there is need for us to sell it, because 
there is no any pharmacy in local areas. I want to tell you that without patent 
medicine dealers in Nigeria, there is no way you can help the condition of patients in 
this country. Reason by yourself, in this local government area, how many of these 
pharmacies do we have? Can one pharmacy be able to attend to everybody in this 
local government area? And some local government areas do not have any pharmacy 
shop. It is we that are providing drugs where there is no pharmacy.” (R 02) 
Whilst these drug sellers emphasised their role in complementing the public sector in 
attaining the overall health agenda of the country, they viewed the public regulatory 
body, Pharmacy Council of Nigeria (PCN), a body of mainly pharmacists as rivals 
and competitors in the market. Their expressed views were borne out in the 
following excerpts: 
”... even though they are genuine and we bought them from the pharmacies, they will 
come and put pressure on us, because they are controlling us, so that they will make 
more profit. When they are selling ciproxine at N500 and we said no, ciproxine is 
supposed to be sold at N300, they will now bring law enforcement agency to harass 
us in the business, so that they can sell that ciproxine which can go for 300 naira at 
N500. That is what they are doing, it is not regulation.” (R 03) 
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“You know, in this field I earlier said that the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria do 
not allow us to fill our shops in the same way like a pharmacy. They want our shops 
to be maintained in a skeletal form.” (R 05) 
“One of the challenges we have in expanding the scope given is the fact that some 
feel that they are our competitors for example the pharmacists say that this is their 
business. They have gone to school and spent money and when they come out 
someone who have not spent the time and money will come and hijack the business.” 
(R 10)  
These expressions clearly betray the mistrust the regulatee has for the regulator and 
his intention. They also provide a perspective for understanding regulatory outcome 
in the market.  
5.2.5 Practice boundaries and linkages 
All medicine sellers appeared to acknowledge the limits of their competence and 
resource availability as reflected in their expressed willingness to refer difficult cases 
to hospitals and laboratory facilities, which are better staffed and equipped. Again, 
interviewees explicitly acknowledged their knowledge and practice limits. 
“As I earlier said, we don’t just go into treatment, we provide first aid. When doctor 
prescribe, we can now supply the drugs. In case of malaria, if it is a high condition, 
we can refer you to lab and then make doctor to prescribe drug for you, after which 
we can now supply you the drugs. When we see that the situation is not severe, we 
can give you panadol to cure the temperature, before the patient go to the laboratory 
man. That is how sometimes we do in this environment.” (R 02) 
“What am able to do I do, if the situation is not above me, like when you come with 
wound that is minor or say if it is the issue of minor malaria, I still handle it, but if it 
is a  serious malaria fever, I tell you to go to the hospital because I don’t have drugs 
to administer and if it is the issue of surgical operation, that one, everybody knows 
that it is the hospital, we are not even up to the standard of clinic or dispensary, we 
are just patent medicine shops. We are only here to give drugs to the people to settle 
their problems, if it is above us, they go to the higher level.” (R 06) 
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The motivations for these decisions and actions may be patients’ best interest and 
concerns for implications of poor outcomes and community perception of provider 
competences. Providers might have been mindful of the poor public judgement of 
their competence if they treated complaints that exceeded their capabilities and the 
associated negative impact on patronage from community members. 
5.2.6 Regulation and legitimacy 
All medicine sellers recognized the appropriateness of regulation over medicine 
distribution; “we want to avoid uncontrolled, unskilled, uncertified and unlicensed 
person presenting themselves as people’s doctor” (R 10), but expressed frustration 
with current regulation, describing it as corrupt, duplicative and redundant, meant to 
undermine patent medicine vendors. The regimen of regulation involves the 
Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN), National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA), and the Police Force, sometimes with no clear delineation of roles. The 
last was particularly described as notoriously corrupt and often extorted informal 
payments from patent medicine vendors. These impressions form the core of the 
following excerpts from provider interviews: 
“Anyway, the little profit that we make, we share it with the government, because we 
have a union, any time we have a meeting, especially monthly, they will attend the 
meeting and say ministry of health says this or that, National Drugs Enforcement 
Agency say this or that, Pharmacist Society of Nigeria says this or that. So they will 
tell us to be contributing money so that they will visit them so as to avoid 
disturbance. …because all those people are government agencies and even the police, 
we visit them, so any little money that we make is shared among them.” (R 06) 
“Police visit us regularly. They are regular visitors to our shop not that they will 
come in a harsh way, but they will just come and say hello to us at times. When they 
come now, we do call them our big friends, so they will say they come to say hello to 
us. So we do understand with them and find some pure water (informal payments) 
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and they will just leave. At times when they are passing, they will just enter our 
shops and say hello, then we understand with them.” (R 04)  
This speaker is meaning paying bribes to police to avoid inspections. 
Whilst conceding to regulatory infractions, most patent medicine vendors felt the bar 
on the scope of their practice was not realistic and gave legitimacy to their practices 
thus: 
“Actually, what you are saying is true, eh, some of the drugs we sell, our license did 
not cover it, but since we are in local area, where sometimes, we only find one 
pharmacy or not, we do have those essential drugs, but not on our own to prescribe, 
but if they are prescribed through the doctor, we can now supply you the drugs. So 
we only supply them with drugs based on the doctor’s prescription so that is how we 
help the community.” (R 07) 
“That is where the union come in to say that when you are practicing in this area, you 
don’t present yourself as a doctor or pharmacist and also why the workshops and 
trainings by NGOs like Society for Family Health comes in. A lot of them are 
sponsored by America and World Health Organization. They come to train patent 
medicine vendors on how to handle certain issues.” (R 02) 
Community approval of their good performance was also perceived as further 
support for the legitimacy of the practice as one provider implied: 
“yeah, they are getting back to tell me and appreciate my service,” (R09). 
Furthermore, collaboration with the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control was also cited as lending credence to their practices as 
one NAPPMED official said with excitement: 
 “NAFDAC applauds our actions. They gave us the standard and that is why we are 
working with them. Most of the time when NAFDAC comes for their random 
checks, they discover that the union is actually working and they commend the union 
on their efforts.” 
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Patent medicine vendors expressed satisfaction with an internal self-regulatory 
mechanism (Taskforce) put in place by their umbrella body: National Association of 
Patent and Proprietary Medicine Dealers, although questions remain about the 
adequacy of this process. One official of the union describing the regulatory 
activities of the body said: 
 “…, the union does not overlook these offences, but we do not invite the law 
enforcement agencies to such an offender.”  
Pressed on why the union would not hand over offenders to be prosecuted, the 
official went on: 
 “We have a good rapport with the police and we make the police understand that we 
are not trying to kill these offenders or send them out of business.”   
This may mean that the Task force plays the role of mere moral suasion without 
enforcement capacity, which members might have been aware.   
5.2.7 Aspirations and expectations 
All interviewees and questionnaire respondents consistently expressed the desire for 
enhanced knowledge, skills and practice improvement through continuing education 
and information dissemination from the government and its regulatory organs.  
However, having perceived current regulatory interventions as oppressively unfair, 
all desired autonomy and the establishment of a patent medicine regulating body. 
One described the value of practice improvement this way: 
“The Government, Federal Ministry of Health and even people outside have to look 
at us and say these people are improving, then they stand in a better position to argue 
in our favour to upgrade and give us more recognition, but if they come and see bad 
things, then they will assume that we are killers.” (R 08) 
Another captured his expectations for the vocation thus: 
“Also we want the government just as they are having the School of Medicine, 
School of Midwives, to have a school also for patent medicine practice. When this is 
done, they will be able to review drugs that they are allowed to sell upward.” (R 10) 
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Most vendors were impassioned about autonomy and freedom to engage in the full 
spectrum of drug selling: 
“We feel that they should allow us to be selling drugs like the pharmacy, freely, 
because when you go to their shops, they sell anything they want to sell but not that 
we are appealing to the law to sell any kind of drug that we want to sell, but just to 
give us our licence telling us what to sell. Without licence, we don’t have any 
authority to sell, but hence we don’t have that licence, police disturb us because they 
know that we don’t have the licence. They know that we are selling illegal, and we 
are doing or operating illegal because we don’t have anything to stand against them.” 
(R 04) 
“The PCN or the Ministry of Health should allow us, we the patent medicine dealers 
to be practicing our business and at least give us our licence, that will enable us to be 
carrying out our business, because the local area where there are no pharmacy, it is 
this patent medicine dealers that do help people, like here in Gbor, there is no single 
pharmacy, and before you could find any, you must go a distance.” (R 05) 
There was also unanimity about desire for improved access to financing capital to 
expand their businesses. 
“I do not get enough money to buy drugs. That is why sometimes people come to ask 
me some drugs, I do not get it, so they go away.” (R 06)  
“Everything that moves around us is finances; enough money makes us to move 
forward. So I need more aid and assistance from government.” (R 03)  
Patent medicine vendor expectations include practice improvement through 
enhanced knowledge, regulatory autonomy and improved access to financing capital.  
This section has presented the results of perceptions of patent medicine vendors in 
relation to their roles, customers, regulation and aspirations for the future. Patent 
medicine vendors see themselves to be knowledgeable enough to sell drugs and also 
feel their practice is legitimate. This derived from training in handling of drugs 
through the informal apprenticeship paradigm of working alongside other patent 
medicine vendors, in pharmacies or hospitals or other relevant formal health training. 
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The former was frequently linked with family members who owned drug shops 
already. Formal training was acquired at institutions as nursing schools, schools of 
health technology or community health extension schemes. Collaboration with 
formal regulatory organs of government and international NGOs was perceived as 
conveying legitimacy. They believed they were constrained however, technically, 
materially and by the complexity of clinical manifestation of diseases and desired 
knowledge improvement and better access to formal financing opportunities. Whilst 
profit maximization was the primary motivation for going into the business, this 
appeared to have been tempered with a realization of the sense of responsibility to 
society. All medicine sellers recognized the appropriateness of regulation over 
medicine distribution, but expressed a sense of frustration with current regulation, 
describing it as corrupt, duplicative and redundant, meant to undermine patent 
medicine vendor interests. Respondents consistently expressed the desire for 
progress and service improvement through continuing education and information 
dissemination from the government and strongly expressed the desire to see an 
expansion in the current number of drugs they are legally allowed to sell at the 
moment. Finally, patent medicine vendors perceive pharmacists as competitors and 
therefore to be supervised by the Pharmacists Council was unfair and desired an 
independent regulatory body. 
The thesis will now focus to examine competition in the market, beginning firstly 
with non-price competition and then price based competition.   
 
5.3 Non-price Competition 
Non-price competition is interpreted as provider perception of service qualities 
which differentiate one provider from another and lead consumers to prefer a 
particular provider over other rivals (Scherer 1970). It may operate through product 
specific properties or through provider related unique approach brought to bear on a 
business practice (Dinlersoz 2004). Such provider engineered features may include 
both observable and unobservable product and service attributes. Empirical evidence 
from provider interviews and questionnaires showed that the main axes of non-price 
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competition were availability of drugs and their reliability, convenience, courtesy, 
perceived provider competence and the scope for credit. These causal mechanisms of 
competition are considered individually in relation to the data gathered to enable a 
better understanding of the nature of non-price competition in this market.  
5.3.1 Availability and range of drugs 
It was observed that medicine vendors stocked a wide range of different categories of 
drugs including antimalarials, analgesics, anti-allergics, anthelmintic, antitussives, 
vitamins and antibiotics. These were sold in diverse forms including oral capsules 
and tablets, injectables and other parenteral preparations. Some sellers additionally 
stocked surgical items, such as intravenous drips, sutures and hand gloves. In one 
particular drug shop, even the short acting surgical anaesthetic ketamine, was bought 
by a customer. Stocks were extensive and included innovator brands, generic brands 
and unbranded generics, in pre-packed and packaged forms. While almost all 
qualitative interviewees reported consistent drug availability as a strategy for 
attracting and keeping customers, only 2 of the 30 questionnaire respondents thought 
that consumers patronized their businesses because of reliability and range of drugs 
stocked. However, 92% claimed they received referral from other drug shops on 
account of their consistent stocking of needed drugs. The rate of outward referrals 
almost paralleled inward referrals with 83% of providers also indicating that they 
referred customers out for non-availability of drugs. During provider interviews 
some patent medicine vendors argued quite strongly how they often received 
referrals for drug purchases from formal facilities to support the claims of product 
availability:  
“I used to buy drugs and keep in my shop so when am selling out, I will be using that 
money to continue buying until I make sure my shop come to a limit that will be 
attracted to customers.” (R04) 
Poor stocking in contrast was linked to loss of customers. 
“I do not get enough money to buy drugs, that is why, because, sometime people 
come to ask me some drugs, I do not get it, they go away, that is it.” (R 07) 
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These claims were empirically confirmed in Katsina-Ala town for instance, where 
consumers actually came into drug shops with prescriptions obtained from the 
general hospital in the town to make purchases. It has emerged quite clearly that 
adequate stocking is signal for attracting customers and conferring competitive 
advantage.  
5.3.2 Drug quality 
A typical patent medicine vending shop was a single room often poorly ventilated 
and partitioned in front by a counter containing drugs and also serving as a reception 
point. The walls held hanging shelves stacked with a variety of pharmaceutical 
products. Some providers went further to box-out a small cubicle within the shop for 
administration of injections and wound dressings. The stocking of shops also varied, 
with some shops impressively stocked while others displayed sparsely furnished 
dusty shelves. However, in particular locations, shops were fairly of regular sizes. 
All retailers dispensed using dispensing trays and spoons from packaged drug 
containers. 
 From qualitative interviews, it emerged that poor drug quality and inaccurate 
diagnosis of disease symptoms were among reasons shop owners felt could elicit 
aversive behaviour from consumers. This thinking was supported from questionnaire 
answers also, where over 90% said they believed they attracted and maintained 
customers based on consumer perceptions of the quality of drugs they sold. Fake 
drug sale by vendors was reported by providers as a common infringement in the 
market. However, they had no way of accurately judging genuine products from fake 
ones other than the reality that a product carried the drug regulatory agency’s 
registration number printed on the packing, generally referred to as “NAFDAC 
number” by sellers and consumers and the public broadly. An interviewee said: 
 “We look out for fake drugs, which are drugs without NAFDAC number and not 
registered with NAFDAC, substandard drugs and expired drugs” (R 10). 
The NAFDAC number inscribed on the pack of a drug serve as the most powerful 
indicator of product genuineness and therefore drug quality. This quality barometer 
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is however not reliable as shown in chapter 7 of the thesis, where the challenges of 
fake manufacturing concerns is discussed from regulators’ perspective.  
5.3.3 Provider knowledge, competence and agency role 
Provider expertise will relate to level of educational attainment, years of experience 
in drug retailing, having a relevant health professional training and regular 
attendance at workshops, trainings and seminars. Of the 30 providers sampled, only 
two had only the legal minimum educational level of primary education, 17 (56.6%) 
attended secondary schools, and formed the modal class for the distribution, while 
the rest 11 (36.7%) indicated they have had post-secondary schooling. The 
distribution is shown in the pie chart below. 
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of years of education of patent medicine vendors. 
Professional education is acquired in Universities and Polytechnics and the minimum 
entry requirement for admission into tertiary institutions in Nigeria is secondary 
school qualification. Therefore, this result implies that over 92% have potential for 
even professional training in any health related discipline.  
It is interesting that the participants who indicated they had post-secondary education 
turned out to be vendors with a form of health related training or another and 
6.67% 
53.33% 
40.00% 
Years of Education 
Primary Education 
Secondary Education 
Post-Secondary Education 
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included diverse specialties as nursing, pharmacy technology, medical laboratory and 
community health extension work or some relevant experience in formal health 
sector work. The range of health related professionals practicing as patent medicine 
providers is displayed in box 5.1. 
 
 
Box 5.1 Health related cadres retailing as patent medicine 
vendors 
 Staff nurses 
 Pharmacy technologists 
 Medical laboratory technicians 
 Community health extension workers 
 
 
It is possible this category of health personnel might provide an explanation for the 
technical practices identified by vendors as unethical at this level of health services 
delivery as discussed below. 
 Also, there was great variation in years of experience in retail drug vending of the 
sample, ranging from a year to thirty years. The years of experience distribution is 
shown by the histogram below. 
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of years of experience of drug retailers. 
Class 1: 1-5 years of experience in drug retailing. 
Class 2: 6-10 years of experience in drug retailing. 
Class 3: 11-15 years of experience in drug retailing. 
Class 4: 16-20 years of experience in drug retailing. 
Class 5: 21-25 years of experience in drug retailing. 
Class 6: 25-30 years of experience in drug retailing. 
The near symmetrical distribution of years of retailing experience may mean a 
market that is perhaps very dynamic in nature and therefore potentially contestable. 
Only 40% of the respondents indicated they had ever attended workshops organized 
variously by the Pharmacy council of Nigeria (PCN), National Agency for Food and 
Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), National Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency (NDLEA) or Society for Family Health aimed at improving their practice. 
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However, all providers said their competence was what attracted customers to their 
shops. All providers indicated they had not received any complaints about their 
services as 90% claimed they were providing standard quality of care. However, just 
one of them said he knew he was providing good care based on positive affirmation 
from his customers. Whilst the vast majority were satisfied with their output, 33% 
admitted to knowledge of unethical practices among patent shop outlets, which 
included sale of fake drugs, unauthorized drugs, expired drugs, administration of 
injections and intravenous fluids. They also saw drug sale by some individuals as 
unethical, labelling such providers as untrained or quacks. The sale of unauthorized 
drugs and expired drugs were the most common unethical practices identified.  A list 
of unethical practices alluded to by the sampled population of patent medicine 
vendors are reproduced in the box following.  
 
Box 5.2 Unethical practices of patent medicine vendors 
 
 Sale of unauthorized drugs 
 
 Sale of expired drugs 
 
 Sale of fake drugs 
 
 Administration of injections 
 
 Administration of intravenous fluids 
 
 Selling by untrained individuals (referred to as quacks) 
 
 
Exploring provider competence in-depth through provider interviews, interviewees 
argued further that their proven competence was what informed clients’ decisions to 
consult them for diagnosis and treatment and health advice other than acting as 
simple salesmen. On a few occasions, drug providers were seen taking a brief 
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history, enquiring about the nature and duration of illness, consumer age, followed 
by advice of an appropriate drug and dosages clearly written out. This is how a 
sample of them underscored their capabilities: 
“…, then I do advise them on what to do that will prevent them from being sick 
always. I advise them on health programmes, I tell them that this is what you will do 
that will help yourself or help your children, if it is diarrhea. I advise them on how to 
do that diarrhea will stop in their family. If it is malaria problem, I will tell them the 
way they will do that malaria will stop in their family. So because of that, they like 
coming to my shop, because they know that if they come here, they will feel like 
they have gone to the hospital, because what the hospital do tell them, is what I tell 
them when they come. So they feel if they come here I will still give them the correct 
treatment or the correct advice they use to get from the hospital, so for that, they feel 
like coming to my shop always.” (R 04)  
“I can dress wound, give injection, give drugs.” (R 09) 
“I fit do diagnosis and treat for the same time” (R 05)  
(I can diagnose and treat patients at the same time). 
Also the issue of unethical administration of injections was examined closely during 
provider interviews. While some providers said they did not administer injections, a 
few others stated they prescribed and administered injectable drugs. This sub-group 
included mostly providers who had health related training background and one other 
vendor without medical training when pressed.  It was observed that most shops 
actually partitioned a secluded area for practical procedures like administration of 
injections and wound dressing. Interestingly, some medicine vendors referred to 
others as quack provider as one argued: 
“Well, I can’t tell about other medicine dealers, because some of them are not 
trained, they just feel like they want to run this business and just start it so they don’t 
know the ethics of this business, because the profession has its own laws. So if you 
don’t know the ethics that means you will not be able to do fine, because there are 
some patent medicine dealers that do not go to school. Some of them did not finish 
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secondary school, they don’t attend any health facility. I’ve not been with them, so I 
don’t know how they treat their customers or their client, so I cannot tell much about 
other shops, but I must emphasize on what I do in my shop.” (R 01) 
However, to the patent medicine vendor who started a drug shop from the 
apprenticeship model, a quack meant someone who neither had a medical 
background nor mastered the art of drug retailing through apprenticeship. 
These pieces of evidence support a conclusion that there might be high levels of 
unethical practices, poor quality of care and regulatory violation in this retail drug 
market. 
Patent medicine vendor knowledge of diseases and drugs was analysed to establish 
the veracity of these assertions, as revealed by this encounter between the researcher 
and vendor 04.  
Q. Do you know the Federal Government’s guidelines for treating malaria? 
R. I don’t know. 
Q. Do you treat malaria here? 
R. I don’t know. 
Q. So you don’t treat malaria? 
R. They catch us for malaria treatment one certain time and they talked about 
chloroquine, so we stop all those things. 
Q. So what do you use now? 
R. I use one fansidar and camoquine, for small babies. 
Q. And for adults, what do you use? 
R.   I don’t have that one for adults I only give fansidar and camoquine. 
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This provider clearly lacked knowledge of the national guidelines for the treatment 
of malaria, one of the commonest ill health conditions of children and adults alike, 
requiring prompt treatment to prevent progression to the more severe form of the 
disease. During observations of interactions between providers and clients, it was 
observed that most drug retailers simply sold what customers demanded or just 
dispensed according to a tendered prescription of any sort. Where a customer came 
with complaints, vendors demonstrated limited understanding of signs and symptoms 
of diseases generally. Drug envelopes were not labeled with names of medications, 
side effects were never explained nor contra-indications for a drug sold out. Sub-
doses were commonly sold as was the selling of under-dose combinations of drugs, 
referred to as “mixture” locally (poly-pharmacy). In some shops, children less than 
16 years sold drugs independently, without an adult supervising.  However, in 
questionnaire answers, 90% of drug shop providers indicated they were aware of the 
dangers of drug use and misuse.  
Empirically therefore, the conclusion reached is that patent medicine vendors in this 
market demonstrated a low understanding of both diseases and drugs. A summary of 
the basic characteristics of patent medicine vendors is presented in below: 
 
Box 5.3: Basic characteristics of patent medicine vendors 
 83% male sellers 
 Modal age group is 26 – 30 years 
 All have at least primary level education  
 Majority (67%) have no health related training 
 77% of participants have a minimum of 10 years of retail experience 
 Most (53%) are married  
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5.3.4 Convenience 
Providers stated in qualitative interviews that people patronized them because they 
were located close to them, and in remote places, they were the only drug source for 
the communities.  They also said services at drug shops were fast, devoid of the time 
wasting associated with government facilities. A transaction time lasted 5 minutes on 
the average, ranging from 3 to 8 minutes. Also listed as providing convenience to 
consumers was the long opening hours provided by drug shops, all of whom opened 
from 8.00 am to 9.00 pm, Mondays to Saturdays and for some Sundays as well. 
These long opening hours were said to be particularly suitable in rural settings where 
farmers require flexible opening hours that fit into their farm schedules: most rural 
people worked on farms during the day and would only want to use health care when 
it was convenient to them, thus ensuring minimal disruptions to their farming 
activities. Shop services may also have been more convenient because of proxy 
buying, where people bought drugs on behalf of others. 
5.3.5 Credit selling 
Credit selling was also cited by many patent drug shop owners as a strategy to attract 
and retain customers, provided the customer was regular, trustworthy and could be 
located in the event of default. Asked what they did when a customer could not 
afford the cost of medication, 46.7% of questionnaire respondents said they offered a 
price reduction, 27.7% sold on credit, while 10% withheld services. This is how 
some interviewees expressed their views about credit selling: 
“Well, in any business you are doing, you cannot avoid credit. Because, some of 
them when they come, they claim they are the people that know me very well. So at 
times when they don’t have even ten kobo, they will still come, asking me to give 
them drugs before they will find money and come for payment. So for that, there are 
some people I do consider, when they come for credit. I still give them, but not that I 
need people buying for credit, because in this business, if you put credit forward, the 
business will not move anywhere, because it is a petty business.” (R 04) 
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“It is difficult, now that there is economic melt-down, companies no longer give 
drugs on credit, if they give you drugs, they collect their money, so it is difficult to 
sell on credit.” (R 06) 
“Before I give credit to somebody, I feel because at times somebody will have a 
severe sickness and if you have come to me without money, for me to reject such 
persons becomes difficult, because I am dealing with human beings, so putting this 
thing at the back of my mind, I just decide to help some of them. Some of them are 
people that are very close to me, they know me for long and have been patronizing 
my shop for long, so when they come, I consider their patronage, so I decide to give 
out drugs to them on credit basis.” (R 09) 
However, observations revealed that buying on credit may not have been common, 
as not a single case was witnessed during this study. This means that credit sales 
might not have been an important competitive strategy in pragmatic terms in this 
market.  However, sale of incomplete dosages was rife in the market and was 
practiced across all providers. It is therefore more realistic to conclude that under-
dosing could have been a competitive strategy, rather than credit selling where a 
consumer’s ability to pay was lacking. This practice may also have been a reflection 
of low provider and consumer knowledge of the importance of appropriate dosage 
buying for disease outcomes. Payment in kind was not observed and did not appear 
to be an important dimension of competition either.  
5.3.6 Provider courtesy 
   All drug retailers regarded good relationships with customers as critical to 
enhancing patronage and were unanimous that people would only come to shops 
where staffs were polite and friendly. They stated that once patients had established 
rapport with a local shop, they tended to come back repeatedly afterwards. 
“It is how I do with them, if I do them treatment, if they are well, they can go out and 
advertise that if you come to this person’s shop, this is how she will do me, she treat 
me this case and the case is over, so I will just get more people.” (R 08) 
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“When my customers or my client come, what I normally do is that I welcome them 
fine and be simple and jovial to them. So by doing these to them, being social to 
them, very lenient to them and operate on a very small scale, I do not charge them 
high.” (R 03) 
Surprisingly, staff attitude was not considered an important factor for custom in 
questionnaires, but during observations it was noticed that providers treated 
customers well by being polite and giving courtesy. When there was no pressure on 
time, vendors would engage customers in long conversations about burning social, 
economic and political issues, interspersed with jokes and laughter.  
This section has examined and evaluated the elements of non-price competition in 
detail, with the evidence suggesting reasonable levels of competition along most 
dimensions of non-price competition. The patent medicine vendor market improved 
access to drugs in the local council area, given that it had only one formal pharmacy 
shop and several government facilities which often had no drugs. The quality of 
these drugs however, could not be guaranteed. Services were provided close to 
consumers and at convenient hours with considerable customer autonomy to 
purchase any drug in whatever quantity. Products and services where traded under 
cordial and polite conditions. Analysis of competition on provider knowledge and 
competence revealed that competitors had low knowledge of disease prevalence and 
presentations and manifested inappropriate drug dispensing practices. There were 
also reported regulatory infractions on a wide scope.  
Having analysed non-price behaviours of providers, the thesis will turn to provider 
knowledge and response to regulation. This is apt because the main axis of 
regulatory success hinges substantially on provider perceptions and response to this 
key strand of market competition.     
5.4 Knowledge and Response to Regulation 
All retailers agreed that sale of drugs should be regulated because of its potential 
harm when misapplied to humans. Responding to the research questionnaires, 80% 
said their business premises were formally registered with the Pharmacy Council of 
Nigeria, and 60% had at least one regulatory inspection in the last one year preceding 
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the study. Only 2 shops, representing 6.7% of the sample had not been inspected at 
any time in the past by any of the regulatory agencies. Regarding the level of 
regulation, only 6.7% of the sample expressed dissatisfaction, a majority of 83% was 
satisfied with the level of regulatory performance. On the contrary, provider 
interviews revealed that regulation was unsatisfactory with widespread regulatory 
infringements as earlier highlighted in the section on provider perception of the 
processes of regulation.  
One vendor said: 
“There are some drugs that really as you said, the Ministry of Health or the 
Pharmaceutical Counsel of Nigeria does not allow us to sell, so we sell them to 
people that we feel we can assist them to get those drugs and it will help them.” (R 
06) 
Others gave reasons for breaking the laws regulating the market in the following 
sequences of dialogues; 
R.09 We are not supposed to give injection, but we are doing it. 
Q. Why? 
R.09 We are not getting too much money, but if you give injection, you will get 
small money, that is all, but it is not good, everybody know. Because even in the 
clinic, if they give injection and it develop any problem, they will answer a query, 
talk less of here in the chemist, that one is dangerous. 
R. 10 There are some bound drugs (prescription-only), the reason why they bound 
(banned) them is not because when you take them, it have a health effect or toxic 
effect, but the reason why they do bound those drugs is because people are using it 
and diverting it to another thing apart from the real work of that drug to that 
particular sickness, so by that the Ministry of Health or the Pharmaceutical Council 
of Nigeria feels that if they allow this thing to open like that, it will make the drug 
too addicted and when you treat them, it will not work. That is the reason why some 
of these drugs are bound from selling, not that when you give to customers, it will 
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affect them or it will give a toxic effect to them. So being like that, we do sell to 
some of our customers that we feel it is necessary to give them.  
Q. You know for instance that this ampiclox you are selling, you are not suppose 
to sell, because this is a patent medicine store and the law says you should not sell 
antibiotic, why are you selling it? 
R.01 We don’t know like that, I don’t understand, that is why I use to sell it; even 
if it is dangerous for us to sell ampiclox antibiotic we can stop it. (We will stop the 
sale of prescription drugs) 
Patent medicine vendors demonstrated good knowledge of existing regulations but 
also conceding to regulatory infringements at the same time for reasons clearly 
linked to profitability of prescription drugs and misunderstanding of the principles 
underpinning regulation of drug use by the public. 
5.5 Price Competition 
Pricing and price competition is another key dimension of provider conductand 
understanding the price process is crucially important in defining the nature of 
competition in the market. Price is traditionally the main axis of any industrial 
market analysis and it is particularly important in this study given the contexts of 
poverty, combined with full out of pocket payments. The section proceeds to 
describe pricing mechanisms, sources of price variations and explores the extent of 
price competition. 
Economic theory predicts that the degree of price competition will depend on the 
location of a particular market along the prefect competition–monopoly spectrum. In 
perfectly competitive markets, firms are not able to raise price above marginal cost 
and are described as price takers, while the monopolist has absolute market power 
over price and is a price setter. Producers in market structures in-between these 
extremes possess varying degrees of power over product prices, their output 
quantities and qualities. 
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Therefore, in markets characterised by strong price competition, firms will have 
limited scope for price setting and there will be low price mark-ups. Also, relatively 
stable prices are expected for a defined product. 
The findings of the researched market are presented against these theoretical 
concepts and the thesis proceeds to establish whether medicine vendors in katsina-
Ala were price takers or price setters. 
5.5.1 Price setting 
Qualitative data is used to explore how drug shop retailers fixed prices and their 
perceptions of their price fixing behaviour. All providers questioned said the prices 
of drugs were determined by wholesaler drug costs, transportation costs, informal 
payments to regulatory agencies and the police and profit considerations: the same 
set of factors mentioned in survey responses. Interviewees also reported that prices of 
particular drugs were identical for all shops and any attempts to raise price would 
lead to loss of patronage to other sellers, considering that they operated in small 
communities and price sensitive consumers would easily detect a price differential 
between the same products within the market. This would indicate that patent 
medicine vendors perceived themselves essentially as price takers in a way, as one of 
the interviewees observed: 
“Some of the reasons I can say is let’s take an example: somebody come to buy 
paracetamol syrup which is N 80. If I start selling the paracetamol syrup at N 100 or 
N 120, some of them will run away from me, because they will no more buy. They 
will run away if I say a card of ampiclox is N150, when everybody know is N 80 or 
N 100. They will say it is costly, so they will run away from my shop.” (R 05) 
Although drug prices were said to be uniform generally, when pressed, some 
confessed to allowing price concessions for the poor, particularly in emergency need 
for medications. Throughout the research activities, no such case was observed. 
To fully gain insight into mechanisms of price setting, interviewees were asked to 
describe their price fixing strategies and their narratives are presented below, 
including one extended dialogue between the researcher and interviewee 04.   
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"It depends on how much we purchase, how it comes. If Onitsha is given us a pack 
of ampicillin or cloxacilin for N500, with the transport we have paid to bringing the 
drugs down here, we may now sell at say N530 that is N30 gain, and it is from this 
N30 gain that we settle agencies who come to check and do other things and put our 
association together. It is how we purchase.” (R 02) 
“This business, I earlier said that it is profitable because if you take just a small 
amount like N10, 000 if you sell finish, you will be realizing something like N15, 
000 and with this, I believe this business is more profitable than other businesses. In 
the area of this field of medicine, there are some drugs you bought and then, even if 
you sell cheaper, you will be topping 10% or 50% of what you bought.” (R 06)  
Q. So a card of ampiclox is how much? 
R.04 Is N 100 
Q. How much is a packet? 
R. A packet is N 550 
Q. If you are buying, how much does a card cost you? 
R. A card is N 50 
Q. But you sell it at N 100? 
R. Yes 
Q. That is 100% mark up, why do you mark up so high? 
R. Is it so high? 
Q. You bought it at N 50 and you are selling at N 100, which is 100% mark up 
R. Mmmm 
Q. How do you decide to sell what you buy? 
R. that is all over, it is everybody, not necessary only one person that is selling 
like that, it is all over. 
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Q. So all of you decide to sell like that? 
R. Yes 
Q. In your meeting? 
R. Not in the meeting, but even if you get to Katsina-Ala or Zaki-biam, a card of 
ampiclox is sold at N100, Beecham is N350 and you can sell it at N400 or N450 like 
that. You will calculate your transport and police on the way. 
Interviewees appeared to have also considered seasonal sales pattern in determining 
prices of medicines. One retailer said: 
“Ok, in this business area or sector, there are some periods that we do get customers 
more than others, like during raining season around April, June and July, we use to 
have a lot of customers in our shop because this is time of mosquitoes, malaria 
outbreak, so we do experience much attendance in our shop. Around that December 
down to February, we do have customers too, because during that time, we expect 
diarrhoea problem, so from now till September to that November, we have a lot of 
patronage in our shop too. At the other months if they are sick, it will be difficult for 
them to come to clinic or to a health facility, so during that time, we don’t normally 
have customers.” (R 04) 
The dynamics of price fixing in this market is complex, but grossly the cost structure 
appears to be influenced by the costs of purchasing stocks from wholesalers, 
transportation, informal payments and profit top-ups. Although prices were said be 
uniform in the market, the dominant role of a price leader appeared insignificant, as 
there was no clear reference to any particular price setter in the study. Superficially 
therefore, this suggests a price taking behavior of sort. However, in a less than 
imperfect market structure, the implication of these fairly uniform prices might be 
that retailers either simply tended to copy each other or avoided potential loss of 
business through undercut if they raised their prices, or tacit adoption of rule of 
thumbs. Interviewees made definite mention of top-ups over the range of cost 
elements in fixing drug prices as enumerated above. Vendors consistently talked of 
50% to 100% top-ups to the overall cost of a product, suggestive of collusive pricing 
130 
 
strategy or simply an implicit understanding among retailers. From a consumer 
welfare perspective and superficial evaluation of these mark-ups, they may be judged 
as high especially when bench-marked against international standards. The WHO for 
instances, recommends mark-ups of between 25-50% on retail pharmaceuticals 
(WHO/HAI 2011) and when further compared to other settings for instance, gross 
retail mark-ups have only averaged 25% for most of the 20
th
 Century in the United 
States (Larson and Rosen 2002; Kaiser Family foundation 2005). On closer 
examination however, these recommendations did not capture the range of hidden 
costs retailers in this researched market may face. The retailers alleged hidden 
outlays, which can potentially increase operational costs of retailers and conceal true 
profit margins. Unofficial practices and regulatory capture in African health care 
markets have been widely reported, which may support the claims of these medicine 
vendors (McPake et al. 1999; Wafula, et al. 2013).With limited information about the 
cost structure and financial risks associated with transportation, storage, marketing 
and retailing of products, it is difficult for the researcher to determine if retailers’ 
margins are actually excessive, even though grossly the mark-ups exceed the WHO 
recommendations. 
From economic theory, we can predict that retail prices should be a sensitive 
indicator of pricing behaviour and price sustenance in this market may be understood 
form both the abstraction of the kinked demand model and the collusive olligopoly 
paradigm (Clarke 1985). The Kinked demand model argues that if providers believed 
that a price cut will be matched but not a price rise, then prices will remain sticky at 
equilibrium. This offers a lens to see why no provider might have attempted to 
undercut prices in the market, rather accepting the general price. Providers had 
actually alluded to losing customers if they tried to sell at higher prices, because 
other providers did not increase their prices. Another interesting dimension in 
understanding pricing mechanism in the market is the allusion to uniformity of prices 
in all sub-markets as demonstrated in the dialogue with interviewee 04 above. It is 
therefore quite possible that explicit or tacit collusive pricing might have been 
operational in the market as an alternate pricing mechanism, although this was 
explicitly refuted by retailers. However, the role of NAPPMED in the market broadly 
and therefore specifically in price fixing process cannot be ruled out. Given that the 
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association principally sets out to pursue best interest of its profit maximizing 
members, as even the disciplinary and self-regulatory task force it instituted did little 
to instill disciplined practice among its members. One way of achieving this pricing 
behavior might have been through fostering collectivization of interests and 
discouraging competitive individualism. This conclusion is further supported from 
the observation of interviewees constantly making the association a reference point 
for behaviour, for example the use of the personal pronoun, we instead of I during 
interviews was a recurring decimal.  
Contradictions emerged between survey responses and interview opinions of 
providers. For example, outlet providers expressed satisfaction with the level of 
regulation and its implementation in surveys, but strongly critical of the regulatory 
system during interviews. This discrepant posture may be linked to initial distrust for 
the researcher and the purpose of the research, which became replaced with 
acceptance and support later in the project, when the research was more fully 
understood to be in no way inimical to their business interests.  
5.6 Summary Findings and Discussions 
Retail drug shops perceived they were highly patronized because they were close to 
the people provided quality and reliable drugs, the convenience of services and 
courtesy. Other studies have also documented similar advantages of retail drug shops 
in other settings (Adome et al. 1996; Brugha and Zwi 2002; Goodman et al. 2004; 
Hughes et al. 2012; Molyneux et al. 1999; Stenson et al. 2001; Van der Geest 1987; 
Williams and Jones 2004). Even though drug shop providers are unspecialized health 
care providers, their convenience and perceived cheapness could explain why they 
are accepted for perceived simple ailments that needed first aid care. They also 
stocked beyond their legally allowed stocking list, this tendency to stock prescription 
only drugs has also been widely reported in the literature (Adikwu 1996; Fassin 
1988; Goodman, et al. 2007; Indalo 1997; Kumaranayake et al. 2003; Oshiname and 
Brieger 1992; Van der Geest 1987).  
Drug shop providers viewed themselves as knowledgeable first aiders as well as 
complementing the public health system which is often plagued by recurring health 
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worker walk-outs and stock-outs.  Drug stock-outs in public facilities have been 
reported elsewhere in Africa (Gilson et al. 1993; Gilson et al. 1995; Hughes et al 
2012; Okoli 2001). Patent Medicine vendors saw themselves as providers of health 
care for acute ambulatory health problems; however, since interventions at this stage 
of a disease process also influence the probability of progression, the activities of 
drug shop providers is likely to have an important impact on overall disease 
outcomes in terms of disease morbidity, co-morbidity and mortality (Greenwood et 
al. 1987). The recognition of their knowledge gaps and therefore practice limit is 
important in designing strategies to align their practice with public health goals.  
The variation in levels of education of patent medicine vendors and their equally 
diverse training in health related disciplines reported in this study are consistent with 
findings in other settings in Africa (Adikwu 1996; Brieger et al. 2004; Oshiname and 
Brieger 1992; Kumaranayake et al. 2003). In this particular regards, it is interesting 
that vendors themselves had created a dichotomy within them, with some viewing 
others as quacks, because of lack of health related training of the latter. The issues of 
poor storage of drugs, under-dosing and inappropriate drug combinations have also 
been found among drug shop vendors in Tanzania and Uganda (Amin et al. 2004; 
Goodman et al. 2004; Goodman et al. 2007a; McCombie 2002; Marsh et al. 1999; 
Nshakira et al. 2002).    
Limited evidence on retail drug shop mark-ups were found, but high prices have 
been reported in private pharmacies in Kenya and Ghana (Madden 2004; WHO and 
HAI 2003). Russo and McPake (2010) also reported high retail mark-ups in the 
related phenomenon of pharmacies in urban Mozambique. It was discovered in the 
WHO-HAI study that drug prices were lowest in public facilities, followed by not-
for-profit facilities and most expensive in the private outlets, a conclusion which will 
support the induction that private providers are likely to be more expensive for the 
same product market. The study also showed that brand premiums in African 
countries were high compared to generics. This means that in these settings prices 
were higher than the marginal cost of production and incompatible with predictions 
of the perfect competitive model. 
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5.7 Nature of Competition 
From the evidence base presented so far, the patent medicine market may pass for a 
competitive market on face value, given that even though they sold a vastly wide 
range of drugs, within a drug category, these products are based on relatively fixed 
chemical formulations within the class and therefore, the retailers may be viewed as 
providing what may reasonably be termed as homogenous products. No attempts by 
providers to influence market structure through publicity strategies or predatory 
pricing techniques were observed. Drug consumers obtained drugs freely and 
regularly and were likely to have been well informed about prices and products 
indications from repeated purchasing, though they remained poorly informed about 
the technical issues of drugs such as dangers of injections from unqualified 
providers, dangers of misdiagnosis and the risks of inappropriate drug use. Thirdly, 
purchases were all out-of-pocket payments therefore, consumers were probably price 
sensitive as against the situation of insurance coverage. Consumers also had options 
to choose their providers and were also free to demand particular products. This 
constellation of features would seem to constrain the market in the perfectly 
competitive direction. 
However, the market also approximates a few features of the oligopolistic paradigm. 
For example, entry barriers existed as evidenced by regulatory entry requirements 
and the unclear role of NAPPMED and its relationship with non-NAPPMEND drug 
vendors. Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated that retailers exhibited strategic 
pricing behaviour by taking into account the expected behaviour of their competitors, 
for example in the case of an upward price change. These characteristics are 
consistent with economic theoretic predictions for oligopolistic competition. 
However a potentially oligopolistic market structure does little to specify the nature 
of competition in the market. Pinning down precisely the nature of competition 
requires comparative analysis of the multitude of oligopolistic models reviewed in 
the economic theory of markets in Chapter 2. Particularly insightful are the models 
that relate to a firm’s price setting behaviour.  
The classical price leader-follower paradigm makes assumptions of homogenous 
goods, with market leader setting the price and output levels and the followers taking 
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these price and output decisions as given. However, it has been argued that the health 
care market is fragmented, and pharmaceutical markets are highly differentiated in 
both products and provider characteristics (Gaynor and Town 2012), making the 
standard leader-follower model an inappropriate approximation of the market 
phenomenon observed. Moreover, sales volumes across retailers were not quantified 
in the study and a market leader could not therefore be clearly observed. Collusive 
behaviour offers plausible explanation of the price sustenance in this market and 
provides further helpful insights in characterising the nature of competition in the 
market.  The features conducive for the evolution of potentially successful cartel 
include the small number of sellers, especially when viewed at sub-market levels. 
Therefore members might have been able to more easily have full information about 
each other’s prices by directly observing or eliciting such information from 
consumers and thus able to mitigate cheating behaviour among its members if this 
was a situation of explicit collusive arrangement, as exemplified the real world 
cartel, OPEC (Dibooglu and AlGudhea 2007). The research did not establish support 
of open collusion between the retailers. Tacit collusive model may better fit this 
market, based on the evidence presented particularly in reference to the uncertain 
roles of NAPPMED, the formal umbrella body of drug shop vendors, which 
appeared to only foster the norms of cooperation rather than articulate any systematic 
codes of professional conduct among its members. This sort of cooperative market 
behaviour among micro-enterprise owners, rather than competition, has also been 
documented in reviews of industrial structure and microenterprise in Africa 
(Fafchamps 1994; Tripp 2001).  
Price sustenance behaviour in this market can also be explained from the kinked 
demand model, which allows visualization of how established price may resist a fall 
and be sustained in a stable position even where providers are confronting changing 
costs as discussed above. 
This chapter has demonstrated a strong non-price competition, but weak price 
competition picture, tending towards a collusive paradigm as retailers appeared to be 
takers of a given price without an identifiable market leader. Prior findings in chapter 
4 showed a general tendency towards un-concentration in the overall market, but a 
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mix picture at the sub-market level. However, with the findings of strong 
oligopolistic pricing behaviour among medicine vendors across drug shops in the 
entire local council areas in this chapter, it is difficult to conclude that one single 
market structure and competition model perfectly matches the analysed market. Both 
monopolistic and oligopolistic features coexist together in this market, only to 
varying degrees.  
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CHAPTER 6:  RETAIL CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 
6.1 Introduction 
The third objective of the thesis is to analyse the health seeking behaviour of 
consumers in the patent medicine retail market in Katsina-Ala. The conceptual 
framework of the thesis specified in chapter 2, predicted that the nature of 
competition and hence market performance is a function of the interplay between 
market structure, provider conduct and consumer behaviour (Martin 1994; Tirole 
1988). The first two elements of the model have been analysed in the preceding two 
chapters and this chapter will complete the spectral analysis of market interactions by 
undertaking a detailed view of consumer behaviour in the researched market. 
Conventionally, human behaviours are shaped by perceptions and beliefs and the 
value judgements made regarding phenomena. Therefore any attempt to explore 
behaviour in a market situation must be rooted in an understanding of the normative 
systems of the consumers concerned as a first step. The chapter therefore opens with 
a presentation of consumer perceptions of the multiple characteristics of market 
providers in section 6.2, to consumer health choice making behaviours and utilization 
experiences in sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. Section 6.5evaluates consumer 
expectations from providers and regulators, while section 6.6 provides a synopsis of 
the chapter analysis. The thesis then situates these findings in the context of current 
economic literature in section 6.7. Section 6.8 ends the chapter with a summary of all 
results chapters to this point. 
Following on the pattern of the analysis of provider behaviour in the preceding 
chapter, the current interpretation of findings regarding consumer behaviour will 
draw substantially on exit consumer interviews, with exit consumer questionnaire 
responses and research observations providing complementary evidence.   
6.2 Consumer Perceptions 
Providers were referred to variously as doctors, chemists, patent medicine vendors, 
or simply as drug sellers and generally described either as qualified or quack. They 
137 
 
were therefore judged to offer services of varying standards, although overall, patent 
medicine vendors were perceived as rendering useful services.  
6.2.1 Provider role 
Questioned about their perceptions of the role played by patent medicine vendors in 
their communities, all respondents felt that drug shop vendors played crucially 
important roles in their host communities. They were thought of as providing 
emergency services, temporary treatment before definitive treatment and they also 
offered affordable services: 
“Well, I feel the medicine store sellers too are of help, because in emergency 
situations, they address immediate problems that may arise,” … (R 04) 
“These people are important because they are helpful, especially in times of 
difficulties, like now.” (R 06) 
Other opinions expressed by interviewees further revealed the diverse roles played 
by patent medicine vendors. 
 “Actually, my husband doesn’t like the idea of going to retail shops for treatment, 
but since he is not around, I decided to come to the retail shop for treatment, so that 
the illness will subside, and whenever he returns, he will take the person to the 
hospital.” (R 08) 
“… but I hope to go to the hospital for adequate treatment, for now, I only wants to 
control the situation.” (R 10) 
Implicit in these perceptions of drug vendor roles are the notions of first aid, 
substitutability and complementarity between formal facilities and the informal drug 
shops and therefore, their indispensability. It also portrays patent medicine shops as 
places where consumers may get services in a way that best suits their actual 
situations and expectations.  
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6.2.2 Provider qualification and competence 
Respondents to the exit consumer survey did not consider provider qualification as 
an important consideration in choosing which provider shop to buy drugs from. 
During interviews, even though drug shop providers were perceived as providing 
needful services, doubts existed about their qualifications and competences, as 
expressed by some interviewees. Opinions oscillated from viewing them all as non-
professionals to describing some providers as quacks.  
“I consider them to be non-professionals; they are just business men trying to make 
their own money.” (R 01) 
“… personally, I don’t tell them anything, because I feel they are not qualified to 
treat me, I buy as prescribed by health professional.” (R 10) 
“,,,, just take a look at this young boy selling, he came here as a little boy, who sold 
since then to this level, after getting independence from his Oga (Master),  he was 
given money to operate the business and he eventually ventured into it. He is just a 
quack, he is not qualified in any way, That is why these pharmacists should be 
encouraged.” (R 09) 
Other consumers however, expressed satisfaction with the performances of some 
patent medicine vendors, whom they associated with prior work experience with the 
formal health sector, as one said: 
 “He tries very well, because he formerly worked with a clinic and he can administer 
any kind of treatment apart from surgical operations.” (R 02) 
“Some of them are qualified because they graduated from the required institutions, 
like school of health technology, some are health attendants and they own and 
operate shops, but some are quacks actually, these are the type that prescribe drugs or 
administer treatments that have side effects that kills at times. I have witnessed it.” 
(R 03) 
“…, in most cases, people who are not qualified to operate in the system are found 
operating the system, they buy drugs from somewhere and set up their businesses in 
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a different places. There they start to administer drugs that are dangerous. I have seen 
a situation where drugs meant for adults alone were given to little children, this 
sometimes lead to something different even administering drug that have other side 
effects.” (R 07) 
“I had never for once placed confidence in their way of treatment, that is why I 
always opt for hospital treatment, I still reiterate my commitment to going to the 
hospital, even if it means going there up to twenty times, am ready, provided I have 
the required money.” (R 06) 
Asked to judge treatment outcomes, one consumer said:  
“Sometimes, you get relief and sometimes it will re-surface or come back again, in 
this case you will then be referred to the hospital after they have taken our money.” 
(R 10) 
The findings clearly demonstrate consumers’ dilemmas of and desires for quality 
amidst perceived low provider competence. It also implies that drug buyers may not 
be mere passive consumers, but may in fact consciously do their utmost to get the 
best quality in the market. Consumers also expressed dissatisfaction with the 
apprentice mode of entering patent medicine business and identified the formal 
sector with better quality.  
6.2.3 Drug quality 
In consumer questionnaire responses, participants placed high premiums on quality 
as an important consideration in the choice of where to make drug purchases. All 
sampled individuals unanimously indicated drug quality as a principal factor guiding 
their decision to use a drug shop. Also, during consumer interviews, interviewees 
raised issues around the quality of drugs bought from patent medicine vendors. 
Drugs consumed were sometimes said to either be ineffective or caused adverse 
effects. Some buyers simply described some drugs as fake. 
“Yes, there was a time I bought a particular drug cimetidine when I was having a 
feeling of pain on my chest. When I took it, I noticed the pain was getting worse. It 
brought a lot of negative effects on me, so I had to drop it.” (R 01) 
140 
 
“Some of them sell fake drugs, such that even if you take it, it will not work.” (R 08) 
Drug consumers judged drugs sold at formal pharmacies to be of better quality than 
drugs traded in patent medicine shops. 
“Yeah, for quality, I cannot bet on that, but the quality when you buy from the 
pharmacy, is better than retail shops.” (R 08) 
The conclusion from these consumer notions would be that consumers valued 
treatment outcomes highly and therefore, the quality of drugs purchased mattered 
much. They however are not able to know true quality. 
6.2.4 Consumer knowledge of drug regulation 
Consumers’ knowledge of regulations guiding the operations of patent medicine 
vendors and drug use varied in depth and breadth between respondents. While a few 
appeared fairly knowledgeable, the vast majority seem to have little to no knowledge 
of retail drug vending laws and drug use. A large number of drug buyers confessed to 
no knowledge of any laws regulating the market in any way. Evidence supporting 
this inference is presented below.  
“I will just look around on the wall to see if there is a certificate pasted on the wall; 
this will clearly indicate whether the seller is a quack or qualified personnel” (R 03) 
“No one has told us about laws guiding the sale of drugs. We do not know which 
drug to buy and which one not to buy” (R 10) 
Consumer knowledge of regulations designed to ensure the availability of effective 
and safety drugs in the market and their safe utilization was for the most part poor 
among retail drug shoppers, even though the market was highly valued by 
consumers, as discussed in more details in section 6.5 below. 
 
6.2.5 Perception of regulatory enforcement and compliance 
With the background knowledge of poor consumer awareness of laws regulating 
patent medicine vendor operations, the researcher sought to explore participant 
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perceptions of regulatory enforcement activities and their impact on provider 
practice. A consumer said: 
”Yes, I know of one of agency called drugs enforcement agency, but this time 
around, due to the corrupt nature, there are no proper regulations, when caught, they 
bail themselves with money. (R 03) 
“I know of NAFDAC, Standard Organization of Nigeria, but sometimes they don’t 
reach many places, like here in Katsina-Ala you don’t feel their presence at all, they 
are not in existence.” (R 07) 
“This is one of the reasons I have earlier emphasized, it is because of ignorance and 
the lack of adequate regulations or adherence to the laws that is actually perpetrating 
these practices” (R09) 
Regarding element of compliance with regulations by patent medicine vendors, these 
are some consumer views:  
“No matter what you tell them is your problem, they assure you of doing it, they 
sometimes suture, they normally go beyond their powers to even operate. Sometimes 
they suture even when you have a deep cut, and they will give you plenty drugs.” (R 
07) 
“Sometimes, they have it available in the shop, and other times, they will tell you to 
wait , they will get into private rooms and bring it but most at times all their drugs 
are mostly available.” (R 10) 
 “if they see that you don’t have any understanding concerning drugs, they may give 
you less quality and collect plenty money or give you different drug entirely, simply 
because you don’t have any idea, these are the practices they do, but here they are 
aware that I have a better understanding of knowledge about drugs, so they don’t do 
that to me, but they’ve been giving many people. Sometimes when people bring 
empty packets of drugs for easy identification, they rather give you a close substitute 
with the assurance that the one they’ve given you is better and preferable instead of 
giving you what you actually demanded for.” (R 09) 
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These comments reveal that consumers have low knowledge of existing patent 
medicine drug vending regulations and also have no clear knowledge of which 
regulatory organization have oversight over what and the lack of any visible 
regulatory activities in the area. They also lend evidence of unethical practices on the 
side of vendors such as sale of prescription drugs and suturing of wounds and 
injections. 
6.3 Consumer Knowledge of Diseases and Drugs 
Consumers in some instances appeared to be certain about the impressions they held 
about the nature of their ill health and the appropriate drugs they self-prescribed, 
others were hesitant. One who demanded an antibiotic, traditionally used in the 
treatment of microbial infection, explained to the researcher the different indications 
he uses the medicament in this way: 
“Sometimes if I have skin infections, fever and body scratch, I take it for relief and 
even in operations and accidents, it helps in bringing quick healing.” (R 05) 
Pressed further for the specific need on this occasion, he said “this time around, I 
bought it for my wife who had stop baby breast-feeding and is suffering from 
swollen breast. She also is having some form of skin scratches, so I bought it for her 
use.” 
Asked again why he did not attend a formal consultation at a hospital, he responded 
thus: “even if I take her to the hospital, these will be the same drugs that I have 
bought that will be prescribed.” 
To further underscore the poor knowledge of diseases and drugs by this buyer, the 
antibiotic was combined with a laxative used specifically for the treatment of 
constipation. 
Questioned if he checked for the expiry date label of drug packages before making a 
purchase another buyer responded, “No, I feel it is not significant bothering the seller 
to bring the package for checking the expiration date before buying.” (R 05) 
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Another consumer said: 
“Well, we just buy them not minding whether they’re genuine or not, but they 
sometimes help us. We don’t really know how to identify the drug that is genuine or 
not, especially here in the village, here where we do not have the experience to know 
that.” (R 07) 
These consumer opinions portray poor knowledge of diseases and appropriate drug 
use: consumers seem not to bother with checking out observable signs of drug 
quality such as NAFDAC registration numbers or drug expiry dates.  Even though 
drug consumers seem not to demonstrate adequate levels of knowledge concerning 
diseases and their appropriate medications, they knew about the potential for adverse 
effects posed by inappropriate drug consumption. There is also an element of 
experience gained through past purchases guiding repeat drug use. 
“If you are taking drugs just like that, without going to the hospitals for a check-up, 
then it can cause adverse drug reaction.” (R 08) 
One customer summed all the shortcomings of patent medicine vendor practice in 
comparison with formal provision in these words: 
 “I believe that government hospitals or hospital treatment are better than medicine 
stores treatment.” (R06).  
In most of the provider-customer interactions observed, patent medicine vendors 
acted essentially as economic agents who simply responded to customer requests, 
rather than acting as health information resource persons.  
The combination of questionable provider qualifications, poor regulatory 
enforcement and compliance and flawed consumer knowledge of diseases and drugs, 
health seeking in the researched market might have been substantially influenced by 
belief based on past experiences and credence status of providers and health 
products. The apparent failures highlighted in association with the market 
notwithstanding, it appeared consumers still used patent medicine vendor shops more 
frequently than hospitals and other better staffed facilities. The thesis next seeks to 
understand the factors that shaped the observed behaviour.  
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6.4 Consumer Utilization Behaviours 
To undertake the analysis of provider utilization by consumers, the demographic 
characteristics of the 30 surveyed participants is presented first. 93% of drug 
purchasers had at least primary education, out of which 53% were schooled up to the 
secondary level and 33% had tertiary education. In 5 out of the ten observed 
transactions, drug purchases were made on demand from the consumers, in 3 cases, 
customers had a consultation with the druggist and in the remaining 2 cases, the 
clients presented a prescription request (though the sources were not verified). This 
dominant trend, where consumers are exerting independence in health care purchases 
might mean that purchases have been repeated events for uncomplicated illnesses, 
which patients are well informed about. The age distribution of clients demanding 
drugs from patent medicine shops ranged from 4 days to 72 years. Consumers 
posited several reasons why they resorted to utilizing patent medicine vendors. These 
spanned over an array of motivators: cheapness, availability of drugs, convenient 
opening times, easy access, provider social embeddedness and credit opportunities, 
perceived severity of disease and constrained utilization (default utilization). 
Basic characteristics of patent medicine vendor consumers are summarised below: 
Box 6.1: Basic characteristics of patent medicine vendor consumers 
 Most consumers (70%) of patent outlets bought for self-consumption 
 The modal age of consumers is 31 – 35 year old category 
 Majority of buyers are males (73%) 
 The vast majority (83%) have at least secondary school level education 
 The majority (66%) of customers are self-employed 
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6.4.1 Affordability considerations 
Relative affordability appeared to be the most frequent motivation for the use of a 
patent medicine vendor shop rather than a government facility or other formal 
provider, as expressed by interviewees. 
“I am financially handicapped and maybe if I go, the charges will be too expensive to 
afford, and I consider the retail shop to be the immediate source of solution to my 
problem.” (R 03) 
“Anytime that I come, I tell him the amount of money that I have and he gives me 
drugs.” (R 04) 
“Personally, my treatments are mostly done in government hospitals, it is because of 
financial constraints that have made me come to a retail shop for treatment.” (R 06) 
“You know all fingers are not equal, some people may not afford the money to go to 
the hospital, if these patent medicine shops are closed, many will have no way to get 
drugs, especially those who treat on credit, you can see that even the little here they 
find it difficult to afford, how much more will they afford that of the hospitals?.” (R 
09) 
Inductively, one may conclude that charges at formal health facilities provided 
perverse incentives for utilization of patent medicine shops. Affordability in the view 
of consumers was interpreted relative to outlays at a formal facility where 
consultation fees, laboratory charges, transport fares, all contributed to treatment 
costs.  
6.4.2 Drug availability 
Users of patent medicine vendor shops also cited drug availability and their range as 
another reason for patronage. One customer said: 
 “there have been a difference, between buying from a shop and in the hospital, and 
even when I go to the hospital and they prescribe drugs, they direct me to go to the 
retail shops to buy the drugs, so instead of going to the hospital to be directed to the 
shop again, I go to the shop directly and buy the drugs” (R 03) 
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Another buyer also said: 
 “The difference there is, when I go to the hospital, they always prescribe drugs for 
me to come to the retail shops and buy.” (R 03) 
Results of exit surveys showed that 60% of respondent indicated drug availability 
was a reason for the use of a patent medicine vendor. 
The conclusion here is that drug consumers found the patent vendors more reliable 
and dependable source of required medicaments than hospitals and a strong influence 
on their utilization.  
6.4.3 Consumer convenience 
A multiple of reasons for the use of medicine stores fit into to this broad group. This 
connects attributes such as closeness of provider to home, proxy buying, quick 
services and suitable opening times, as these typical responses reveal: 
“I have so many children, so when they go ill, I usually consult the retailer on behalf 
of my ill child, and disclose the symptoms of the illness, and he administer drugs that 
cures the child’s health immediately” (R 02) 
“The  retail shops are better because they respond quickly to people’s problems, 
unlike the government hospitals, they don’t even have drugs, I remember, when I 
took my wife to the government hospital for treatment, they prescribe drugs for me 
which were not available in the hospital pharmacy, … so, the retail shop are more 
efficient in taking adequate care of patients.” (R 10) 
“My children were vaccinated by the government team and a problem has arisen 
which deserves urgent attention, which is why I have brought them here.” (R 06) 
“Sometimes, it is very difficult to have access to a general hospital or a primary 
health care centre, so I decided to come to a convenient place whenever am feeling 
pains or have to buy drugs.” (R 07) 
Putting all of these together would clearly project convenience as an important 
consideration in a consumer health seeking behaviour equation. 
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6.4.4 Social embeddeness and credit potential 
The quality of being seen as credit worthy appeared to be yet another idea consumers 
of health care evaluated in their decision making process. Related to credit scope was 
the implicit role of relational buying where social links determined where a 
consumer bought drugs. This notion is underpinned by these responses to interview 
questions. 
“Yes, but due to our familiar nature, the person often give me drugs on credit.”  (R 
03) 
“When I don’t have the money, I go to my regular customer for credit, so whenever I 
have money, I come and pay him.” (R 05) 
“…, but in a place where the seller and I are familiar, then credit selling too would be 
possible even in the hospitals, but everything depends on familiarity. (R 06) 
 “You know they are our friends and part of us, so they sometimes give us on credit, 
and sometimes, we give them the little money that we have, and then balance them in 
the future.” (R 09) 
A central theme that runs through all the responses is the concept of familiarity with 
a drug shop provider. This reveals some form of strategic behaviour on the part of 
the consumers, considering their difficult financial context and drug knowledge 
weakness. The concept also exemplifies the importance of social embeddedness in 
consumption utilization behaviour, where familiarity serves to build trust and 
acceptance. Even though exit consumer interviewees explicitly mentioned a role for 
credit transactions, all observed drug purchases were paid in cash as no credit 
transaction was directly observed. The place of credit consideration of utilization 
may therefore be anticipatory and purely strategic. However, this behaviour signifies 
the importance of financial safety mechanism in health care systems. 
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6.4.5 Perceived severity of disease 
The perceived severity of a malaise also determined consumers’ utilization choices. 
A broad range of diseases were presented in patent medicine shops, which have 
broadly been classified into aches/pains, making up 78% of complaints, fevers 13%, 
and diarrhoea and vomiting 9%. The detailed listing of specific complaints 
consumers sought treatment at patent drug shops is presented verbatim in Box 6.2 
below.  
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Box 6.2 Types of complaints treated at patent medicine vendor as described by 
consumers 
1. Fever 
2. Malaria 
3. Headache 
4. Diarrhoea 
5. Chest pains 
6. Eye pains 
7. Abdominal pains 
8. Stomach ulcers 
9. Typhoid fever 
10.  Waist pains 
11. Tooth pains 
12. Vomiting 
13. Loss of appetite 
14. Body maintenance 
15. Urinary pains 
16. Accident 
17. Body pains 
 
Source: Exit research questionnaires, 2012 
The group of aches and pains include complaints as headache, chest pains, eye pains, 
and abdominal pains. Others are waist pains (low back pain), tooth ache, urinary 
pains and body pain (general body aches). Fevers consist of symptoms as fever, 
malaria and typhoid fever. The duration of disease symptoms varied widely,  from 
one day to symptoms lasting a year as reported by consumers, but simply classified 
into acute disease for symptoms lasting no longer than seven days and chronic 
disease for ill-health longer than seven days (Morrisy et al. 1989). 73% of surveyed 
consumers had acute symptoms and 80% of the sample was seeking care for the first 
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time.  The analysis indicates that patent medicine vendors treat a significant number 
of people seeking orthodox care for the first time, who have a form of ache/pains in 
the acute phase of the disease process. This finding was also borne out in exit 
interviews: 
“I normally try to address little problems from the retail shops, because the cost are 
less expensive compared to the hospital bills, I therefore go to hospital for treatment 
only when the situation is beyond the control of retailers medicine shops sellers.” (R 
04) 
“Well, I feel the medicine store sellers too are of help, because in emergency 
situations, they address immediate problems that may arise …” (R 04) 
“My illness is no severe, but when it is severe, I go to the hospital, so minor illnesses 
are brought here, but severe ones are taken to the hospital.” (R 08) 
Choosing to use patent medicine shops for diseases considered as minor may be a 
reflection of consumers’ perception of provider knowledge base in these outlets as 
poor and low quality of their practice as argued in Section 6.3.2 above.  
6.4.6 Constrained utilization 
For other consumers, patent medicine shops provided the only real source for any 
form of orthodox medications and therefore, the decision to use them is one by 
default. 
“I cannot stop because I have no alternative means, even in most cases, they hawk 
these drugs.” (R 05) 
“Well, we just buy them because we don’t have alternative, not minding whether 
they’re genuine or not …” (R 07) 
“You know they are the only people available, and as such, we have no choice …” 
(R 07) 
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The section has analysed motivations influencing consumer utilization choices of 
patent medicine vendors, despite the many issues of the quality of services in these 
shops. In the following section, consumer expectations of this market are explored. 
6.5 Consumer Expectations 
Consumer expectations in respect of the market were sought in key areas as banning 
of patent medicine vendor shops, handling of providers and the role of government 
and its regulatory agencies and are presented below. 
6.5.1 Banning of patent medicine shops 
In Nigeria at the moment, there seems to be a growing consensus among formal 
regulatory agencies and formal pharmacy operators about scrapping of drug retailing 
by vendors. Therefore, asked if patent medicine vendor practice be banned, all 
interviewees strongly opposed the notion. These are the thoughts of one respondent:  
“Government should not scrap it, because they are helpful, especially in times of 
difficulties, like now I’ve no enough money to go to the hospital, so medicine stores 
should not be scrapped.” (R 06)  
Similarly, another buyer put it even more strongly this way:  
“The government will kill us, because not all of us will be able to go to the town for 
hospital …” (R 08) 
The many deficiencies identified in the market notwithstanding, it is unequivocal that 
consumers valued this group of medical entrepreneurs highly and want them 
retained. 
6.5.2 Provider training and qualification 
Patent medicine vendor clients desired that providers improve their educational 
training and enhance their qualifications to boost their competences. These 
expectations were communicated in passionate appeals to drug shop providers 
succinctly: 
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“It is advisable that they further their education so that they will treat people well” (R 
05) 
“… and to the medicine store sellers, they should not relent in trying to further their 
education and update themselves with adequate knowledge.” (R 03) 
“I will advise the federal, state and local governments to organize workshops that 
will further enlighten these practitioners, and also make a law that will mandate 
training for the retail shop practitioners like the health technology, health 
management institutions. That will help a lot, since most of them gained freedom 
from apprenticeship, this will improve rural services, which they offer.” (R 09) 
6.5.3 Regulation 
Consumers also expressed the prospects of seeing improved regulation of 
practitioners, to ensure that the right standard of health care is provided.  
 “There should be a regulatory body that should be seeing over their respective 
affairs, let them not take it as their own personal business, let them be checked.” (R 
01) 
“Yeah, it is the government that ensure that drugs are available. Therefore, the 
government should check the activities of the medicine store sellers, ensure that fake 
drugs are not sold to patients.” (R 05) 
“Moreover, medicine stores are of great importance, so I feel, it should not be closed. 
If only the government wish to be fair, it should look for better means that will 
improve services, thereby ensuring that it is qualified personnel that should 
dispense.” (R 09) 
These expectations from drug shop consumers are supported by their perceived 
inappropriate qualifications and practice of providers, their poor regulatory 
compliance and weak regulatory enforcement. The imperatives for them may have 
arisen from their poor technical knowledge of diseases and drugs, heightened by drug 
consumption by even vulnerable members of the society such as the young and 
elderly, all driving the ardent calls for improved regulation. 
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6.6 Summary Findings 
In this chapter, it has been shown that consumers perceive patent medicine vendors 
as offering important health services, but beset with quality issues around provider 
qualifications and competences, much as with drug effectiveness. Consumers 
continue to use these drug shops despite these deficiencies for their cheapness, 
nearness, drug availability and quickness of services. Other considerations in the 
decisions to patronize drug shops identified include social connectedness, access to 
credit, and perceived severity of disease and in some situations utilization is 
constrained because of lack of a viable alternative option. The consumers themselves 
demonstrated poor technical knowledge of diseases and drug use, weak 
understanding of regulations governing patent medicine retailing and no knowledge 
of regulatory implementation and enforcement. Retail drug users however showed 
strong desire of high value services for money. Despite this predilection, observable 
indicators of drug qualities as NAFDAC registration number or drug expiry dates are 
not looked out for by drug buyers, even though some had this knowledge. Overall all, 
consumers exercised considerable freedom in utilization choices signifying a good 
general familiarity with the market. All consumers looked forward to greater 
government role in the market through ensuring better provider training and 
qualification and improved regulatory oversight as ways of ensuring better 
performance of the market.  
6.7 Discussion 
Most consumers surveyed and interviewed said they resorted to the use of patent 
medicine vendor shops based on user experience. These influences were attributable 
to elements of convenience as closeness to home, long opening hours, absence of 
waiting times, affordable charges and potential for credit buying. These health care 
behavioural metrics have been corroborated in other studies (Amin et al, 2003; 
Brieger et al. 2001; Cross and MacGregor, 2010; Goodman et al. 2007a; Goodman et 
al. 2004b Goel et al. 1996; Igun 1987; Snow et al. 1992; van der Geest 1987).  
The findings of the use of patent medicine vendors as sources for treatment in acute 
phase of ill-health has been reported by other investigators in Nigeria (Igun 1987) 
and elsewhere in Africa. Also, basing a decision to use a patent medicine outlet for 
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what is considered as minor illness and recourse to the formal sector for more severe 
ill-health has been documented in other African settings in the context of malaria 
treatment seeking behaviour (McCombie 1996; Lindblade et al. 2000; Molyneux et 
al. 2002). The very high patronage of medicine shops by individuals seeking care for 
the first time in an illness episode demonstrates the fact that in rural settings, patent 
medicine vendors may in fact be a first port of call for health care as also pointed out 
by several other investigators in Nigeria and elsewhere (Brieger et al. 2004; Iweze 
1987; Salako et al. 2001). By and large for some consumers, patent medicine vendors 
may have become viable alternatives for clinics and hospitals and Primary Health 
Clinics (PHCs) in particular, and acting as competitors in a real way. The fact that 
patent medicine shops act as points of first contact for care has policy implications, 
because the accuracy of diagnosis and correct treatment of ill-health early in the 
course of a disease is a major determinant for long term health outcome and 
underscores a need for some level of technical competence of these providers. 
Traditionally, patients make very few decisions themselves concerning their health. 
However, consumers in this study had a free rein to the purchase and use of drugs, as 
also observed in other Nigerian settings by Brieger and colleagues (2004) and 
elsewhere by Kamat and Nichter (1998). This consumer behaviour has been 
understood as beneficial in fostering self-care and confers on people control over 
their health care experiences (Levin 1980).  However, free access of consumers to 
just any kind of medications and the potential danger of toxicity, drug abuse and drug 
pressure on the society has been emphasised in the literature (Igun 1983; Jeffery et 
al. 2007). WHO has also shown that several microbes, including malaria parasite 
have developed resistance to most commonly used drugs. In the case of malaria for 
example, this led to the discontinuation of Chloroquine mono-therapy, as well as 
anti-folate therapy in favour of Arthemisinin Combination Therapy (WHO 2001). 
The unfettered use of drugs by the public therefore, poses an important drug pressure 
challenge for public health policy. 
The study findings also bring out the mismatch between everyday expectations of 
consumers in terms of quality of care and the medical knowledge base and therefore 
the quality of practice of patent medicine vendors. Information giving to customers 
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on health matters was observed to be a minor component of the interactions between 
providers and consumers, as also reported by Brieger et al. (2004) in Nigeria and 
elsewhere, but related phenomenon (Chalker et al. 2000; Goodman et al. 2007a). 
Other publications have equally noted wide variation in the amount and accuracy of 
information given by drug shop retailers to their customers (Indalo 1997; Maiga 
2003; Ongore and Nyabola 1996; Twebaze 2001; Nshakira etal. 2001). The 
description of patent medicine vendors more as economic agents than as repositories 
of health information adequate for clinical transactions has also been highlighted in 
the international public health literature (Brieger et al. 2004; Cross and MacGregor 
2010; Goodman et al. 2007b; Kamat and Nichter 1998).    
The results have in addition revealed the deep rooted inadequacies in the current 
Nigerian national health care system, regarding spatial availability of health care 
facilities, supply of essential health commodities, particularly drugs and a critical 
mass of well-trained human resource for health, as has been highlighted by other 
researches (WHO 2006). These have also stressed that where there is adequate public 
supply of quality healthcare, consumers are less likely to patronize untrained 
providers.   
Furthermore, the thesis findings highlight the vexing issue of weak regulations and 
inadequate regulatory enforcement on the part of government, a characteristic of 
many other health systems in Africa (Goodman et al. 2007b; Kumaranayake et al. 
2000; Hongoro and Kumaranayake 2000; Wafula et al. 2012; Wafula et al. 2013). 
Economic theory of consumer choice and utility maximization makes explicit 
assumptions of a clear sense of the utility of the product to be consumed, knowledge 
of the rate of change of marginal utilities and the ability to compare marginal utilities 
of a consumption bundle. These ideas are frequently encapsulated in the axiom of the 
fully informed and rational consumer. In the real world however, the model does not 
always predict accurately how people are going to behave, because consumers are 
not always fully informed about the choices they make. This means that for some 
consumption decisions, consumers may not be able to know and evaluate all their 
possible options and their associated opportunity costs. Behaviours in this market 
best match these limitations of the neoclassical consumer choice theory. From the 
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survey result, majority of drug consumers were purchasing a product for the first 
time in that episode of ill health and therefore might not have had the requisite 
experience to make informed decisions about their options for maximizing health 
outcomes. Moreover, consumers are poorly informed regarding disease symptoms 
and manifestations and might not have been making the best choices of the 
medications they bought, added to the perceptions that providers also lacked 
adequate knowledge and clinical expertise, the uncertainty of what consumers bought 
in this market is even more complicated. For the consumer therefore, it turns out that 
this is a situation of choice based on best guesses as predicted by the public choice 
model. Information asymmetry is a dominant feature of healthcare markets and dots 
the body of economic literature (Arrow 1962; Feldstein 1973). This is the case in this 
market too. Evidence equally exists in published work of non-utilization of 
information by consumers generally even where it was available to inform choice 
making, similar to the gaps in utilization of knowledge of drug quality signals by 
consumers to discipline the market as found in this study also (Bugvi et al. 2014).   
Economic theory also posits that the consumer is a rational individual who is capable 
of thinking and making logical choices. However, consumers of health services are 
much of the time not able to firmly evaluate the utilities of all possible treatment 
options and may not also be able to say with all certainty if a treatment actually cured 
a disease or a favourable outcome resulted from other factors. The assumption of 
rationality of the consumer therefore does not provide useful insight in understanding 
of consumer behaviour in this study, even though the research has shown consumers 
doing their utmost given their socioeconomic circumstances to get the most. This 
underscores the role of policy in improving public information dissemination 
covering health and health care by all relevant organizations and institutions as a 
strategy for improving population health and health outcomes. 
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6.8 Conclusions 
The thesis has analysed consumer behaviour in the market as one of constrained 
optimization, with buyers doing their all to get the best value for money. There are 
general uncertainties around most provider competencies and consumers have 
multiple information gaps concerning diseases and appropriate drug utilization. 
Virtually all patent medicine vendor consumers recognize and acknowledge the 
important role of patent medicine vendors in their communities, characterising them 
as indispensable.  
To summarize this market so far, the thesis has demonstrated pervasive failures in 
this market: imperfect competitive market structure, poor provider knowledge of 
diseases and drugs, low quality issues, wide spread regulatory infringements and low 
consumer information base of the market. These therefore provide justification for 
the case of government intervention in the market. The research next undertakes to 
analyse the overarching concept of regulation which cuts across all components of 
the market relationships. 
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CHAPTER 7:  PATENT MEDICINE REGULATION IN 
NIGERIA 
7.1 Introduction 
The role of regulation is pivotal to all elements of the structure-conduct-performance 
evaluative framework, which formed the fulcrum of this thesis and provided the 
analytical tools for understanding the relationships in this market to this point. This 
chapter undertakes a description and analysis of the nature of regulation of patent 
medicine vending in Nigeria and concludes the series of results analysis, which 
commenced in chapter 4. 
Drug production, distribution and consumption in Nigeria falls principally under the 
regulatory purview of the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN) and the National 
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), with the Federal 
Ministry of Health of Nigeria (FMOH) articulating policy frameworks for their 
modus operandi. Therefore, the data analyzed in this chapter is mainly based on 
documents retrieved at these agencies and interviews with their key officers. Other 
national agencies with ancillary roles in drug regulation also exist:  the National 
Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and the Consumer Protection Council of 
Nigeria (CPC). The former is strictly mandated with the regulation of narcotic and 
abuse-prone substances, which are not used routinely in health care and not 
considered important in this study. The Consumer Protection Council is vested 
mainly with the responsibility of protecting the interest of the consumer generally, 
which also includes healthcare consumption, hence was adjudged relevant in the 
study. 
Prior analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 revealed inadequate regulatory knowledge, weak 
regulatory enforcement and poor compliance by both suppliers and demanders of 
pharmaceutical products in the patent medicine market in Katsina-Ala: all of which 
cast severe doubts relating to effectiveness of the nation’s regulatory institutions. 
Unanimity of opinions among both patent medicine vendors and drug consumers of 
the desirability of regulation was also demonstrated. This chapter therefore, 
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undertakes to analyze how the patent medicine market is regulated with a view to 
identifying opportunities for regulatory improvement. It opens with the description of 
what regulators understood their roles to be, in section 7.2, and then the analysis of 
the portrait of patent medicine vendors in the eyes of regulators in section 7.3. This is 
followed by the responses of regulators to the demand of patent medicine vendors for 
an expansion on the list of drugs they could sell in section 7.4. The processes of 
regulatory enforcement are explored in section 7.5, while regulatory challenges are 
put under the search light in section 7.6. Section 7.7 summarizes and discusses the 
chapter findings in relation to regulatory effectiveness and winds down with 
conclusions drawn in section 7.8.  
7.2 How Regulators Understood their Roles 
When asked to describe their roles, regulatory staff perceived themselves variously 
as inspectors, regulators, controllers and educators of pharmaceutical and pharmacy 
practice, as well as consumer protection in Nigeria. Below are excerpts of their 
evaluations: 
“It is charged with the responsibility among others of regulating and controlling the 
education and practice of pharmacy in all its aspect and ramification. The PCN been 
empowered by this enabling law, it has its statutory function by the same law among 
which are: the determination of the standard of knowledge and skills to be attained 
by any person who proposes to practice pharmacy profession in Nigeria, updating the 
register from time to time, to stick to the code of ethics of the practice of the 
profession” (PCN) 
“The law establishing the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria, grants me the authority 
to inspect and regulate pharmacy practice in Nigeria in all its aspects and 
ramifications.” (Benue State regulator) 
“Our mandate is to regulate and control specific products otherwise known as 
regulated products and the products are food, drugs cosmetics, chemical devices, 
soap and detergents, drinks including bottle water. The mandate is very clear 
NAFDAC is to regulate the manufacture, importation, exportation distribution, 
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advertisement, sales and use of these products otherwise known as regulated 
products.” (NAFDAC) 
The officer went into details of the scope and scale of the agency’s responsibility 
thus:  
“When we are talking about use, we mean that at the point of dispensing the product, 
the product must be properly dispensed with proper information that will enable the 
patient to use the product rationally, in such a way that the patient should have an 
idea of the drugs he want to consume, the dosage and the storage condition so that 
the same product that is supposed to alleviate the problem of illness, will not be the 
one that will endanger the lives of the consumers.” 
Both PCN and NAFDAC appear to be involved in regulating pharmacy practice, 
which would appear to be a source of potential regulatory overlap and conflict. 
Still on their perceived roles, another regulator said: 
“We are to provide speedy redress to consumers’ complaints. We are also to 
enlighten consumers and remove any substandard product that we see. So in essence, 
we are on the feedback side of regulation.” (CPC) 
These excerpts would support the induction that all the regulators were well 
informed of their lawful duties of ensuring that only effective and safe health 
products reach public domain, as well as providing a platform for informing 
consumers and redressing user complaints.  
However as shown in Chapter 5, patent medicine vendors had alleged multiple and 
overlapping regulatory functions and the seeming overlap in some responses above, 
the researcher put this question to one regulator and this was his thought: 
“Let me clear this here that in regulation of drugs, there are two basic agency of 
government; we have NAFDAC and Pharmacist Council of Nigeria. The Pharmacist 
Council of Nigeria regulates the practice of pharmacy and also licenses the premises 
where drugs are stock and offered for sales. In the case of NAFDAC, we regulate the 
products itself because NAFDAC is empowered to license the product for sale and 
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when you license a product, there are conditions that the production must have 
satisfied, and there is a need to always monitor in such a way that the moment the 
conditions are no longer there, that license that had been issued for the product is no 
longer valid. That is the reason why the agency has the mandate to monitor the 
distribution and storage condition of drugs that have been licensed.” (PCN) 
 His counterpart at the opposite agency also expressing his viewpoint on the same 
issue said: 
“I don’t think so because the functions are well streamlined; one is to license the 
premises, that this premises is fit for the products that you want to venture into, the 
second agency is to actually monitor and control the product stock there. As long as 
these two agencies know their core functions, and stick to it I do not envisage any 
conflict of interest.” (NAFDAC) 
The responses suggest there is no regulatory overlap between the main regulators of 
pharmaceutical distribution chain in Nigeria. 
7.3 Patent Vendors in the Eyes of the Regulators 
Regulatory staff characterized patent medicine vendors variously as untrained 
pharmaceutical merchandizers, more appropriate for rural areas and fit only for the 
delivery of basic household remedies as first aiders. Patent medicine vendors were 
also framed as law breakers: 
“In Nigeria first and foremost, we recognize pharmacist, the pharmacy technician 
and for the purpose of pharmaceutical care and services in the remote areas and basic 
household remedies, we recognize the patent medicine vendors.”(PCN) 
He went further: 
“This is to make available to the community basic household remedy that may serve 
as first aid or drugs that could render palliative measure before patient access 
relevant health care services. This group of people does not qualify to practice as 
such by reason of any formal education but by way of coming on board as a stop gap 
mechanism to provide pharmaceutical services.” (PCN) 
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Another regulator said: 
“Retail medicine vendors are supposed to fill a gap that is created because 
pharmacists are not in that community and because the operators of patent medicine 
shops are not highly skilled in the art of medicine, most of them are probably school 
cert. holders (O’Level) and they are not professionals. Generally they serve the need 
of a certain class of people which is providing the immediate health need. Therefore 
the intricacy of what it takes to know what a particular drug can do, they are not as 
knowledgeable as expected. As a result of that, patent medicine vendors are limited 
to stock and dispense certain category of drugs which we call over-the-counter drugs. 
Those drugs are considered to have wide safety margin.” NAFDAC 
A state level regulator expressed his views this way: 
“They are not trained remember,  I told you that being able to read and write in 
English language you don’t have any other prerequisite qualification, so you are not 
trained.” (Benue State regulator) 
Arguing further, he framed medicine vendors as unethical and often practiced in 
breach of the rules of healthcare.   
“If you go out to their shops, you will be seeing it oh. They hide the prescription 
drugs in some places, and when you request, they will take it from the carton. If you 
want to buy ampiclox for example, they will bring it out from the carton. They do not 
display on the shelves for people to access. Also, some of them stock even more than 
a pharmacy shop. We are talking to them on wholesale too. They are not supposed to 
do wholesaling, certain vendors are involved in wholesaling, when you want to do 
wholesale, you have to register as a pharmacy and you need a pharmacist as a 
partner, you can only do retail, not wholesale.” 
The researcher at this point, sought to know what regulatory measures had been 
deployed in the light of this experience, and the response: 
 “I have not seen, but only heard about such behaviours they exhibit, but my advice 
goes thus: that they should be able to distinguish clearly to the patients what they can 
do and what is beyond their capability. If such patient is to be referred to the hospital, 
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then they should recommend as the need arise, they should not sell or give priority to 
money making but rather consider quality of their services and as such avoid extreme 
exploitation of patients.”  
Regulators have said patent medicine vendors are untrained and unskilled in the art 
of pharmacy and medicine. They flaunt the rules by engaging in unlawful practices 
as sale of prescription only medicines, wholesale and handling of cases beyond their 
competencies. The implication of this statement is that regulators appeared aware of 
regulatory infringement by patent medicine vendors, but possibly tacitly permitted 
them. 
7.4 Expanding Drug List of Patent Medicine Vendors 
In chapter 5 of the thesis, it also emerged that patent medicine vendors, all wanted an 
expansion on the list of drugs they were permitted to sell to include some 
prescription drugs, given that in most cases they were the only source of drugs for 
consumers. Federal and state regulators were asked for their views about this and 
their views are presented below: 
“We cannot allow them to sell any drug they want. They were brought on because of 
shortages of qualified pharmacists. Now that we are producing more pharmacists and 
pharmacist technicians, we may soon ban patent medicine vendors” (Federal 
Ministry of Health) 
“That will not possibly happen, as a matter of fact that cannot come to be. You 
cannot because of that singular reason have the entire list deregulated. For example 
you have a patent medicine vendor possibly in a remote area, it is expected that the 
PMV should be able to refer, that is the essence of referral.” (PCN) 
“Now coming to CPC to increase their list I don’t think is proper, because they are 
not safe to handle that, even as a pharmacist, the doctors are the ones to prescribe. If 
you must give them the authority to stock those products, they must be attached with 
some pharmacies alongside.” (CPC) 
“No, there is no law, and no law will allow them, because they are not trained if they 
are doing so, they are doing it at the risk of the patients; somebody is not trained on 
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the course of antibiotics to give, you are not trained on diagnosis, how should I allow 
them to sell drugs like that? If you give them the limelight, you are doing it at the 
risk of the people in the rural areas. (Benue State regulator) 
 When reminded that patent medicine in the research field sold most prescription 
drugs openly, he said: 
“That one you see, my hand can’t give them an open pay check because I didn’t 
make the law. I didn’t draw out the list for them. If I am keeping a blind eye to what 
they are doing, (when I talk of I, I mean the pharmaceutical inspection committee, 
don’t take that it is I. I, because it is a committee that I am just the chairman), it is not 
a license. So what they are doing is illegal. If you go and catch them with the drugs, 
they have nothing to do about it; our own is to go to court. They have no permission 
to sell those drugs, so for the fact that we are silent does not mean that they have 
liberty, they are not licensed to sell those drugs.” 
“At this point I want us to realize that drugs are essential commodities. Drugs are 
products that can determine whether someone will survive or not. Better put, the use 
of drugs affect human life seriously. Therefore, it is better to allow someone who is 
knowledgeable, who knows the art and science of drugs to be the custodian of drugs. 
Remember where we started, that generally 100% operators of patent medicine stores 
are not professionals, they know little to nothing about medicine ” NAFDAC 
Regulators appear unwilling to expand the list of drugs patent medicine vendors may 
sell, citing public safety concerns, even though they seem fully aware providers were 
actually selling prescription drugs already. They argued that patent medicine vendors 
were poorly trained and therefore, not qualified to administer regulated drugs. 
7.5 Regulatory Approaches 
A wide range of regulatory strategies and interventions were said to be adopted by 
regulators in the process of regulatory implementation and enforcement. These have 
been broadly classified under themes as standard setting and eligibility testing, 
information dissemination and awareness creation and coercion and sanctioning. 
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Below are answers to inquiries exploring strategies deployed in regulatory 
approaches. 
7.5.1 Provider licensing and quality control 
“An intending candidate for that trade applies to the committee, screened by the 
committee and recommended as eligible or otherwise to PCN to further process and 
admit the person into that category of practice. Upon the admission there is an 
orientation programme for patent and proprietary medicine vendor’s license holders. 
This programme is one of the things used to bring them on board, introducing them 
to what they are expected to do as patent medicine vendors. They are given the right 
orientation, they are put through some basic education requirement, they are trained 
on what to do, what their shops should look like, the basic tenet of the practice they 
are going into and the need to appreciate the fact that what they are intending to trade 
in is not an article of trade as it where, but drugstore which affect human lives and 
physiology.” (PCN)  
“We interview them, we give them a written examination and we interact with them 
face to face, when we go out on inspection.” (Benue State regulator) 
“Any NAFDAC regulated product that does not carry NAFDAC registration number 
according to the definition of fake product, that product will be tagged a fake 
product.” (NAFDAC) 
“About the issue of quality and availability of drugs sold directly to consumers, we 
invite drug sellers for stakeholders meetings. We call them once in a while, like the 
one we have finished some time ago with the banking industry, all of them came, and 
issues of consumer interest are discussed. The same thing we do for the drug 
industry, we’ve done this two or three year ago.” (CPC) 
The licensing process of patent medicine vendors involves interviews and screening 
of prospective vendors and physical inspection of the shop by state officials, while 
the quality of products sold is ensured through checking of drugs for identification of 
NAFDAC registration number and moral suasion. These approaches appear to be 
infrequent, occurring every two to three years in principle. 
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7.5.2 Provider training 
“We have continuing education programme for patent medicine vendors. This 
continuing education programme is a bi-annual programme, in every two years every 
PPMV (proprietary and patent medicine vendors) are expected to access the 
programme to keep them updated as to what is expected of them, to refresh their 
knowledge and to keep them abreast of any new developments in the practice of the 
profession but not without setting the limits as to the scope of their practice.” (PCN) 
“NAFDAC have taking the lead in recent time by conducting training workshops 
relevant to their activities as to how they can improve the practices of patent 
medicine vendors in such a way that they will stock only drugs within their category, 
drugs licensed by NAFDAC and that they are also stocked under the appropriate 
conditions that will maintain the efficacy and safety of the product itself.  Recently 
the Director General of NAFDAC had taken the campaign to traditional rulers as to 
empower them to know what is expected of them at the same time also empowering 
the patent medicine vendors to know their limitation and making sure that the 
practice is done appropriately. By so doing they will be able to serve the rural 
communities better without fake drugs or expired drugs.” (NAFDAC) 
Training opportunities offered to patent medicine vendors included two yearly 
refresher workshops to update knowledge and practice, coaching on proper drug 
storing techniques and recognition of knowledge and practice limits. Traditional 
rulers involvement is being pioneered. 
7.5.3 Consumer protection 
“We have done radio programmes to educate consumers on how to take medications 
and enlighten them better on what to do if someone reacts to some products. We 
advise them to consult their doctors. We’ve been advising on compliance with the 
dosages and food and drug interaction, things like that.” (CPC) 
“That’s what call centres are supposed to do, and we do have channels through which 
consumers who have complaints can reach us. We have phones, emails and websites. 
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We do awareness in churches and mosques, so that the opinion and religious leaders 
can be carried along on these awareness programmes.” (CPC) 
“We interact with them through public enlightenment, public enlightenment comes in 
so many ways, we use electronic media, print media and one of the programme 
NAFDAC has ongoing now is a programme called NAFDAC and your health, which 
is aired every Wednesday on Nigerian Television Authority (NTA). I am also aware 
that that we use television stations like African Independent Television (AIT), and 
Channels, radio stations and newspapers. Apart from providing them with necessary 
information useful for their health, the present management has sort of empowered 
the consumers to be able to differentiate on the spot between genuine and fake drugs. 
NAFDAC is working in collaboration with manufacturers where by the 
manufacturers incorporate certain digit numbers on their products which can be 
texted to a particular phone controlled by NAFDAC and immediately, everything 
that relates to the drug comes out which include date of production, expiry date, 
NAFDAC registration number and so on. To me that is a way of interacting with the 
consumer to let them know their rights. Also on our own without consumers coming 
to lodge complaints, we go ahead to do what we call full marketing surveillance. 
During this period what we do is pick particular drugs that we know are prone to 
faking that could have environmental challenge we scrutinize them randomly in 
different parts of the country and NAFDAC come on air to tell the whole nation the 
state of the quality of such drugs and batch. From time to time NAFDAC is 
interacting with consumers. NAFDAC also organize phone in programmes that you 
can talk with the Director General of NAFDAC, Deputy Director in charge of 
protocol, Deputy Director in charge of drugs information centre to tell them the state 
of drugs. NAFDAC have offices in all the states of the federation including FCT.  
Our officers in the states are open and free to the consumers, the consumers can 
interact with our officers, they can lodge complaints and their complaints will be 
entertained and appropriate actions will be taken. I can confidently say that 
NAFDAC interacts a lot with the consumers.” (NAFDAC) 
Consumer empowering techniques used is mainly mass media (electronic and print), 
targeting health seeking and health utilization and provision of consumer complaints 
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channels. An instant drug quality verifying mobile phone initiative is also being 
rolled out and disclosure of relevant information is also provided.  
7.5.4 Sanctioning of regulatory infringements 
Agencies also discussed what they did in situations of regulatory breach on the part 
of patent medicine vendors and their views are as presented below: 
“What NAFDAC does is to evacuate those drugs confiscate and destroys them. 
NAFDAC has task forces in each state of the federation for inspection.” (NAFDAC) 
 “The law is not cast in stone or iron, whichever one. There are exceptions where the 
decision is left to the state, because in some local governments, you will not be able 
to find shops. These people cannot find shops to rent to operate their business, except 
in complexes like you are saying and so, when we get such cases, we are not rigid. 
Like in Katsina-Ala, how many pharmaceutical shops do you have? They are 
supposed to be two but one is not even functioning very well and so we give room. 
We have been to the market and notified them that they are not supposed to cite 
businesses in the market area, and they have been given quit notice. When we go 
back there, we are going to lock those shops.” (Benue State regulator) 
Responding to specific observations about sanctioning of erring vendors in the 
researched site, the officer said: 
”When the law begins to work, they will see it. Particularly now, we are 
handicapped, because we cannot carry them and go and lock those who are 
perpetuating this illegal health practices, but the task force on fake and counterfeit 
drugs is being reconstituted. In fact, I have the final copy to publish … and when we 
go out, the law mandates us to confiscate, to arrest and to lock, and to prosecute. 
Until that is done, they won’t listen.” 
He also added: 
“we have given them enough time this year, as many as don’t register in the coming 
year, we are going to lock the shops that have not registered, then we will face the 
product compliance that you are talking about.  
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Sanctioning and enforcement approaches included confiscation of products and 
prosecution, but it would appear frontline regulatory staff never wielded the big 
stick, preferring to allow vendors more time to meet regulatory norms. This might 
suggest that regulation was selective and random or regulators tacitly refused to 
implement practice standards, allowing local realities to temper sanctioning of erring 
vendors in rural areas. These inferences do much to stimulate a fertile theorizing of 
the causal influences on regulatory behaviours of officials in this study. Section 7.5 
therefore examines the challenges of regulating patent medicine vendors on a broader 
Nigerian context. 
7.6 Challenges of Regulating Patent Medicine Vendors 
Regulators identified a plethora of constraints inimical to effective regulation of 
patent medicine retailing in Nigeria. These are discussed in-depth under main sub-
categories below. 
7.6.1 Inadequate funding 
“On our own part there are challenges like the insufficiency of fund with which we 
need to get so many things done; we need to manage within the budgetary allocation 
of the federal government. Also inadequacy of logistics to manage the activities of 
these people we need vehicles, we need to reach the remote areas, to do that we need 
personnel. Though we have our offices in all state of the federation including the 
FCT but they are all located in the state capitals and the people in this category are 
not only in the state capitals we need to go to the remote areas therefore we need 
more personnel. As it is shortage of staff is major challenge.” (PCN) 
“We need money to employ many hands, that’s one of our pressing challenges.” 
(CPC) 
“We are supposed to have what we call state consumer committees and local 
government  consumer committees by law, but because we do not have the money, 
but Benue will soon do that as well as other states. It is step by step, every state need 
to have a state consumer committee.” (CPC) 
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The funding gaps have meant that regulation was poorly implemented and enforced, 
especially in the rural areas as stated in these quotes. Funding of regulatory agencies 
is from fixed budgetary allocations and inadequacies existed in areas as critical 
staffing, logistics and infrastructural support.  
7.6.2 Uncooperative manufacturers 
“The little challenges we have is that the manufacturers don’t want to cooperate with 
us.” (CPC) 
“The challenge is the issue of production of fake drugs, you have premises that are 
neither licensed by the Pharmacist Council of Nigeria to go into production, and 
neither is the product licensed by NAFDAC for production and release to the public. 
You see them producing paracetamol syrup and even some tablets, we have a 
challenge with production of fake products in Nigeria.” (NAFDAC) 
“…, fake and counterfeit regulated products is a global phenomenon, it is not 
peculiar to Nigeria. They know that any product without NAFDAC number will not 
be easily accepted by the public so, there are few cases where people fake NAFDAC 
registration number as well. We also have cases where some people use NAFDAC 
number from a different company and print on their own products.” (NAFDAC) 
These excerpts reveal the inability of regulatory agencies to control profit 
maximizing organizations engaged in drug manufacture, who appear to continue to 
side-step rules of pharmaceutical manufacturing. Faking of NAFDAC registration 
number is another dilemma of regulators. 
7.6.3 Institutional constraints 
Several aspects of institutional issues were frequently alluded to by regulatory 
official as limiting effective regulation. The list includes policy inconsistencies, 
judicial constraints and fragmented inter-agency collaboration, and is presented in 
that order.  
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7.6.3.1 Policy inconsistencies 
“The authority to regulate the PPMV was reverted to PCN in April 2003 by 
ministerial directive;  it used to be under the purview of PCN for a time, there after it 
was delegated to various ministries in the state later to Local Governments then  back 
to the State Ministry Of Health and then to PCN for various reasons. At the time, 
there was an abuse of the issuance of licenses to just anybody, people who are not 
eligible to have it were issued the license. Then the license was abused to the extent 
that proliferation of fake and substandard drugs in Nigeria was traced to this to 
unrestricted issuance of PPMV licenses. It was not until April 2003 by ministerial 
directive that the authority to regulate them was reverted to PCN so it was after that 
that what we have put in place like the guidelines for the issuance of license, PCN 
approved drug list, orientation programme and continuing orientation programme 
came in. The groups of people who have not accessed the continuing education 
programme are those who have not gone through the orientation programme and are 
not licensed by PCN. What am saying is that not all patent medicine dealers are 
registered with PCN, we have to start with advocacy and sensitization to get them 
registered immediately the ministerial directive was passed. It was in 2004 that we 
started issuing out the application form, we brought so many of them on board and as 
at today we have over 56,000 PPMV registered with PCN but I can tell you that we 
have multiple of that number that are practicing as patent medicine dealers who are 
yet to make themselves available for PCN for the purpose of registration, annual 
license, education and possibly reorientation. Some of them are restricting the 
regulatory activity of PCN as it affects their trade of practice.” (PCN) 
This comment suggests that the policy inconsistency created two classes of patent 
medicine vendors: the regulated and unregulated retailers, with the size of the latter 
many times over that of the former. It also pointedly acknowledged commencement 
of systematic regulation of patent medicine vendors only from 2004.  
“Recently NAFDAC is one of the agencies that were ordered to vacate the ports in 
Nigeria so most of the times when these items are smuggled in, NAFDAC official 
are not permitted to be there, it is only in Lagos International Airport that we are 
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present. Up till now NAFDAC officers do not have direct access and that is a 
challenge.” (NAFDAC) 
This comment conveys another policy somersault by government that is inimical to 
drug import regulation.  
7.6.3.2 Judicial constraints 
“You mentioned two things; you are talking of proximity of the sellers to each other 
and selling of prescription drugs. Well, for some time back, in the early 90s up to 
2003, there was a court injunction from the vendors that restrained the ministry from 
licensing and regulating them. Things were haywire; they were doing the things they 
want to do, until 2003 when that issue was resolved. Then regulation started in 
earnest, so, we are starting from the scratch. What we are doing is trying to buy them 
in without using force, to register. So, that was the main thing. So all the efforts that 
we’ve been doing for quite long now, is to get them registered and get their license 
renewed and let them know that, now we have people watching over them. So our 
target now is not on product compliance, it is to get them registered and renew their 
licenses.” (Benue State regulator) 
This remark implies that effective regulation was stymied by protracted legal tussle 
which influence is external to the regulator. 
“The Pharmacist Council of Nigeria has a lot of litigation from various stake holders; 
various stake holders in the past have had course to institute cases against PCN so it 
is not unexpected. There are packets of litigation, litigation that the national body of 
NAPMED was like did not subscribe to, there are packets of litigations like that from 
some factions, and among them they have even litigations within the association. Just 
like in this country we have history of so many professional association and societies 
where members within the society instituting cases against the professional 
association or professional regulatory body so it is not unexpected and I don’t think it 
can form an item of news.” (PCN) 
The many and prolonged litigations against the PCN, meant that the agency for much 
of the time, did not enforce any regulations. 
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7.6.3.3 Inter-agency collaboration 
Only one agency explicitly acknowledged a cordial working relationship with other 
drug regulatory bodies. 
“We collaborated very well with NAFDAC, as a federal government agency, we 
collaborate with all these agencies. We have MOU, standing MOU with NAFDAC. 
We have a good relationship with them and sometimes have joint market or 
enlightenment programs.” (CPC) 
Between the key regulators of patent medicine vendor practice, their views were less 
direct: 
“Another challenge is the fact that we have one or two regulatory body that are 
infringing on our statutory regulatory functions; we have some regulatory body who 
approach this people and by the way of propaganda are more popular than PCN, they 
get to be more respected than PCN by the patent medicine dealers who fear them. 
Today the patient medicine dealers confides that there seems to be an over whelming 
regulatory policing, PCN will go there; NAFDAC, NDLEA will also do the same. 
The PCN that has been given the charge of the regulatory mandate is the one coming 
last which might as well be seen as the one adding to the overwhelming number of 
regulators. As such rather than fighting those who are infringing on the regulatory 
function of PCN, they rather fight PCN.” (PCN) 
Asked of regulatory conflict between the two key drug regulatory agents, the 
NAFDAC official said, 
“When it comes to patient medicine vendors it has not been as pronounced” 
“Yes because we do monitor their activities through surveillance, we go there to look 
at what they have and then advise them. Most of them have good storage condition 
we also expect that those in the rural areas should have the same because of the 
enlightenment that is going on by NAFDAC and am also aware that the Pharmacists 
council of Nigeria do the same.” (NAFDAC)  
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“Between PCN and NAPMED there is a good relationship but I cannot say here that 
it’s all jolly in all states of the federation.  Be that as it may we try to get them to 
partner with us” (PCN) 
These views suggest sublime regulatory conflict between the Pharmacy Council and 
the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control as well as weak 
inter-agency coordination.   
7.6.4 Geographical challenges 
Several geographical challenges were mentioned by regulatory authorities that posed 
particular barriers to effective regulatory enforcement and are discussed below. 
7.6.4.1 Large geographic land mass 
An official, who felt the agency was doing good, was confronted with the finding in 
Chapter 6, that patent medicine vendor consumers in Katsina-Ala reported having no 
knowledge of the agency. He said: 
 “Apart from the head office that we have here in Abuja, we have offices in Lagos, 
Bauchi, Katsina, Awka, Port-Harcourt, Oshogbo and Sokoto. The Council also 
established response centers in Local Governments Areas which will partner with the 
National Orientation Agency to make sure that these information get everywhere. 
We have been to Makurdi also, and all local governments in Benue state were 
invited. You can see that we are really trying. The country is large, we know where 
these problems are and we are trying to overcome them.” (CPC) 
Continuing, he added, 
“Like I said earlier, about 3 minutes ago, we have the challenge of establishing our 
local state consumer committees at the state level. Every state is supposed to have the 
office, but you know we can’t be everywhere, it is not possible. What we have now is 
zonal offices which are 7, but in essence should be 36.” 
The official is clearly accepting the daunting challenge of effective coverage of the 
entire country, which can be linked to the issue of inadequate funding discussed in 
section 7.5.1.1 above. 
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7.6.4.2 Trans-border smuggling of drugs 
Regulators also cited porous border control as a source of free flow of unregulated 
drugs and a source of challenge for drug regulation. 
“…, it is a fake product and such products do not necessarily come to the country 
through the official route. We are aware that smuggling by all means is still there, 
those products do not pass through the regulation procedure of NAFDAC.” 
“The challenges are many but just to mention a few; one, our borders are porous. 
When am talking about the porosity of borders, I am not limiting it to the north 
alone: in the places we are having boundary with the sea, people come in through the 
sea, it will be difficult to monitor everybody. Like in the South-South people go into 
the high sea whereby they can exchange and bring any article in, they do not pass 
through customs whereas in the northern part of the country, across the northern 
boundaries everywhere is a road so people can always come in.” (NAFDAC)  
This regulatory challenge implies that medicinal products enter the shores of Nigeria 
through routes that are illegal and not controlled. 
7.6.5 Social factors 
Regulators identified several social issues that tended to constrain the success of 
regulatory efforts. The issues are presented below. 
7.6.5.1 Low public interest for information  
“Nigerians are uninterested in information. I was just telling somebody of how the 
First Lady has launched a program to recruit 200 Nigerian ladies to drive Taxis here 
in Abuja. The launching was very elaborate and all the media houses carried it for 
days, but he was not aware of it all. So you can see the level of interest that Nigerians 
have for getting information. That is the problem. The case of Benue State for 
example, we organized an awareness program for road-side food handlers, the Mama 
put, last year. We chose Benue state because it is the food basket of the nation and it 
was an elaborate programme that was well attended by the First Lady of the state, so 
I am very surprised that people in Katsina-Ala did not mention anything about CPC. 
We have our radio programmes, even today, every Wednesday 8:30-9.00am, for the 
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past years, even today we spoke about issues we have resolved, that consumers 
brought to us. It is just lack of interest by people to get information to use.” (CPC) 
This statement would suggest public lethargy to information seeking and apathy to 
utilization of available information. 
7.6.5.2 Uncooperative patent medicine vendors 
“With the patent medicine vendors one of the challenges as I mentioned before has 
been that many of them are yet to come on board under the regulatory control of 
PCN, they are still resisting as a result of one apprehension or the other and they 
have been practicing without any control. Recently NAPPMED members came to 
complain that they are feeling bad because their income is beginning to dwindle, 
there is a decline in what they make as against what they use to make in the past and 
that drug hawkers on the street have taken over their activities and those ones are 
trading on drugs and making more money. They said they were feeling that they 
were been over regulated and many of their colleagues were getting discouraged and 
don’t want to even trade on drugs any longer because drug hawkers have taken 
over.” (PCN) 
He explained further: 
 “One challenge on the part of patent medicine vendors is that before the regulatory 
mandate was given to PCN in 2003, they have been doing what they like, there was 
no practice scope or limit, many of them I want to believe are still stocking 
prescription only medicine. They have been making money from stocking these 
drugs and all of a sudden there is regulatory provision that says this is an approved 
drug list and you should not sell this category of drugs. Those that are making money 
from prescription only drug will want to make money from it and such a person will 
never want to submit, will never want any regulatory control. Some of them store 
this pharmaceutical product under unacceptable conditions and now you are telling 
them to improve on the storage condition of the drugs by a way of possibly investing 
more in their shops, to improve the outlook, to keep records and so many provision 
of the guidelines, they  won’t naturally want to do that. When you want them to 
come around to get educated and keep them abreast with the developments in the 
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pharmaceutical world and you ask them to pay a token fee of 1000 Naira, it is a 
challenge to some of them because they find it difficult to part with such amount for 
such education.” (PCN) 
These comments reveal the perceptions of regulators why patent retailers appear to 
resist regulation. This border on opportunity cost of compliance with regulation and 
financial disincentives of paying for refresher training workshops. 
“Pharmacy as a profession in Nigeria is now been seen to be fighting everybody; 
when you embark on regulatory activity, what everybody sees is that you are fighting 
them so those are the issues in Nigeria. Given the level of illiteracy and the economic 
pressure, I think it has come to do nothing than to add to the regulatory challenges of 
PCN that I want to agree is happening and you can now imagine, the Community 
Health Extension Workers (CHEWs) have their own association, so any attempt to 
regulate patent medicine shops or patent medicine practice is like you are fighting the 
CHEWs, the Community Health Officers, the Nurses, the unemployed graduates 
from various other courses, the retirees. Everywhere in this country because drugs is 
profitable, everybody wants it to be an-all-comer’s game or business. So that is 
another regulatory challenge we are facing, it’s not easy.”  (PCN) 
Another regulatory puzzle regulators say they encounter from this statement is the 
multiple health professional cadres that have resorted to patent medicine retailing and 
the recourse to their professional associations to resist regulation. 
7.6.5.3 Unemployment pressure and social connections 
“To address your question head-on, given the fact that in this part of the world, an 
holistic view of the economy that we run is buying and selling. For survival instinct 
today, one of the easiest means of survival among people is the buying and selling of 
commodities. Healthcare is one of the basic needs of life and the emerging trend of 
need for drugs due to emergence of diseases and new health trend today has made 
graduates of Biomedical sciences like Biochemistry, Physiology and so on, to find a 
good means of income in opening chemists. At times when some factions among the 
Patent Medicine Vendors are filling petitions, you will know from the level of their 
write-up that these are not people who could just ordinarily read and write, you see 
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on the pages of paper that graduates are involved and of recent, a field assessment 
have shown that many graduates who could no longer find jobs in Nigeria are just 
falling back to opening chemists, so that is another terrible challenge.” (PCN) 
“I can only tell you that it is not completely eliminated, remember the level of 
unemployment in the country. Many people go into establishing patent medicine 
store as a mean of getting themselves engaged” (NAFDAC) 
The sense in this statement is that regulators have become sympathetic to 
practitioners, since they are striving to eke out a living. It explicitly affirms a trend of 
highly educated individuals entering patent medicine vending business and a 
continuing spiralling growth of this industry. It also means that the trade is 
increasingly been undertaken by well-educated individuals. 
“Even at that, there are elites, rich men that also travel abroad just as you go into 
provision store and pick whatever you like, they also go there to pick some drugs 
they feel will sell in their own stores. In fact those drugs they consider it very cheap 
because bringing them in, they are not going to pay any revenue to the government 
and by so doing most unlicensed drugs come into Nigeria” (NAFDAC) 
7.6.6 Miscellaneous issues 
The Pharmacy Council was asked about patent medicine vendors’ allegation 
regarding predatory regulation and his view was, 
“That does not apply to PCN; no category of practitioners under PCN can come out 
to say that. As a matter of fact you hear many of them say that PCN is very friendly 
and nobody keeps us away from regulating him or her by giving us anything. To 
process their license and their application with us they pay only a token of 500 naira 
which is documented and receipted. If there is anyone making such complain let him 
file a petition because am not in any picture of such complaints coming to PCN from 
any quarters.” (PCN) 
It also emerged that restrictive policies were been implemented targeting patent 
medicine vendors, as one regulator revealed. 
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 “patent medicine vendor are not only found in the rural areas some of them are in 
the urban areas but am glad to tell you that the Minister of Federal Capital Territory 
in collaboration with pharmacist Council of Nigeria made it mandatory that patent 
medicine owners cannot operate within the urban areas. What it means is that they 
are to move to the rural areas. There is also another condition that within certain 
meters of a pharmaceutical location, a patent medicine must not be found which 
means that with time, their activities even though may not be completely eradicated 
but certainly will be minimized.” (NAFDAC)  
This reveals contemplation of banning of patent medicine vendor shops in the future.  
Granted that the Pharmacy Council is saddled with the regulation of pharmacy 
practice in Nigeria, the question was asked how it thought access to essential drugs 
for rural communities could be improved. One official answered: 
“The approach to that has to be multi factorial, it is not the work of PCN to get all the 
road networks in Nigeria perfect or good, and it is not in the purview of PCN to have 
various infrastructural amenities in place, which all have bearing to health care 
provision. As such, I will recommend a multi-sectoral approach. If we have good 
road networks it makes referral easier, if all our health care facilities are well 
structured, funded and equipped, things will be better. Health care delivery is not 
within the purview of PCN, it cuts across all the levels of governments from the 
Federal Government to Local Government. I think what we have to do is to go by the 
way of multi sectoral approach and to also make sure that things are put in proper 
perspective. When things are in place, PCN too, in carrying out its mandate will find 
the job easier to do. That is my summary on that.”  
Further asked to predict when The Council would have replaced untrained and 
unprofessional retailers in patent medicine outlets with professionally trained 
individuals across the country, the official said, 
“You say tentatively how many years then I ask another question to probe that 
question further in saying would all parts of Nigeria have had infrastructural facilities 
or social amenities by whatever number of years you want to propose? That is the 
question that is very pertinent and I don’t think anybody can answer that.  
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This response suggests important implications for patent medicine practice for 
Nigeria: the practice may remain a prominent feature on the health landscape of the 
country for an unforeseeable future.  
7.7 Summary Findings and Discussions 
Specifically, this chapter has explored regulating patent medicine vending in Nigeria 
very broadly, unpicking the nature of current regulation of patent medicine retailing 
and what regulatory instruments are deployed to align practice with public health 
policy objective of access to effective and safe drugs. The analysis also highlighted 
critical areas of regulation where gaps exist. In this section, summary findings are 
highlighted and a discussion of key findings in the context of current knowledge 
from other African countries is undertaken.   
Findings are that the regulation of patent medicine vendor practice is premised on the 
traditional approach of bureaucratic and administrative control, with regulators aware 
of wide spread regulatory infringements by practitioners. Frontline regulators are 
unable to enforce full compliance with regulatory standards, rather adapting to a 
laissez faire disposition de facto. Added to this is the further finding that regulation is 
pluralistic with weak inter-agency coordinating mechanism, which appeared to have 
resulted in sublime conflicts between the key regulators. Furthermore, regulation is 
undertaken by distantly located federal and state regulators, with no corresponding 
local government level offices and personnel, thus giving rise to very irregular 
inspection of providers locally and almost no sanctioning of inappropriate behaviours 
of practitioners. It also emerged that regulators tacitly allowed regulatory infractions 
and concessionary practices on the part of practitioners to allow them time to meet 
up with specified standards. All formal regulators perceived patent medicine vendors 
as untrained and unprofessional providers of basic healthcare best permissible in 
difficult to reach areas, where no formal pharmacies exist. For the same reason of not 
being professional, patent medicine vendors are deemed not suitable for expansion of 
drug list they are currently allowed to trade. Regulators at all levels were inundated 
with an array of regulatory constraints on multiple fronts, revolving around 
economic, social and political factors very broadly. These specifically included 
inadequate funding, staff shortages, policy inconsistencies, litigations and judicial 
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bureaucracies. Others are poor public uptake and utilization of available health 
information, resistance to regulation by patent medicine vendors, uncooperative drug 
manufacturers and regulatory fragmentation. Finally, it also has been demonstrated 
that there is weak collaboration between patent medicine vendors and regulators and 
indications of potential banning of the former with a hope of encouraging qualified 
pharmacists and pharmacy technicians to establish practices in rural areas. This 
intended proscription of patent medicine vending appeared to be at the core of 
distrust of the Pharmacy Council by patent medicine vendors. 
Regulation of drug shops in Africa has a long past but a short history, with only 
recent efforts at systematic documentation in this Knowledge sphere. Consequently, 
few studies were uncovered that closely examined the phenomenon in economic 
literature on regulation. Notwithstanding this limitation, relevant relationships were 
established with other readings. 
The adoption of a command and control approach to the regulation for patent 
medicine vendor in Nigeria appears inappropriate to the study context. It was shown 
in chapters 5 that patent retailers viewed their role as offering first aid and 
complementing the formal sector and in some cases, they were actually the only 
viable option of essential medicines for consumers. Retail drug consumers in chapter 
6rated patent medicine providers as providing important services, further describe 
them as indispensable, in the context of non-availability of higher quality 
alternatives. Yet the regulatory frameworks do not reflect these realities and for 
example remain guided by a narrow range of drug list which failed to match 
community needs and has been openly exceeded by patent medicine vendors. This 
bureaucratic and rigid approach has been identified as the commonest form of 
regulatory strategy applied in most low and middle-in-come countries (Ensor and 
Weinzierl 2007). It has for instance been reported in Tanzania and Zimbabwe also 
(Goodman et al. 2007b; Hongoro and Kumaranayake 2000; Kumaranayake et al. 
2000), and in this model, regulation focuses largely on registration of practitioners, 
the registration of drugs and licensing of business premises. It may mean therefore 
that quite often, regulators may not seem to recognize the gap between need and 
appropriate regulation. However, in this study it appeared regulators recognized this 
182 
 
mismatch between the contextual realities of rural dwellers and policy requirement, 
which may offer a possible explanation for the less rigid implementation of 
regulation and insistence on strict adherence to regulatory standards. Similarly, the 
unpreparedness of regulators to accept a possible extension on the list of drugs 
retailers sell to reflect practical needs also point to dissonance between need and 
intervention, although it is recognized that for this policy change to occur, there may 
necessarily be predated appropriate legislative approval by the legislature. This 
inclination to withhold a greater role definition for patent medicine vendors contrary 
to need and de facto practice is not confined to the Nigerian context, as similarities 
do occur elsewhere in Africa (Brieger 2002; Goodman et al. 2007b). These 
demonstrate regulatory inappropriateness and inadequacies. 
Most consumers expressed dissatisfaction with the competence of patent vendors 
who have had no formal training in health care to provide good quality service and 
this questions the appropriateness of the regulatory criterion that mere ability to read 
and write in English language as a sufficient entry requirement in to a business of 
such highly technical competence.  
The study has also uncovered a lack of basic regulatory law for the establishment of 
patent medicine practice in Nigeria, which brings another dimension to regulatory 
inappropriateness. From its origin in 1936 to date, no specific law guiding the 
practice of patent medicine has been articulated and it has remained a licensing 
function of the Pharmacy Council of Nigeria, despite its importance and extensive 
network. This gap might have paved the way for the conflicts and protracted legal 
adjudication between regulators and regulatees, and constituting a potential source 
for the regulatory ineffectiveness observed.  Elsewhere also, it has been argued that 
once private markets are left unregulated for so long they become formalized with 
vested common interests and become extremely difficult to regulate successfully 
subsequently (Kumaranayake et al. 2000).The plural nature of agencies involved in 
drug related regulation in Nigeria may also provide a lens for understanding 
regulatory deficits discovered in this study. Where multiple regulators with 
overlapping roles have occurred, fragmented policy implementation has been 
observed to result (Kumaranayake et al. 2000; World Bank 1997). 
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There were several evidences of inadequate regulatory enforcement in the studied 
market. One relevant consideration to this understanding is inadequate budgetary 
allocation, which caused shortages of regulatory personnel, constrained infrastructure 
and operational logistics and hence, ability to cover the vast geographical spread of 
the country adequately. Studies elsewhere in Africa have also documented weak 
regulatory implementation and enforcement linked to extensive network of the 
private sector and the limited budgets available to regulatory agencies (Bennett and 
Nganlande-Banda 1994; Matsebula et al. 2005). Frequent policy changes by 
government is another factor that might have contributed substantially to the 
regulatory failures: in this study there were repeated switching of oversight control 
over patent medicine control from the PCN to the state ministries of health and then 
to the local authorities prior to 2003 and then a reversal back to the PCN after 2003 
period. Equally important to understanding of regulatory inadequacy in the country is 
the new policy which ordered NAFDAC out of sea and air ports as another case of 
policy reversal, which has the potential to significantly impact negatively on 
regulatory effectiveness. Where policies are not well designed to align with realism, 
frequent shifts are inevitable and government failure to regulate private drug retailers 
in low and middle income countries has been blamed on setting of unrealistic 
policies or their inconsistencies (Ensor and Weinzierl 2007).   
Patent medicine vendor resistance to regulation and drug manufacturer 
uncooperativeness where also reported as reasons for regulatory ineffectiveness by 
regulators.  Economic considerations could have been responsible for these 
behaviours. Taking the patent medicine vendors for example, during the regulatory 
transitory period of 1990 to 2003, regulation became dysfunctional with no 
inhibitions to the range of drugs they stocked. Compliance in the new era of 
regulation meant lower revenues from a more limited stock list. The unwillingness of 
vendors to pay to attend refresher workshops designed to update their knowledge and 
practice skills, can also be understood from economic lens of the outlays acting as 
financial disincentives. Another economic reason for opposition to regulation from 
vendors may have arisen from the perceived rivalry between patent retailers and 
pharmacists who run formal pharmacies and the expressed threats of official banning 
of patent medicine vending in Nigeria by the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria, 
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franchised by pharmacists. Regulatory compliance by patent medicine vendors in the 
circumstance would also have been understood to mean ceding substantial market 
advantage to pharmacists. Similar pecuniary considerations may be conceptualized 
for the uncooperative labeling of drug manufacturing concerns reported by 
regulators. In all the scenarios analyzed, a combination of high compliance costs and 
weak sanctioning potential are argued to have created fertile ground for regulatory 
ineffectiveness (Ensor and Weinierl 2007; Kumaranayake et al. 2000).  
Although retailer allegation of making unofficial payments to regulatory officials 
was out-rightly refuted, it is possible this would have been the case, given the 
pervasive culture of corruption in the country. In Tanzania, Wafula and colleagues 
(2013) did find deep rooted corrupt practices of varied forms among regulatory 
officers. These assumed the forms of institutional payment of bribes to inspectors, 
inspectors aggressively demanding bribes and cases where drug sellers paid bribes 
for infringements uncovered during inspections. Elsewhere in Uganda also, it was 
demonstrated that unofficial practices of public health workers were related to gaps 
in government policy enforcement and effectiveness (McPake et al. 1999).  
Demand side efforts of regulators to create informed consumers, might have failed as 
a result of many possible explanations like the medium and language of 
communication, but crucially important to the creation of this gap might have been 
the mode of generating the information communicated. Health information appeared 
to emanate from the top without inputs from consumers of what specific information 
needs they require. This assumption is based on consumer poor knowledge of 
existence of the different regulatory agencies and their functions as reported in 
chapter 6, which suggests weak interactive information generation and 
communication by these agencies. The information intended for the public has 
therefore been ineffective in achieving the desired health behaviour change in 
consumers as intended. It has been reported that mutual trust is critically important in 
the utilization of information and forms an important determinant of information 
effectiveness (Thiede 2005), a condition that appeared lacking in this study site. The 
finding of supposedly non-utilization of information provided by regulatory agencies 
by both medicine vendors and drug consumers may therefore be attributable to lack 
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of trust due to the non-interactive nature of information production. It has been 
argued that untrustworthy information source may offer low use value for users 
(Yesudian 1994). For the retailers in particular, financial incentives may be another 
explanation for gap between knowledge and practice reported in this study (Wafula 
et al. 2013). 
Also the thesis reported regulators conceding to many lapses in regulatory provisions 
which could have contributed to regulatory ineffectiveness. For instances, they 
acknowledged that formal pharmacies were lacking in rural areas and patent 
medicine vendors were the sole sources of medications for consumers in these 
places. This understanding may explain why regulators turned a blind eye to 
regulatory infringements, opting rather to give retailers more time to meet up with 
requirements. This agrees with other studies in much of sub-Saharan, where 
regulators similarly looked away from shop retailer infractions (Goodman et al. 
2007a; Hongoro and Kumaranayake 2000; Kumaranayake, 1997; Tawfik et al. 2002; 
Wafula et al. 2013). In this context of near non-existence of formal pharmacies to 
provide prescription drugs and their equally non availability in government facilities 
either, formal implementation of regulation may not be a good fit in this context. 
Ignoring the inappropriate behaviours of drug shop providers might equally be a 
subtle acceptance from regulators that curtailing the behaviours of these widely used 
providers is simply not doable. This passive attitude of regulators to regulatory 
breaches by drug shop retailers has been reported extensively in the literature in other 
settings also (Attanayake and Siyambalagoda 2003; Goodman et al. 2007b; Wafula 
et al. 2013, Yesudian 1994).   
Regulators had decried the high unemployment rate in the country and the recourse 
of several job seekers to self-employment in patent medicine vending as a means of 
eking a livelihood, meaning that regulators might have been influenced by feelings of 
compassion to temper regulatory regimens so that self-employed people remained 
productively engaged and letting off the steam on unemployment that currently 
besiege the nation.  
In principle, patent medicine retail market regulation purposes to promote attainment 
of public health policy objectives of access to effective and safe drug services. 
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Therefore, patent medicine practice regulation in Nigeria would appear to be a good 
approximation of the public interest theory of economic regulation, which makes 
assumptions of market failure, well informed and endowed benevolent regulators, 
pursuing public good. However, with the litany of failures bordering on inadequacy 
and inappropriateness of regulation highlighted in the thesis, the model poorly 
matches the observed phenomenon. With explicit evidence of regulatory staff’s tacit 
dereliction of formal roles, which may be linked to multi-factorial aetiologies; 
including but not restricted to savvy self-interest as pointed out in Chapter 5, the 
model of private interest of regulation would offer a better explanation of the 
regulatory regime in the studied market. Overall therefore, regulation of patent 
medicine market in Nigerian better fits the public choice perspective of regulation 
than public interest paradigm. 
7.8 Conclusions 
The evidence discussed in this chapter show that regulators acknowledge patent 
medicine shops as legal entities, run by unprofessional individuals and whose 
services remain relevant but to be tolerated only in distant and underserved 
communities. Regulatory agency officials know the illegal behaviours of retailers in 
the market but are constrained by multiple challenges and regulation is largely 
ineffective in terms of both appropriateness and adequacy. These evidences better fit 
the public choice model of regulation. 
The thesis has now established an imperfectly competitive retail drug market plagued 
by pervasive regulatory infringement on the part of providers against a backdrop of 
chronic inappropriate and inadequate regulatory controls and progresses to address 
the weakness in the market in terms of access to effective and safe drugs and 
solutions are proffered in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8:  IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR ACCESS 
AND REGULATION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter jointly undertakes to address objectives four and five of the thesis, 
which are to investigate the implications of the interplay of market structure, 
provider conduct, consumer behaviour and regulation for access to quality and safe 
essential medicines in patent medicine vendor markets in rural areas of Nigeria. It 
also undertakes an exploration of the policy implications of the insights gained from 
the study and makes recommendations of how best to attain the aforementioned 
public health goal. Therefore, findings from chapters 4 through 7 have been weaved 
into a synopsis of the de facto patent medicine vendor market in Katsina-Ala, the 
researched field in section 8.2, while their implications for access and policy are 
discussed in sections 8.3 and 8.4 respectively. The chapter ends with a summary of 
key issues and conclusion in section 8.5. 
8.2 Summary Research Findings 
The market structure has been shown to be imperfectly competitive harbouring both 
elements of monopolistic and oligopolistic structures as demonstrated in chapter 4. It 
was discovered in chapter 5 that providers had low technical knowledge of both 
medicine and pharmacy and exhibited widespread regulatory breaches: medical 
consultations with customers, drug prescription, poor dispensing practices, non-
renewal of licenses and the sale of unauthorised drugs. Patent medicine retail 
consumers in chapter 6, acknowledged the important role of patent medicine vendors 
for their health care needs, describing them as indispensable. They however 
expressed deep quality concerns with regards to drugs and provider competence at 
the same time. Despite the recognized deficits, consumers cited convenience as the 
principal motive for continued use of patent medicine vendors, even where more 
formal healthcare facilities were found in some cases. For example, closeness to 
home, cheapness, quickness services, longer opening hours and courtesy formed key 
considerations for preferring patent retail medicine outlets. Insights also emerged that 
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patent medicine regulation was ineffective: inappropriate to local needs for health 
care and inadequate in terms of supervision, inspection and sanctioning of 
infringements. The latter is the finding of the penultimate chapter and all findings are 
presented as a model of this retail drug market in figure 8.1 below, highlighting the 
overall implication for market performance.   
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Figure 8.1 Patent medicine market performances in Katsina-Ala 
Monopolistic and Oligopolistic 
Regulatory entry requirements 
 
Inappropriate prescription, under-
dosing; Regulatory infringements 
No consumer health education, 
strategic pricing behaviour 
Perverse sale of prescription-only 
drugs 
SS 
 
Free purchase of drugs; 
Relational buying strategy 
Awareness of retailer competence 
weakness and drug list limits  
Inappropriate regulation for 
context 
Irregular supervision and 
inspections 
Tacit permission and weak 
sanctioning 
Low quality drugs and services 
Inappropriate dispensing and use of 
drugs 
High price mark-ups 
Market Performance 
Regulation 
190 
 
 
8.3 Nature of Competition and Implications for Effective Access 
In Chapter 2 of the thesis, one access framing was the “the degree of fit between the 
client and the health system,” (Penchasky and Thomas 1981; Thomas and Penchasky 
1984), and the evaluative framework by McIntyre and colleagues (2007) was 
adopted for understanding the nature of access in this study. The framework 
differentially distinguished three major aspects of access comprising availability, 
affordability and acceptability dimensions and their indicator variables against which 
the market performance is compared.  
The thesis evidence supports the argument that patent medicine vendors improved 
geographical and temporal access to medicines generally in the researched local 
council by virtue of the fact that when compared to government and other non-
governmental health facilities in the area, consumers preferred retail drug shops 
given their relative closeness to homes, long opening hours and prompt and quick 
services. Other market attributes that increased drug access and utilization of 
medicine vendor outlets were relative cheapness of drugs which contrasts with the 
fee uncertainties in formal facilities, friendly and courteous attitudes of providers, 
availability and range of perceived quality drugs, free access to drugs in-store and 
potential for credit: the latter considered important due to the low socioeconomic 
status of most community members and illness uncertainty. Patent medicine vendors 
lived in their host communities and this social embedment created and fostered trust 
and confidence in community members, thereby enhancing greater acceptability and 
their high usage for health care than the more distantly located formal health 
facilities. These attractive characteristics of the market satisfy the variables 
encapsulated within the availability, affordability and acceptability dimensions of the 
access framework adopted in this study (McIntyre et al. 2007). These factors to a 
large extent can be seen as enabling high coverage of the population and improving 
the promptness of health care seeking. On the contrary, poor access to finance 
emerged as a key constraining influence on access for consumers through narrowing 
the drug inventory of retailers and consumer ability to pay for health care. Also 
limiting affordability and therefore access to essential drugs is the high transaction 
costs, attributable to multiple taxations (business and regulatory) and informal 
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payments to public officials and consequently, the impact on prices charged for 
drugs.   
On the demand side, poor incomes of community members who form the bulk of 
customers in drug shops constituted another barrier to accessing needed drugs in the 
market, as borne out in consumer interviews and observed purchase patterns of sub-
optimal doses on some instances. However, whilst poor regulatory inspection and 
sanctioning would have allowed retailers to stock essential prescription drugs (even 
though this is illegal) and expand access for consumers, it also risks important 
negative quality implications.  
A multitude of factors have been identified which are crucial for treatment quality 
and health outcomes in the short and long terms. These determinants include 
provider expertise and competence, availability of quality drugs, prompt health care 
seeking, accurate case diagnosis and appropriate drug prescription and patient 
compliance with dose regimen (MSH 2012). The evidence in this study 
demonstrated strong non-price competition along some of these variables in the 
market, which in a conventional market should predict high quality products and 
services, but in health care, this may not necessarily so due to the difficulty of 
observing and valuing technical quality accurately. Relatedly, insights showed 
further that consumers therefore based their choices of drugs and outlets for most 
part on their perceptions of quality, familiarity and trust of providers. However, it 
was observed that there was widespread use of inappropriate prescription of drugs by 
both providers and clients alike. This observed behaviours brings to the front, the 
challenges of observing quality associated with health care goods even after use, as 
some of the customers in the market would likely have been making repeat 
purchases. Also, in this agency situation, providers are expected to use their greater 
expertise in health care to the best of consumer interests. However, the distortionary 
use of this asymmetric information advantage to induce demand and enhance profits 
appeared rife in this setting such as treating cases that providers had not full 
competence: a not unusual tendency of self-interest profit maximizers.  The range of 
variables appealing to consumer convenience such as short waiting times, quick 
consultations and third party buying of drugs may also have contributed negatively 
in terms of technical quality of treatment provided in the market. Similarly, non-
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price competition to improve affordability through sale of sub-optimal doses of 
medications also tempers technical quality of treatment bought by consumers in the 
studied market. This particular pattern of drug consumption behaviour has grave 
treatment outcomes for consumers as well as negative consumption externalities on 
society in general by promoting resistance development of microbials to antibiotics 
(SCORE 2004). 
In this situation of imperfectly observable quality signalling with price sensitive 
consumers in poor rural conditions, the potential of crowding out sellers of high 
quality drugs in the market and entrenchment of a culture of low quality in perpetuity 
is highly possible: the “market for lemons” phenomenon (Akerlof 1970). These 
quality concerns require appropriate policy measures to address, and these quality 
enhancing measures are evaluated in section 8.4. 
8.4 Policy Implications 
Regulation of pharmaceutical markets is normally targeted at providers, consumers 
and the industry, using regulatory instruments that best suit the policy objectives 
which often include universal access to quality, safe and affordable essential 
medicines (including devices and consumables) and their rational use (Philipson 
2002). The study has identified several policy relevant market and regulatory failures 
that can be improved through policy instruments targeting demand, supply and 
regulatory variables. This section analyses what feasible approaches government 
may pursue in order to enhance optimal quality of products and services in patent 
medicine vendor markets across Nigeria. It argues that systematically improving 
services and products at patent medicine retail outlets will require integrated 
programmes that constructively engage with all stakeholders by adoption of 
regulatory approaches that recognise the appropriate linkages and balance between 
needs and standards. 
 Knowledge gaps resonate across the market, which have significant implications for 
consumer access to effective medicines and their appropriate use. These factors 
include poor consumer knowledge of drugs and disease manifestation, poor provider 
knowledge of drugs, inappropriate dispensing practices and inadequate health 
information disclosure to consumers. For quality sensitive consumers as 
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demonstrated in this study, who to  a large extent consume health care as credence 
goods with no way of judging the quality of drugs correctly either before or after 
consumption, the role for greater regulatory effectiveness in ensuring and sustaining 
high quality products and services is critical. This access policy objective can be 
attained through rethinking the entire continuum of policy design, implementation 
and feedback. Findings in this thesis offer insights that can feed into this policy re-
engineering agenda. Adopting an economic perspective, the debate will swing 
between whether government should allocate more scarce resources to tighten 
current regulatory regimes or seek more cost-effective alternative market control 
measures. The author will discuss interventions that target consumers, providers and 
the pharmaceutical industry, drawing parallels with successes and challenges in 
similar settings in the literature. The thesis recommendations will be hinged on the 
balance of imperfections in both markets and regulation against the context of high 
unmet need for health care, explained in part from poor access and critical health 
worker shortages.  
8.4.1 Regulatory strategies 
From public health perspective, concerns for improving access to essential medicines 
in patent medicine outlets and by extension pharmaceutical markets in general must 
focus on improving availability, affordability and acceptability to quality products 
and services and their rational use (WHO 2004). Comprehensive drug regulation 
often would involve related areas as drug manufacture, importation, distribution and 
sale to end users. It will also include functions as prescribing, labelling, dispensing, 
licensing, inspection, certification of personnel and in some cases, drug pricing 
((MSH 20012). Therefore, strategies to effectively address patent retail market 
failures must target these essential elements in a holistic approach and the role of 
regulation that support these inter-related functions are considered along broad 
themes as regulatory tightening, widening of regulatory scope and institutional 
capacity strengthening. 
8.4.1.1 Regulatory tightening 
Effective regulatory control of pharmaceutical industry is said to be neglected in 
developing countries, but remains indispensable tool in attaining public health goals 
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of drug quality, efficacy and safety (MSH 2012). To ensure that only efficacious and 
safe drugs enter the market and ultimately reach the public, stricter enforcement of 
regulation will appear to work better, particularly on manufactures. Regulatory 
agencies could insist on drug manufacturers to improve packaging and labelling of 
their products for consumers, clearly differentiating between age grades in packaging 
and giving detailed yet accessible information about dosages, actions, side effects 
and adverse reactions. In addition, manufacturers may be made to include a 
translation of these drug instructions in the three most popular local languages of 
Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo to convey critical information which at the moment are 
communicated solely in English. This change may have multiple advantages. It will 
address the challenge of inappropriate dosing and poor information giving observed 
in the study. The policy change can be enforced during drug registration process with 
NAFDAC. This regulatory intervention should influence improved product quality 
nationally, with the cost impinging substantially on drug manufacturers and 
leveraged as a drug registration standard. Whilst potentially enhancing drug 
instructions, it will also improve contamination and drug degradation linked with 
poor dispensing practices of patent medicine vendors as well as improved consumer 
compliance with dosage regimen (WHO 2004).  
Also, if drug manufacturers can be made to invest more in research and development 
of safer chemical entities which offer more specific actions and wider safety 
margins, then the dichotomy between prescription and over the counter medicines 
that currently exist and sustain the thinking and unwillingness of regulators to 
enlarge the list of drugs patent medicine vendors can trade may pale down. This will 
potentially expand access to safer drugs needed by a large proportion of people 
generally, and in particular in rural areas where as shown in this study, consumers 
have near unfettered access to just any drug on demand. However, the 
implementation of this recommendation may only be partial, given that some of the 
drugs on the Nigerian drug market are imported from business concerns abroad and 
therefore, do not fall under the jurisdiction of local Nigerian regulatory authorities. 
Notwithstanding, the implementation of this policy even at local level alone may 
help improve the overall pharmacy practice and pharmaceutical development of the 
country generally. 
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 Both policy recommendations of improved packing and labelling and research and 
development have implications for the costs and consequently the prices of drugs 
and their affordability. They may inadvertently drive up prices of drugs and 
constrain access further for a high proportion of people as unintended outcome, if not 
well handled 
Further evidence from this thesis has shown that regulatory enforcement of 
pharmaceutical legislation in Nigeria is weak, with regulators citing a range of 
constraints and patent medicine vendors alleging corrupt behaviours on the part of 
regulators. With this low threshold for corruption and therefore high potential for 
regulatory capture of officials, the probability of enforcing adherence by drug 
manufacturing firms to improve packing and labelling looks low. Likewise 
compliance with a policy of increased funding of research and development 
activities would appear unlikely, given the addition to production costs. These profit 
maximising businesses may find it more profitable to capture savvy regulators than 
invest in improving their products.  
 Other than these, the case for global tightening of regulation in the market may not 
be desirable for public health as evidence in the thesis revealed numerous constraints 
to this approach. There are for example, consumer demand for essential drugs, 
frequent government hospital stock-outs, severe funding gaps of government health 
facilities and repeated staff work-outs in public health facilities over remunerations, 
all of which might make stricter control approaches undesirable. Therefore, adoption 
of a command and control strategy to improve quality of products and services in the 
market will exert a contractionary drag on access to essential medicines for rural 
peoples and thus not a recommended approach.  Besides, it is pertinent to note that 
regulatory tightening may not even be feasible in the market considering the 
inspection, supervisory and enforcement weaknesses enumerated in this thesis. 
Institutional bottlenecks of a multifaceted nature confront all agencies which range 
include, inadequate and inappropriate personnel, shortages of infrastructure, 
financing gaps and tacit permission of infringements by front line regulators. For 
effective implementation of the above recommendations, factors within regulatory 
institutions will have to be reorganised to provide the enabling environment for 
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regulatory tightening approaches to be effective, which aspect is discussed in-depth 
in section 8.3.1.3. 
Granted that regulation is effective and yielding improved manufacturing, packaging 
and enhanced quality signalling features which will most certainly improve the 
functioning of this market, the poor practice by patent medicine vendors will not 
resolve. More effective regulation of provider behaviour is a necessary 
accompanying policy discourse to also explore and forms the subject matter of the 
following section. 
8.4.1.2 Provider practice improvement  
In the area of provider conduct, insights from the thesis revealed that drug retailers 
unanimously recognised the impact of knowledge improvement on enhancing the 
quality of services, much in the same way as consumers emphasised the need for 
patent medicine vendors to be certified in relevant health fields and that certification 
be a precondition for licensing of patent medicine vendor practice. Therefore 
continuing education programme for patent medicine vendors that recognises this 
relationship will have a positive influence on provider practice and also meet 
consumer expectations. Even though the guidelines for the regulation of patent 
medicine practice in Nigeria stipulates that such trainings be organized once in two 
years for each vendor, findings in this study showed that continuing medical 
education programmes for patent medicine vendors were sporadic and far-between. 
Further insights gained from observations demonstrated that majority of medicine 
vendors had no formal health training of any form (against consumer expectations), 
meaning that most consumers would continue to receive inappropriate counselling 
and medicines for their ailments if the status quo persists. This may result in 
consumers continuing to get drugs that are not only ineffective, but that also 
endanger their health (CMP 2003; Abuya 2007). Therefore, increasing the number of 
patent retailers who can sell common medicines appropriately may go a long way in 
enhancing the potentials of patent medicine retailers to improve the health of many 
people in underserved locations. This believe is supported by why patent medicine 
vendor educational training has been the commonest intervention targeting improved 
provider performance in sub Saharan Africa (Nigeria inclusive) in the past (Greer et 
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al. 2004; FHI 360 2013; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Wafula et al. 2010).The 
effectiveness of this approach to sustainably improve drug retailer practice has 
however not been established and here lies its weakness as a sole intervention 
(Wafula and Goodman 2010). These educational enhancing interventions have 
focussed on a range of aspects as knowledge and skills improvement to provide 
appropriate medications, targeting of particular behaviour issues of provider-
consumer interactions for example inadequate drug and health education counselling 
of consumers, regulatory standards and requirements and case referral processes. 
Reports that have evaluated these interventions have shown that although these 
initiatives resulted in improved appropriate prescription by providers in the short 
run, issues as client counselling and history taking did not change (Brieger et al. 
2003; Greer et al. 2004; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Wafula and Goodman 2010). 
In the main, it has been noted that provider trainings have been irregular and did not 
improved all aspects of provider behaviour (Marsh et al. 2004; Marsh et al. 1999; 
Tavrow et al. 2003), hence the thinking that for optimal impact, provider trainings be 
reinforced with other supportive measures, such as frequent regulatory inspections 
and support of retailers and community behaviour change information activities 
(Marsh et al. 2004; Marsh and Kachur 2002; Thiede 2005). Also stressed in these 
reform arguments is the role of profit motives of providers in constraining the full 
impact of educational training, and failure of drug retailers to adhere to practices that 
seemed to contract sales and profit margins have been highlighted (Wafula and 
Goodman 2010). Additional evidence supporting the conclusion that stand-alone 
educational training programmes for retail drug sellers have failed to yield 
satisfactory practice outcomes abound (Goel et al. 1996; Goodman et al. 2007b; 
Gross and Pujat 2001; Kumaranayake 1998; Shah et al. 2011; Waters et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, patient demand, advertorials of pharmaceutical and alternative 
therapies, the internet and commercial interests of businesses contribute to the 
unending list of other influences that may interfere or distort the impact of provider 
training interventions alone (WHO 1998). Therefore, patent medicine vendor 
practice improvement interventions must be systematically integrated programmes 
that weave multiple effective strategies into one holistic initiative (Gross and Pujat 
2001; Shah et al. 2010). 
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Patent medicine vendors as profit maximizers, theory predict would strongly be 
influenced by financial incentives and this tendency has been reported among drug 
retailers in different studies (Patouillard et al. 2007; Shah et al. 2010; Wafula and 
Goodman 2010; WHO 1998). Therefore integrated provider practice improvement 
strategies as drug shop accreditation and franchising approaches have been shown to 
address the limitations of stand-alone provider trainings, by incorporating financial 
and business incentives in their core design. These strategies have proven as useful 
tools that enabled better uptake of improved training practices by drug retailers in 
several places in sub-Saharan Africa (Marsh et al. 2004; Rooney and van Ostenberg 
1999; Ruster et al. 2003; Rutta et al. 2011; Rutta et al. 2009; SEAM 2007). The 
success story of the Accredited Drugs Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs) intervention in 
Tanzania provides a comparable and appropriate template to adapt. This initiative 
provides for training and certification of vendors, monitoring of adherence to 
regulations, expansion of permissible drug list to include selected prescription drugs 
and facilitated access to microfinance and reliable sources of quality drug stocking 
wholesale markets as a single intervention (Centre for Pharmaceutical Management 
2008; Goodman et al. 2007b). Franchising is another approach that has also 
encouraged drug shop retailers to meet and maintain practice standards while 
offering business incentives and have been implemented in Ghana and Kenya, 
countries with similar contexts to Nigeria (Rutta et al. 2011; Rutta et al. 2009; 
SEAM 2007). The franchisor sets its standards to be met by franchisees in addition 
to government’s regulatory requirements as well as providing business training, 
supervision and negotiated access to quality drug supplies. These quality assurance 
systems have brought improvement in the knowledge and practice of drug retailers, 
allowed sale of wider range of drugs and enhanced profits as well as opened up new 
accesses to business improvements (microfinance an reliable wholesale markets), 
while maintaining regulatory inspection, supervision and support. This way, the 
initiative has been said to realign the business motives of providers and the public 
health goals of government in one holistic framework. Both approaches are not 
mutually exclusive and can help achieve health system goals of access expansion to 
essential drugs in rural areas and their rational use. Accreditation programme can be 
established by government regulators targeting areas underserved by qualified 
pharmacists, while nongovernmental organizations and private bodies can be 
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encouraged to set up franchise network to improve new and existing patent medicine 
vendor shops. Both approaches offer more sustainable options to improve provider 
quality performance than the fragmented irregular provider trainings, as is currently 
the case. The case for accreditation in the Nigerian context is further strengthened by 
the stock of trained health personnel already in the patent medicine retailing 
business, which government only need to encourage and attract through enabling 
policy.  
8.4.1.3 Consumer empowerment strategies 
The role of the well informed health care consumer in bringing about improvement 
in the behaviour of health care providers has been highlighted, because if consumers 
lack the capacity to obtain and understand health information adequately, they may 
be unable to make appropriate health and health care choices (Nutbeam 2000). 
However, a lingering challenge to pharmaceutical regulation is changing the way 
individuals, particularly consumers understand and use pharmaceuticals. The thesis 
reported that regulators claimed health and healthcare education programmes ran 
routinely on radio stations and television channels to empower consumers make 
informed health utilization decisions, but they lamented that consumers have failed 
to take full advantage of these opportunities. Most interventions to improve private 
and informal private pharmaceutical providers in Africa have focussed chiefly on 
provider training as argued above, interspersed with regulation and supervision, 
financial incentives, franchising, accreditation and supply provision initiatives. Very 
limited interventions target consumer health literacy improvement, but elsewhere in 
Western settings, consumer health literacy has assumed a vibrant place in health care 
discourse (Baker 2006; Coulter and Ellins 2006). Also, the positive relationship 
between limited capacity of consumers to comprehend and retain health information 
and health behaviours, health outcomes and health costs has been demonstrated 
(Ryan et al. 2011). It is therefore important that health information communication in 
whatever form must be sufficiently clear to avoid miscommunication for maximum 
impact. Health information may be of a general nature meant to inform the public of 
health related issues or specifically for an individual health consumer and 
communicated verbally or in written form both of which depends however on a 
person’s cognitive capability to comprehend. Limited evidence in the literature show 
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that no one approach is particularly superior to the other, but used complementarily, 
they have improved health knowledge and recall and health behaviour, especially 
when personalized (Ryan et al. 2011; Coulter and Ellins 2006).  
The level of involvement of the general public and patients in health knowledge 
communication and the media of their transmission are crucial also to health 
information effectiveness in influencing healthcare behaviours of consumers (Thiede 
2005).In this study, although the degree of involvement of consumers in generating 
the contents of the health information programmes by regulatory authorities was not 
ascertained, it emerged that consumers knew little of diseases and their appropriate 
treatments, patent medicine regulations or even regulatory agencies and their roles. 
Putting consumers in charge of healthcare via participatory production and readily 
access to relevant information offers a most cost-effective way to right the inherent 
failures highlighted in this health care market, because individuals have the highest 
motivation to achieve their best interests when armed with timely and accurate 
information. Information availability and healthcare disclosure as approaches to 
patent medicine retail regulation will be minimally interventionist in the market than 
most other regulatory mechanisms would do. Accessible information which 
differentiates types of good and bad providers and products for example, will enable 
consumers to enforce provider compliance using market signals of informed buyers 
making best healthcare choices that guarantee the most value for their money 
(Grossman 1972). This strategy is argued to probably be the cheapest tool of 
regulation for low income settings (Ensor and Weinzierl 2007). Moreover, for patent 
medicine vendors who are locally situated as social actors with binding relationships 
in their communities, this approach will deepen the opportunity of consumers to 
exploit this relationship and socially regulate provider behaviours (Kamat and 
Nichter 1998; Cross and MacGregor 2010). 
Whilst it may probably be unrealistic or even unnecessary to expect consumers to 
understand the details of healthcare technicalities, the benefits of well-designed 
health communication messages can be substantial (Attanayake and Siyambalagoda 
2003). For rural dwellers in particular, lack of access to adequate information has 
been identified as an important barrier to improvement of healthcare services in 
remote areas (Bloom and Jing 2003). A series of studies have generated credible 
201 
 
evidence which show that healthcare consumers can utilize health education 
information in intelligent ways when appropriately and clearly communicated and 
well-motivated (Leonard 2002; Mackintosh and Tibandebage 2002). This argument 
is important for health policy: it challenges the general assumptions in the arena that 
healthcare consumers are ignorant and incapable of making informed health choices 
especially as relates to local communities. Very importantly also, this suggests that 
consumers in real terms are constrained to a narrow range of options imposed on 
them by their financial and geographical circumstances, otherwise, healthcare 
consumers do actually make sophisticated quality choices of products and services 
when armed with the right information. For rural communities, this will involve 
health information and education that is conveyed in everyday language spoken by 
large segment of the population and written out in simple, plain and easy to 
understand way. In Nigeria in particular, it could be the three dominant languages or 
the more general pigin English (an adulterated form of English language). 
Although assessment of the processes and content of consumer education 
programmes of the Nigerian regulatory authorities was beyond the scope of this 
study, limited evidence from the effectiveness of efforts to educate drug shop 
consumers in Africa show that successful consumer health education interventions 
have to been underpinned by the principle that the information must emerge from an 
interactive and participatory process that incorporates the concerns of consumers and 
its clarity of presentation so as to be understood by the ordinary individual in the 
society (Thiede 2005). Therefore, while the mass media may have presented an 
efficient approach to the Nigerian regulators because of wider coverage, its 
effectiveness could have been hampered if the audience made no meaning of the 
messages or even did not access them. Moreover, evidence from the west has shown 
that while mass media campaigns may raise the awareness of consumers, the effect is 
often short lived (Coulter and Ellins 2006). Other more cost-effective and efficient 
ways the Nigerian regulators may consider will be the communication of the same 
health information broadcasts in local languages and use of strategies like 
engagement of national and local celebrities as health ambassadors to supplement 
their efforts, particularly in rural areas.  
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To fully put rural healthcare consumers in the forefront of their health, market 
regulation will also require an accessible consumer redress mechanism also. 
Consumers in this study did not know of the existence of the Consumer Protection 
Council, whose mandate included consumer feedback of their experiences in the 
market place. Increasing consumer visibility by creating enabling environments for 
consumers to have a voice within the health system may offer an additional flexible 
way of regulation in resource constrained settings, one that will help discipline the 
market to delivering better quality products and services through harnessing demand 
power, leveraged by the provision of methods that permit redressing consumer 
complaints. This will require that the Consumer Protection Council for example, 
focuses more on creating trusted and user friendly channels for healthcare users to 
seek redress at the most peripheral levels. The successful use of consumer protection 
courts in India (Bhat 1996) to address this gap is discussed further in section 8.3.2 of 
the thesis below. 
Another way to empower consumers is strengthening the capacity to identify quality 
products through quality signalling research and development initiatives. In this 
regards, the current pioneering of mobile phone drug quality verification is plausible 
and potentially promising. In this intervention, a consumer scratches up an encrypted 
number on a drug pack, texts same to a computerised database, and receives an 
instant confirmation of the drug’s genuineness. This intervention appears a cost-
effective way of empowering millions of consumers to identify fake drugs, and 
appears more dependable way than the less reliable indicators as brand name, 
country of origin or NAFDAC registration number as is currently the practice of 
most consumers: the latter indicators can easily be faked. The intervention though 
involving a select product lines at the moment will need to be scaled up to 
incorporate all drugs currently traded in Nigeria, given its potential cost-
effectiveness and reach. The initiative may however not be fully exploited by the 
vast majority of rural communities who may not own mobile phones or who for most 
part may not have call time or electricity supply to charge their phone batteries to use 
when making drug purchase.    
Health information and education of the public offers a potentially cost-effective 
way of enhancing consumer visibility in this market. Such reform initiative may 
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improve provider-consumer relationships and quality of medicines and services sold 
and bought in the market. It will give consumers ownership of their health by 
empowering them to moderate their health behaviours while guiding their health care 
demand at the same time. 
8.4.2 Widening of regulatory scope and re-legislation 
This thesis documented ardent calls by patent medicine vendors in the researched 
market for an extension of the list of drugs they could sell, including antibiotics and 
it was observed that they actually sell a wide range of prescription-only drugs 
including anaesthetic drugs and surgical consumables. In some of the researched area 
and from reported patterns of utilization in the literature, patent medicine vendors 
function as the only source of primary health care and are also used even where 
formal health facilities co-exist (Goodman et al. 2007a; Gyapong and Garshong 
2007; McCombie 1996; Ruebush et al. 1995). Therefore a case for expanding the 
allowed list of drugs to include at least common antibiotics as contained in the list of 
essential medicines for primary health care centres is plausible. The thesis 
documented arguments of regulatory authorities that patent medicine vendors are 
untrained and therefore unsafe to dispense prescription drugs, the accreditation 
programme discussed and recommended above may potentially resolve this dilemma 
as it has in the similar situation of Tanzania.  
Also the study reported that NAPPMED has an internal self-regulatory mechanism 
that should support members to operate within regulatory limits. Partnering with the 
association with the aim of exploiting the potential of this internal regulatory 
mechanism may impact positively on the overall patent medicine vendor regulatory 
efforts in the area and Nigeria at large. This will be cost-effective, imposing minimal 
costs on regulators, since it will largely build on the association’s self-existing and 
self-sustaining structures. This strategy should also create an enhanced sense of 
recognition among the ranks of retailers and probably act as a strong incentive for 
patent medicine vendors to better comply with regulatory requirements with the 
intention to improve their status in the eyes of the public. They will monitor their 
performance and watch-out for unlicensed retail operators and report such to formal 
authorities for sanctions. Such a body will however need to be monitored closely, 
otherwise similar organisational self-regulation have only metamorphosed into mere 
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worker’s unions (exhibiting monopoly conduct), rarely disciplining erring members 
and not proactively monitoring their members (Ensor and Weinzierl 2007).  
Patent medicine vendors strongly called for the creation of an autonomous regulatory 
body, distinct from the professionally constituted Pharmacy Council of Nigeria. 
Several advantages may accrue from a disparate patent medicine regulatory board: 
regulatory inspections will be more regular and present a better scope for direct 
engagement with providers at the local level since this body will concern itself with 
patent medicine vendors only, while the Pharmacist Council focuses on regulating 
pharmacists. The approach may give a sense of ownership and recognition to 
vendors, build trust and improve regulatory compliance among these micro 
pharmaceutical entrepreneurs. The consideration of this strategy for its potential to 
improve provider practice can be further argued based on the distinctive 
characteristics of patent medicine vendors and the market they operate in. However, 
it is recognized that such policy proposal may be vehemently resisted by professional 
pharmacists who traditionally view drug matters as a right based on their definition 
of appropriate knowledge.  Government will have to constructively communicate 
with the pharmacists, clearly explaining the gains inherent in such policy (of task 
shift)for public health and to the pharmacists as well. This will be necessary in order 
to win their support for the initiative and correct any misunderstanding of the policy 
as a way to undermine their standing in the society (MSH 2012). It is however 
difficult to predict how well this body will fare compared to current regulatory 
authorities and how it will be shielded from capture by patent medicine vendors 
(Graddy 1991). 
The organization for regulating patent medicine vendor markets in Nigeria does not 
allocate any role for the peripheral local government authorities, who are de-facto 
frontline authorities in rural areas. Incorporating this level of government in retail 
drug regulation has the potential to improve regulatory inspections and compliance 
by patent medicine vendors in rural areas, with expected improvements in quality of 
services, expanded access while saving considerable costs (Rowe et al. 2005). It has 
been argued that local health inspectors are more likely to check patent vendor 
inventories for unregistered and expired drugs and other regulatory infractions more 
consistently and also do not require elaborate transportation arrangements and other 
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costly logistics associated with national or regional level inspections (MSH 2012). 
Moreover, the sheer size of patent medicine vendor shops in Nigeria makes the 
current centralized regulatory inspection ineffective. The performance of health 
services in rural areas have been shown to be strongly related to the extent to which 
local regulatory systems and accountability structures have been established (Bloom 
and Jing 2003). To be effective however, local enforcement structures will need to 
be staffed by properly trained, well incentivized individuals who are appropriately 
supported to deliver on their responsibilities.  
The present educational requirement for drug vendors is the ability to read and write 
(PCN 2003), which fails to clearly define what that means in terms of level of formal 
educational attainment. Evidence in this thesis has shown that a third of the 30 
provider questionnaire respondents possessed one form of health related training or 
another. Government can build on this emerging trend and encourage the 
institutional production of more of this level workforce. The cadre may include 
community health extension workers, community health assistants, community 
health officers, pharmacy technicians, nurse assistants and health technicians. 
Raising the bar of educational standard for licensing of patent medicine vendors to 
this category of health personnel should be cost-effective and vitiate the need for 
regular training of providers and possibly the quantum of regulatory visits that is 
otherwise, currently required for generalist patent medicine vendors. This approach 
fits into the accreditation programme recommended previously and has been shown 
to improve drug retailer quality indicators in the ADDOs project in Tanzania 
(Goodman et al. 2007b; Rutta et al. 2009).  
Currently, Nigerian laws seem to offer healthcare consumers no clear protection for 
healthcare related damages and legal processes to resolve medical disputes are 
tortuous, lengthy and rare. An explicit system of medical liability will potentially 
encourage utilization of healthcare services generally, improve quality of products 
and services and strengthen the national health system performance overall (Bhat 
1996). For example the present sanctions embodied in the operational guidelines of 
patent medicine vendors in Nigeria do not appear to impose appropriate sanctions for 
regulatory offenders. It generally stipulates a nominal fine of five hundred thousand 
Nigerian Naira (£ 1,785.00) for infringing any aspect of the guidelines or two years 
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imprisonment or both concurrently (PCN 2003). This fails to recognise variations in 
magnitude of offences; therefore, a sliding scale-type punitive approach will be more 
realistically enforceable. While consumer protection interventions and quality 
assurance measures are welcome developments in health care markets particularly 
for the vulnerable, they come at a cost, so consequences as increased user fees and 
irrational drug use on the part of providers have been documented and concerns 
about risks and uncertainties that naturally occur with medicines also expressed 
(Bhat 1996; Slabbert and Pepper 2011). Arguments have also been voiced relative to 
the effectiveness of redressal systems and its user friendliness. The consumer 
protection intervention in India serves a useful model for tackling these concerns: 
there are no court charges, claimants can enter plea on their own and verdicts are 
made expeditiously (Bhat 1996). These desirable features lend it appropriate in the 
Nigerian context also, especially for poor rural dwellers, who may not own the 
resources to undertake the expensive formal legal mechanisms of justice.  
8.4.3 Regulatory capacity strengthening 
Even if government adopts the new range of flexible regulatory mechanisms 
discussed above, it still will not diminish government role for example in critical 
areas as licensing, registration and standards setting and hence the need for an 
effective regulatory system. Therefore, attracting and retaining skilled regulatory 
staff remains critically important in any patent medicine vendor reform initiative. 
Funding gaps were identified as a major barrier to regulatory efforts in the market 
and have been reported to be a challenge for regulatory agencies in most of Africa 
(WHO, USAID, FHI 360 2010). One consequence of the funding deficit is weakness 
in staff capacity development and associated gaps in essential skills and intractable 
staff shortages. Staff salaries and other financial emoluments are equally poor and 
work morale is generally poor. A well trained highly motivated regulatory staff 
complement is indispensable in all of the policy recommendations in this thesis thus 
far. To acquire the critical mass of employees that will ensure regular inspection and 
supervision for the required levels of excellence, staff salaries and other proven 
incentives that motivate workers and discourage corruption and conflict of interests 
will have to be adopted. While existing resource constraints may not support an 
expansionary staff policy, a situation of sustained poor staff remunerations will 
207 
 
predispose regulation to capture and create a potential for scarce skilled personnel 
exodus into industries they are supposed to regulate, both of which compromises 
public regulatory objectives (Ensor and Weinzierl 2007; Graddy 1991; Wafula et al. 
2013). The adoption of all or most of the policies argued in the thesis this far should 
substantially reduce the need for an excessively large inspectorate division of 
government and allow for compact and better paid staff strength. Government must 
also match improved pay with transparent measures that will sanction non-
performance and corrupt practices.  
Widening access, even to basic drug alone in rural areas will require political 
goodwill and support to adequately fund the health system. The Nigerian public 
health system receives just about 5% of the national budget annually, which is a far 
departure from the minimum 15% agreed on by African Heads of Governments in 
2001 in order to strengthen country health systems to adequately provide healthcare 
services that will bring health systems closer to universal health coverage (WHO 
2011. The role of government is likely to remain quite important in access to 
medicines in rural areas in the years ahead. Government must refurbish existing 
public health facilities or build new ones and adequately staff and stock them to 
regain the confidence and trust of the public, particularly poor rural households who 
face multiple demands on their scarce budgets. This is important since markets by 
their nature do not provide goods and services to all individuals in a society and even 
in well-functioning markets, the ability and willingness to pay the competitive 
market price by consumers remains the only allocative mechanism. Government 
provision seeks welfare improvement and goods and services are often subsidized in 
a way that may possibly crowd in the market (Hanson et al 2001). Crowding in the 
market may stimulate demand and force existing retailers to become more 
competitive which can possibly result in the improvement of all dimensions of 
access and market performance (Maiga et al. 2003). 
A model of the reformed patent medicine vendor market for Nigeria is here 
presented: 
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8.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter set out to analyse the performance of the researched patent medicine 
market by isolating the root causes of failures within the market and making policy 
recommendations for improving access to quality and safe drugs and their rational 
use for improving population health outcomes. Adopting the economic lens of 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, the thesis attempted to answer the 
question of whether government should continue to expend scarce health resources 
to tighten regulatory control or to seek more effective options of correcting the 
market failure reported. Policy approaches to addressing market and regulatory 
failures highlighted in the thesis entailed a blend of interventions that target patent 
medicine vendors, consumers, manufacturers and wholesalers and regulatory 
systems.  
In general, the specific concerns for improving access to effective, safe and 
affordable essential medicines in patent medicine vendor outlets in rural areas have 
focussed on improving availability, affordability and acceptability of quality and safe 
essential medicines. The thesis has therefore argued that rigid regulatory control 
approaches and stand-alone provider knowledge and skill trainings have not offered 
sustainable quality improvement behaviours in the market. It recommended an 
integrated policy approach that encompasses several proven strategies: Strict 
enforcement of registration standards, drug packing and labelling enforced at the 
point of registration offers a sustainable way of ensuring that only high quality drugs 
enter the market. Accreditation and franchise policies are more likely to improve 
provider knowledge and practice skills while at the same time providing financial 
and business incentives for improvement of access to effective, safe and affordable 
medicines more sustainably in this market. The researcher has also canvassed that 
rural drug consumers have the greatest motivations to make improvements in the 
performances of medicine vendors in the short and long terms, if they are well 
informed through an interactive health education communication process which 
incorporates opinions of the general public.  
The realities of the study findings strongly support the recommendation for review of 
the guidelines for licensing of patent medicine vending in Nigeria. Regulations must 
align with the needs of targeted population. Therefore, initiatives to expand access to 
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improve the quality of services and products offered by patent medicine vendors 
must ensure that drug vendors are legally allowed to sell a select range of 
prescription drugs, such as common antibiotics. It also has been argued that the 
technical nature of medicines makes the minimum educational requirement of mere 
ability to read and write inappropriate:  health related training and certification is 
recommended. Regulatory institutions need to be strengthened through enhanced 
funding and personnel development to enforce compliance with regulations. This 
will have to take the form of reducing the need for a large inspectorate division of 
government to allow for smaller and better paid staff strength, matching improved 
pay with transparent measures that will sanction non-performance and corrupt 
practices. 
In conclusion, the thesis has produced evidence that supports the potential role of 
patent medicine vendors in expanding access to quality and safe pharmaceuticals and 
taken the stance that licensed pharmacies alone cannot remain the only acceptable 
delivery channels for retailing essential medicines particularly in underserved rural 
areas. The attractive features of patent retail drug shops and the long established 
habits of buying medications from these retailers cannot be wished away. Therefore, 
constructive engagement with these providers to creatively exploit their potential to 
expand access to safe and effective medicines while correcting the numerous quality 
concerns offers the best policy approach: one that will improve retail drug shops 
performance systematically by setting practice standards, guaranteeing drug and 
service quality, coupled with a robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.     
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CHAPTER 9:  SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Policy Context 
Modern pharmaceuticals have drastically reduced morbidity and mortality from most 
common diseases and offered relief from pain and suffering for millions of people 
around the world (Henry and Lexchin 2002). A large segment of the world’s 
population particularly in sub-Saharan Africa however, do not benefit from these 
medical advances and lack regular access to effective, safe and affordable medicines 
when needed or the ability to use medicines in their possessions rationally (Adome et 
al. 1996; Amin et al. 2003; Salako et al. 2001; Snow et al. 1992; WHO 2006). Those 
having access to medicines they require often get the wrong prescription of drugs for 
their conditions, receive incorrect drug doses or are sold inadequate drug quantities 
that fit their needs. In rural areas in particular, drugs are prescribed and/or dispensed 
predominantly by untrained and sometimes unlicensed patent medicine retailers 
(WHO 2000). The consensus however now, is that these informal providers are 
important sources of healthcare in Africa and in childhood malaria for example, they 
are the first point of consultation in about 15-85% of cases (Adome et al. 1996; 
Amin et al. 2003; Foster 1991; Goodman et al. 2007; Hamel et al. 2001; Marsh et al. 
1999; McCombie 1996; Snow et al. 1992; van der Geest 1987). Their high patronage 
and rising importance centred on their responsiveness to consumer demand suggests 
that retail drug vendors might continue to be a major source of health care for 
hundreds of millions of people in the future (McCombie 1996; Ruebush et al. 1995). 
In Nigeria like most other African countries, drug shops are sometimes the only 
source of health care for their communities. Therefore from a public health policy 
perspective of population health maximization, improving access to effective and 
safe essential medicines and their rational use through patent medicine vendors is a 
crucial public policy concern.   
9.2 Essential Medicines and Rational Drug Use 
Essential medicines have been defined as “indispensable and necessary for the health 
needs of the population. They should be available at all times, in the proper dosage 
forms, to all segments of society” and they are a core component of primary health 
care (WHO 1977; WHO 1978). The World Health Organization (1985), further 
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defines rational medicine use as when “patients receive medications appropriate to 
their clinical needs, in doses that meet their individual requirements, for an adequate 
period of time, and at the lowest cost to them and their community.” Patent medicine 
vendors have been shown to provide improved access to essential medicines for 
addressing primary health care in their communities, but failed largely to meet 
rational drug use criteria: high numbers of untrained patent medicine vendors, poor 
dispensing practices, irregular refresher trainings, infrequent supervisions and 
consumer self- medication practices are the main underlying factors that drive and 
support irrational medicine use in this context and justify intervention in the market. 
9.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
The study is the first of its kind to undertake to understand demand and supply 
behaviour from the economic lens of industrial organization (Structure-Conduct-
Performance) in a health care market in Nigeria. The study has observed the 
weakness in this model to capture the significant influence of consumers in the 
deterministic relationships of market performance. Patent medicine shop 
characteristics and consumer behaviour in this study site has not been previously 
reported. The thesis therefore adds to existing academic literature further evidence of 
the important role of patent medicine vendors (drug shops) in the provision of 
primary health care and expansion of access to essential medicines, particularly in 
rural and underserved areas. Consumer convenience factors such as drug availability, 
closeness to home, relative cheapness of medicines, prolonged and flexible opening 
hours, scope for credit and perceived drug quality contributed to the acceptability 
and popularity of patent medicine vendors. Medicine vendors did not only sell 
medicines, they consulted, prescribed medicines and gave health counselling in some 
cases, all undertaken for profit motives essentially. They also complemented other 
formal facilities in the drug supply chain and were the only source of needed 
medicines in some communities. 
The patent medicine vendor market studied combined monopolistic and oligopolistic 
features of competition, with relatively low entry barriers and exit potentials. Retail 
providers were diverse comprising mostly untrained sellers with a third having 
formal health training. Drug prices were fairly uniform in all the sub-markets studied 
and mark-ups appeared high. Non-price competition was high, but failed to yield 
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high quality market outcome as evidence of inappropriate drug prescription, 
inadequate dosing, poor labelling and lack of proper health communication with 
consumers was widespread and pervasive.  
Consumers self-medicated and bought inappropriate medications for self-diagnosed 
illnesses, which exemplify irrational drug use.   
Regulatory failures also existed and were gross. Licensure renewal processing took 
long, continuing medical education for patent medicine vendors was irregular, 
supervision, inspection and sanctioning of regulatory infringements were far 
between, as regulatory officials tacitly permitted infractions. Patent medicine 
vendors therefore, sold outside of their remit, trading even in prescription only drugs. 
Consumer and public health education programmes appeared ineffective in creating 
improved health seeking and health consumption behaviours. The implications were 
enhanced access to medicines generally for the communities while undermining 
quality of products and services and the scope for engagement with the public sector.    
Overall, the interaction of imperfect competition and ineffective regulation combined 
to generate a mixed market outcome of improved access, but low quality: the 
“market for lemons” (Akerlof 1970). The significant overlap of these research 
findings with prior literature makes a modest contribution to the broader debate on 
the role of retail drug shops in expansion of access to appropriate health care services 
in low-income countries in general and Nigeria in particular. 
9.4 Thesis Strengths and Weaknesses 
Predicating the study on the economic framework of structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm provided explicit concepts and tools of enquiry, yielding valuable insights 
that underpinned the policy recommendations of the thesis. The approach allowed 
data collection and analysis along distinctively important lines of demand and supply 
components and the unpicking of their complex interactions to understand the 
incentives and preferences that shape provider and consumer behaviours. Particular 
strengths were that it allowed a clearer visualization of the relationship between 
market structure and provider conduct and their impact on availability, affordability 
and the quality dimensions of product and services in the market. For example it was 
demonstrated how a less than perfectly competitive market structure can fix and 
214 
 
maintain prices in a market and how also varying information levels and 
asymmetries distort market performance. It was also possible to show the profit 
incentives of providers is a dominant force in shaping provider behaviour rather than 
knowledge and to see the consumer doing his/her all to get the best value for money, 
given financial and information constraints. 
Secondly, the thesis adopted a comprehensive access framework encapsulating 
availability, affordability and acceptability dimensions, each consisting of clearly 
identifiable and quantifiable variables. This quality permitted easy analysis of access 
and the isolation of areas of deficit access in the thesis. Through this framework, the 
fit of the patent medicine vendor market to the social and economic realities of the 
communities they served has been amply demonstrated, in terms of their geographic 
closeness to the people they serve, their social embeddedness which fostered 
relational buying and enhanced acceptability. Affordability was demonstrated in the 
purchase of whatever drugs and in whatsoever quantities consumers demanded and 
scope for deferred payments to be made. High drug prices, weak purchasing power, 
uncertain quality of products and inappropriate prescribing and dispensing practices 
where isolated as factors undermining effective access in the thesis. 
The thesis provides further appeal by its generalist nature of not limiting the analysis 
to any particular disease state or a specific drug product as many studies of this 
phenomenon had towed. 
For the data collection activity, its key strength lay in the census of patent medicine 
vendor outlets in the local council. This provided a frame for selecting a 
representative sample of providers for provider questionnaires and subsequent data 
collection activities involving drug retailers. Other important methodological 
strengths were the data triangulation approach, which improved the richness of data 
generated and validity of its interpretation. The rapport the researcher was able to 
develop and nurture with officials and members of the National Association of 
Patent and Proprietary Medicine Dealers of Nigeria greatly facilitated the research. 
Despite the plethora of attractive qualities of the study, several counteracting factors 
that popped up intermittently are referenced: the small sample sizes of interviews 
and observations made is recognised and the potential for error effect on 
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conclusions. This was attributable to time and resource constraint. This flaw closely 
relates to the important issue of sampling bias that might have occurred in the study 
regarding the convenient approach criteria of selecting interviewees. In the case of 
consumer surveys and interviews, household survey was a more appropriate 
approach but not practicable, owning to cost and data availability. Whilst the 
researcher took every caution to avoid influencing outcomes in any way, the extent 
to which participants’ awareness of being research subjects and the effect of that 
knowledge remains a source of potential bias. However, this appeared to have had 
little influence on providers’ behaviours as most never labelled dispensed drugs and 
sold under-doses, during observational studies. Further, observations were timed at 
the end of the research gathering activities, a point the participants had become 
accustomed to the presence of the researcher and may not have seen the need to put 
up a performance. Also, having been around them for a long time and the author held 
several informal interactions with the retailers, which supports this position. Mystery 
shoppers approach would appear more appropriate strategy for obtaining this data, it 
was not deployed in this study due the challenge of finding credible individuals to 
simulate this role, considering the time and energies required to locate and train the 
pool of clients to behave in the desired way. The inability to collect data on prices 
and market shares of individual vendors in the market were important weaknesses of 
the study: data on sales volume of vendors was not acquired due to lack of record 
keeping by retailers and therefore, the concentration indices calculated were based 
on the numbers of patent medicine outlets and the assumption of symmetry of shop 
sizes in each sub-market. These proximate measurements therefore remained 
estimates and did not accurately measure market concentration in the study site.  
Detailed data on the cost structure of providers were also not collected, which 
limited the evaluation of price mark-ups in the study. Such data would require longer 
time to accumulate and even higher level of trust with vendors. Analysis of 
competition and its implication for access did not capture direct data from the drug 
supply chain above patent medicine vendors, although these actors actually have 
deterministic influence on product range and prices of products in patent medicine 
vendor outlets below. They are also a key source of information for medicine 
vendors. 
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The operational definition of market for the analysis of concentration was also 
challenging. Product market definition was not sufficiently explicit and referred to 
the entire pharmaceutical products as homogenous while the segmentation of the 
local council area into 5 sub-markets was purely arbitrary based on the divisions by 
the local patent medicine vendor association in the local council area for its 
administrative convenience. These flaws in data collection methods did not enable 
the researcher to make firm conclusion of the nature of competition in the researched 
market, underscoring the practical difficulties in defining and understanding market 
boundaries in economic literature.  
9.5 Generalization of Findings 
Although the study was conducted in one particular local government area, it 
nonetheless has highlighted a number of features which seemed to be shared with 
other studies of the patent medicine market phenomenon across Nigeria and several 
similar settings in sub-Saharan Africa. The findings and recommendations are 
therefore, likely to have utility beyond the study site to other parts of Nigeria and 
sub-Saharan Africa subject to specific contextual realities. The desirability of patent 
medicine shops in terms of proximity, flexibility, expediency and responsiveness to 
consumer demand is generally reported in the literature. For example, Brieger and 
colleagues (2002),Oladepo et al.(2008) and Salako et al. (2001) have reported 
identical findings in south western Nigeria, while Okonkwo and Okwonkwo (2010) 
and Okeke and Uzochukwu (2000), came to the same conclusions in their studies of 
retail drug shops in south eastern Nigeria. These authors also reported low quality of 
services provided and wide spread regulatory infringements as revealed by this 
study. On the broader African scene, Goodman and colleagues (2007a), Wafula and 
others (2013) have demonstrated the same outcomes in Tanzanian drug shops, Greer 
et al. (2004) in Kenya and van der Geest (1987) in Cameroon. In terms of the market 
structure of patent medicine vending, the finding of low entry requirement 
collaborate with the findings of van der Geest (1987) in Cameroon, but differ from 
high entry requirement (drug shop owners must have a health related training to be 
registered) reported for the Tanzanian retail drug shops (Goodman et al. 2007a). 
Also, unlike other retail markets, the Tanzanian market does not embrace the 
apprentice paradigm of qualifying as a drug vendor. These differences 
217 
 
notwithstanding, the researched market is in some ways typical of patent medicine 
vending across other comparable African countries which have been studied. 
This convergence of literature findings with some of the key thesis findings 
reasonably supports the generalization of the study findings to similar contexts. 
However, it is noted that the scope of literature reviewed did not extend to other 
continents, where very different market and cultural conditions may prevail. 
 
9.6 Further Research 
The weaknesses highlighted in the thesis necessitate further inquiry along a number 
of lines: the cost structure and pricing behaviour of patent medicine vendors needs to 
be better understood. This will be useful for analysing strategies to address high 
mark-ups on drugs reported and for which no specific credible strategy for affordable 
pricing is suggested by the thesis. Characterization of the pharmaceutical distribution 
chain above patent medicine vendors needs in-depth exploration and the nature of 
the relationship between them explicitly modelled.  Although they play an important 
role in drug availability, prices, knowledge and practices of drug retailers, this higher 
level drug distribution chain has been overlooked in the research literature and in 
most interventions to improve retailer practice (Cross and MacGregor 2010; MSH 
2012). This is particularly important with the current ease and speed of access to 
health information via the internet. Understanding the nature of regulatory 
constraints encountered by regulators and the motives and incentives of regulatory 
officials is also required to enable development of more effective regulations and 
implementing strategies. About 30% of patent medicine vendors in this market had 
formal health training and a recommendation to benchmark entry requirement by 
these qualifications; research will be needed to compare the relative performance of 
patent medicine providers who have health related training against their non-certified 
counterparts to better understand the influence of formal health training in improving 
quality of products and services in patent medicine markets. These high priority 
research aspects will provide comprehensive evidence of the patent medicine market 
in Nigeria and offer empirical basis for optimal policy actions towards improving 
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availability, affordability and acceptability of quality and safe essential medicines in 
rural Nigeria.  
9.7 Final Conclusion 
The study aimed to evaluate patent medicine vendor market and make policy 
recommendations on strategies to engage this level of health care providers to 
expand access to quality essential medicines for Nigerians, most especially in rural 
and underserved communities. Patent medicine vendors are an important and 
indispensable source of essential medicines in the rural community studied. 
However, the quality of services rendered is low. While patent medicine vendors 
remain the most visible element of the pharmaceutical distribution chain and 
therefore the focus of most interventions in the past, evidence indicates that these 
have not yielded the desired result of sustained improvement in the quality of 
products and services in drug retail outlets. The thesis has therefore argued that for 
the profit maximising patent medicine vendor who may also be influenced by as 
diverse factors as consumer demand, regulation and the nature of the pharmaceutical 
distribution chain further up, more emphasis on measures that target these other 
determinants of vendor behaviour should be explored in the drive towards achieving 
universal coverage of effective, safe and affordable essential medicaments for 
Nigerians, particularly in rural areas. This will require integrated approaches that 
recognise their inter-relatedness. Specifically, the realities of the study findings 
suggest a departure from rigid insistence on unenforceable quality standards of 
regulating patent medicine vending practice in Nigeria and embrace new initiatives 
to improve the quality of services and products offered in this market. These must 
systematically ensure that patent medicine vendors are legally allowed to sell a select 
range of prescription drugs and stock only quality pharmaceuticals, provide 
accreditation and mandatory health training of providers, guarantee strengthening of 
regulatory institutions and most importantly, for the consumer who wants a chance 
to get medicines irrespective of risks, empowerment by provision of accurate and 
timely health information.  
Finally, the weight of collated evidence in this thesis highlights the dilemma for 
health policy making and enforcement in resource poor settings: the trade-off 
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between quality and access, and forces the fundamental question of whether low 
quality should be acceptable for and by the poor.  
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1.          INTRODUCTION 
The Licensing of non-pharmacists to stock, market and sell simple medicinal 
remedies is entrenched in the 1958 Poisons and Pharmacy Act, Cap 152, Poisons and 
Pharmacy Act 535 Abuja Laws and Pharmacists Council of Nigeria Act 91 of 1992. 
This was an attempt to redress the lopsided distribution of the very few healthcare 
facilities, public and private health sector alike, available at that time. 
 Also, an important element of the National Drugs Policy is the adequate 
provision, accessibility and availability of essential drugs, which are effective, 
affordable, safe and of good quality in all aspects of the National Health System. 
 2.  SCOPE 
These guidelines are designed to address the issuance of Patent and proprietary 
Medicines Vendor’s License (PPMVL) in the Country under the following headings: 
(i) Licensing authority  
 
(ii) Eligibility  
 
(iii) Mode of application  
 
(iv) Fees for application  
 
(v) Issuance and renewal of license 
 
(vi) Validity of license 
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(vii) Orientation and continuing education for holders of patent and 
proprietary medicines vendors’ license 
 
(viii) Monitoring and inspection  
 
3.  LICENSING AUTHORITY 
The licensing Authority is the Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) established 
under Act No. 91 of 1992. 
4.   ELIGIBILITY 
An applicant for the patent and proprietary medicine vendor’s license shall produce 
evidence to the satisfaction of the licensing authority. 
(a)   In the case of an individual 
i. that he has attained the age of twenty-one (21) years 
ii. that he is of good character and certified as such by two satisfactory 
referees 
iii. that such individual shall be able to read and write in English 
Language and  
(b) in the case of a person other than an individual, that the nature of the 
business is such to warrant the sale of medicines. 
5. MODE OF APPLICATION 
(i) Application shall be made in applicant’s own handwriting indicating the exact 
location, address where the intended business is to be undertaken. Post Office 
Box (P.O.Box) or Private Mail Bag (P.M.B) shall not be accepted. 
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(ii) The application shall be address to the Registrar, Pharmacists Council of Nigeria 
through the Director of Pharmaceutical Service of the State, where the 
applicant wants to operate.  
(iii) Letters of recommendations from two (2) people as referred to in Section 4 (a) 
(ii) shall accompany the application. Three passport photographs, all of which 
will be endorsed by one referee, shall be attached to the application. 
 The applicant shall forward a current income tax clearance certificate. 
(iv)     Each application shall be accompanied with a non-refundable application fee. 
6.  PROCEDURE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LICENCE 
The following procedure shall be adopted for the issuance of Patent Proprietary 
medicines Vendors License (PPMVL): 
(a)   Submission of duly completed application form; 
(b)   Interview of applicant by PPMVL Committee in the State; 
(c)   Payment of a prescribed inspection fee; 
(d)   Inspection of premises shall be carried out by Pharmaceutical 
Inspectors; 
(e)   A satisfactory report to the PCN by the State PPMVL Committee; 
(f)   Issuance of license by PCN on payment of prescribed registration fee; 
(g)   Applicant shall be issued a booklet containing the list of medicines     
approved for sale by the licensing authority; 
(h)   Attendance at PPMV orientation course. 
 
Note 
License holders shall display the license in the shop conspicuously and their business 
name on signpost in front of their premises. The business name shall also carry the 
wordings “Patent Medicines Shop” conspicuously written. Such names as “Drug 
Store” or “Medicines Store” are prohibited.  
7.  FEES FOR LICENCE 
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The license fees shall be as specified in Schedule 1to these guidelines and 
Pharmacists Council of Nigeria may review such fees from time to time. 
8.  CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF LICENCE  
The following conditions shall guide the renewal of license: 
(a) All applications must be submitted on or before the 31st of 
January of each year. 
(b) All licenses are to be renewed annually subject to satisfactory 
inspection report. 
(c) All license premises for the sale of Patent and Proprietary 
Medicines shall be subject to periodic inspection by 
Pharmaceutical Inspectors appointed by Pharmacists Council of 
Nigeria. 
(d) Evidence of attendance at Continuing Education Programme at 
least once in every two years. 
(e) Payment of prescribed fees. 
(f) Satisfactory performance by the licensee. 
9. VALIDITY OF LICENCE 
The license shall expire on the 31
st
 of December of the year of the issuance. 
However, the licensing authority reserves the right to revoke a license during its 
validity period if there is any breach, false declaration or documentation. 
10. ORIENTATION AND CONTINUING EDUCATION 
Every new license holder shall be required to attend an orientation course. 
Thereafter, the license holder shall be required to attend a Continuing Education 
Programme, at least, once in every two (2) years. Such courses shall be organized at 
state level by the Pharmacist Council of Nigeria in collaboration with the State 
PPMVL Committee. 
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11.   MONITORING AND INSPECTION 
Licensed premises shall be subject to periodic monitoring and inspection by 
Pharmaceutical Inspector(s); 
12.  ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
(i) The Federal Ministry of Health  
(a) Shall formulate relevant policies; 
(b)  Shall give directives of the general character to the 
Pharmacists   Council of Nigeria relating to the 
implementation of these guidelines and it shall be the duty of 
the Pharmacists Council of Nigeria to comply and give effect 
to the directives. 
(ii) Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) 
The roles of the Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) shall include but not limited 
to the following: 
(a)  Shall provide and issue the PPMVL; 
(b)  Shall provide the receipts for the various fees; 
(c)  Shall provide the application forms; 
(d)  Shall disburse funds to states according to the sharing formula as 
contained in Schedule II of these guidelines; 
(e)  Shall accredit pharmaceutical inspectors; 
(f)  Shall approve State PPMVL Committees; 
(g)  Shall enforce sanctions and compliance; 
(h)  Shall provide approved Patent Medicines list 
(iii) State Ministries of Health 
(A)  Shall facilitate the activities of State PPMVL Committees; 
 (b)The Director of Pharmaceutical Services (DPS) Shall arrange for pre-
approval and routine inspection of new and licensed premises respectively; 
(c) The DPS shall collect revenue in respect of PPMVL and pay same to PCN. 
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(iv)  Patent and Proprietary Medicines Vendors License (PPMVL) Committee 
(a) Shall monitor activities of vendors and make quarterly and annual returns to 
Pharmacists Council of  Nigeria (PCN); 
(b) Recommend Pharmaceutical Inspectors for accreditation by the Pharmacists 
Council of Nigeria 
(c) Shall recommend successful applicants to PCN for license; 
(d) Shall organize Orientation Course and Continuing Education Programme for 
vendors in collaboration with PCN. 
13. COMPOSITION OF STATE PPMVL COMMITTEE 
The committee shall compose of: 
(a)  Director of  Pharmaceutical services (DPS) of the State (Chairman); 
(b)  Director of Pharmaceutical Services, State Hospitals Management Board 
(Member); 
(c)  Chairman of State Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria (PSN) or his 
representative (Member); 
(d)  One representative of NAFDAC (Member); 
(e)  A member of the Civil Society nominated by PCN; 
(f)  Head of Pharmaceutical Inspectorate Unit in the State Directorate of 
Pharmaceutical Services (Member/Secretary). 
 
SCHEDULE I  
1. No patent and proprietary Medicines Vendor License Holder shall operate unless 
the under-listed fees have been paid accordingly. The fees so listed shall be reviewed 
from time to time. All payment must be in bank draft payable to Pharmacists 
Council of Nigeria. 
2. (a) Application fee                             -N500.00 
    (b) Pre-approval inspection fee         -N1, 000.00 
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    (c) Registration License                   -N2, 000.00 
    (d) Renewal Inspection fee               -N1, 000.00 
    (e) Registration Renewal                  -N1, 000.00 
SCHEDULE II 
1. The Pharmacists Council of Nigeria shall collect all revenue and disburse as 
follows: 
 (a)   Application fees - 100% to PCN 
 (b)   Inspection fees    -100% to State PPMVL Committee 
 (c)             Licensing fees   -50% to State and 50% to PCN 
 
14.     MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
 (a)  All Patent or Proprietary Medicines shall be sold in the 
original container properly secured.    
 (b)   No holder of a PPMVL shall re-pack a patent or proprietary       
medicine. 
    (c)  Any person who does any act likely to prevent or obstruct the  carrying into 
effect of the provision  of these guidelines is guilty of an offence. 
   (d) A person aggrieved in pursuance to the enforcement of the provisions of these 
guidelines may appeal to the pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN). 
 (e) The licensing authority shall not issue license to an applicant where the 
circumstances, not limited to the following, are show to exist, that the  applicant is: 
a. bankrupt or insolvent. 
b. an ex-convict. 
c. in disobedience of Council’s directives. 
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d. involved in practices outside the scope of the license 
(f) The PCN shall exercise powers generally and do such things that are incidental to 
carrying into effect the provisions contained in these guidelines. 
(g) Any business without a license or who contravenes any other provisions of these 
regulations Shall be guilty of an offence, and is liable on conviction to affine not 
exceeding N500, 000.00 or to a term of such fine and imprisonment. 
(h) The PCN or its representative shall have power to seal erring premises. 
i. Where it is satisfied that a license holder is in breach or in default of his 
responsibility under the prevailing guidelines or law in force, the licensing authority 
may, if it deems fit, revoke, withdraw any license issued and/or strike off the name 
and premises from the register, but without prejudice to administrative charges that 
may be imposed on the defaulter. 
(j) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment or law the federal 
High Court, State High Court, and Magistrate Court shall have jurisdiction to try 
offences under these guidelines. 
(k) The following shall have exclusive powers to prosecute offender (s) under these 
guidelines. 
i. Attorney General of the Federation. 
ii. Pharmacists Council of Nigeria. 
iii. The Nigeria Police. 
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Appendix 2 
RETAIL OUTLET QUESTIONNAIRE 
 Participant’s code number     .............. 
 Date of interview      ............... 
 Interviewer                                                                              ............... 
 Sex        Male/Female 
 Age        ............... 
 Marital Status       Married 
 Single 
 Widowed 
 Divorced/Separat
ed 
 Others (Specify) 
 Educational level      Primary 
 Secondary 
 Tertiary 
 No formal 
education 
1. Professional qualification     .............. 
 
2. How long have you worked as a drug retailer?  ............. 
 
3. Have you undergone any training since your employment?          Yes / No 
 
4. If your answer above was yes, specify    ............  
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5. How many other staffs work in this facility?                                       ............. 
 
6. What services do you provide?                            Drug retailing                                     
i. Consultation and 
drug retailing 
ii. Sale and 
administration of 
injectables 
iii. Laboratory 
services 
iv. Others (Specify) 
 
7. Compared to other drug shops around, how qualified are you? 
i. More qualified 
ii. Equally qualified 
iii. Less qualified 
iv. I do not know 
 
8. What factors do you consider in setting your prices? 
a. Transaction cost / 
expenditure 
b. Prices of other retail 
shops 
c. Perceived ability to pay 
of customers 
 
9. What indicators do you rely on to inform this decision? 
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10. Do you have a past experience of anyone who could not pay for needed 
drugs?    Yes / No 
 
11. If you answered yes above, how did you deal with the situation? 
a. Reduced the price 
b. Deferred payment 
c. Offered exemption 
d. Other forms of payment 
(specify) 
e. Refused services 
 
12. What is the gross income from this business? (Give range) 
 
13. What financial constraints do you have with your business? 
1. Inadequate demand 
2. Inadequate access to 
investment funds 
3. Taxes 
4. None 
 
14. Do you receive referrals from other retailers?        Yes / No 
 
15. If yes why and if no, why not? 
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16. Do you refer customers to other drug shops?        Yes / No  
17. Briefly provide details for your response above. 
 
18. Have you received complaints about your services?        Yes / No 
 
19. From what you know about quality of health care, do you think you are 
providing standard quality of care of would want?                                                                
Yes / No 
 
20. Do you have any means of evaluating the quality of the services you 
provide?        Yes / No 
 
21. There exist unethical behaviours by most drug retailers, such as 
overprescribing in order to enhance profits. Are such practices common?                    
Yes / No 
 
22. Why do you think consumers come to your shop? 
a. Cheaper / Closer / Better quality / Better staff 
attitude / Drug availability and range / 
Cleanliness / Others (Specify) 
 
23. Are satisfied with the quality of drugs you sell?        Yes / No 
 
24. Do you have a permit to run this business? ................ Yes / No 
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25. How often do regulatory authorities inspect your facility? .... At least once 
each year / infrequently / never had an inspection 
 
26. Are you aware of inspection visits to other drug shops? .......... Yes / No 
 
27. Are you aware of imposition of penalty on any provider for regulatory 
infringement? ..... Yes / No 
28. Are you satisfied with current level of regulatory framework? ..........Yes / No  
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Appendix 3 
 
EXIT CONSUMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 Questionnaire Number       ..................................... 
 
 Date of interview                  .................................... 
 
 Name of interviewer          ....................................... 
 
 Sex                                       Male / Female 
 
 Age                                      ........................................ 
 
 Marital status                    Married / single / Divorced / Widow / Widower / 
Others (Specify) 
 
 Level of Education            Primary / Secondary / Tertiary/ Others (Specify) 
 
 Occupation                         .......................................... 
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 Main sources of Income          Agriculture / Formal employment/ self-
employment/ others ( Specify) 
 
1. Did you seek services here for yourself or for someone else          myself / 
someone else 
 
2. If for someone else, what is his / her age?       ................ 
 
3. If for someone else, what are his / her sex         Male / Female 
 
4. How long have you suffered from this health problem?           ................... 
 
5. What do you think is the health problem that has brought you here?   
.................. 
 
6. Why did you choose to seek care in this facility?               Closeness / Good 
quality / Cheapness / Drug quality and availability / provider qualifications / 
Politeness of provider / Relationship with provider/ Others (Specify) 
 
7. How do you now perceive the services provided today?     ........ Satisfied / 
not satisfied / not sure 
 
8. Have you sought treatment elsewhere in this episode of ill health?     Yes / 
No 
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9. If your answer is no, where did go before now?        Public facility / Private 
facility / other drug shops / Spiritual healer / Tradition al healers/ Others 
(specify) 
 
10. Why did you go to the last place?    ............Closeness / Quality of care / 
Polite services provider / know someone there / know the facility better / 
Others (Specify) 
 
11. Who paid for the services provided today.............Self / Third party 
 
12. Where you able to pay all you were asked to pay? ........ Yes / No 
 
13. If no, what happened? ........... Allowed deferment / bought incomplete dose 
/ allowed partial payment / Allowed payment in kind 
 
14. If services provided are paid by third party, indicate who? .......  Private 
health care insurance / National health insurance / Community insurance / 
House-hold relatives / Friends / Others (Specify) 
 
15. Do you know what drugs you were given? ............. Yes / No 
 
16. Where you told what the drugs were, how to take them and their side 
effects? ....... Yes / No 
17. Were you told what you were suffering from? ........................... Yes / No  
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Appendix 4 
 
PROVIDER INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Activities at outlet: 
 Perception of role  
Motivational factors 
 Choice of location and Opening times  
 Job satisfaction and expectations 
 Professional self-regulation 
Finance/income activities: 
 Types of activities performed 
 Annual income and variations 
 Sales strategies 
Seasonality of sales 
 Profitability 
 Coping strategies for financial constraints 
 Others 
Drug stocking: 
 Sources, amount, types, and storage of drugs 
 Costs and cost containment 
 Factors affecting drug stocks / stock-outs 
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 Others  
User charges: 
 Pricing strategies; 
Factors taken in to consideration in price setting, for example, expenditures, prices of 
other facilities or ability of consumers to pay 
Charge per dose for specific illness episode e.g. malaria, diarhoea 
 Charge per unit of specific drugs e.g. paracetamol, aspirin 
 Probe systems allowing for waivers, deferrals, discounts or inability to pay 
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Appendix 5 
CONSUMER INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Utilization of retail drug outlets: 
 Accessibility 
 Availability and perceived quality of drugs 
 Experience (satisfaction) with drug shops 
 Key barriers and suggested solutions 
Behaviour and quality of drug shop services: 
 Availability when needed 
 Perceived quality 
 Perceived qualifications of retailers 
 Strategies to enhance income/ patronage 
 Others 
Prices of drugs: 
 Experience with user charges 
 Forms of payments 
 Effect on health seeking 
 Strategies to make drugs more affordable 
 Others   
Income: 
 Types of economic activities 
 Levels of incomes and variations 
 Approaches to improve incomes  
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Appendix 6 
 
REGULATORS INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Role of regulatory authorities: 
 Powers and functions 
 Views about patent medicine vendors 
Regulatory challenges 
 
Performances of retail shops: 
 Availability and accessibility 
 Quality of drugs and services 
 Problems and actions taken in the past 
 
Nature of interactions: 
 With retailers 
 With consumers 
 Interagency 
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Appendix 7 
SALES OBSERVATION GUIDE 
 
Premises cleanliness:  Clean/Not clean 
 
PCN permit:  Yes/No 
 
Did consumer consult?  Yes/No 
 
Did consumer present a prescription?  Yes/No 
 
Did consumer demand drugs?  Yes/No 
 
Did vendor examine client?  Yes/No 
 
Drugs sold: Full dose/under-dose 
 
Was name of drug and dosage written out? 
 
Was consumer told adverse events to expect? 
 
How was payment made? Cash/ others (specify) 
 
Comments:  
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Appendix 8b
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Appendix 9 
 
 
 
 
Information Sheet 
My name is Iornumbe Usar and I am a research student from the Institute for 
International Health at Queen Margaret University in Edinburgh.  As part of my 
degree course, I am undertaking a research project for my PhD Thesis.  The title of 
my project is: An economic analysis of the retail pharmaceutical market in Nigeria: 
Towards access expansion and policy. 
This study will investigate the behaviour of both sellers and buyers in a rural retail 
pharmaceutical market. 
The findings of the project will be valuable because it will lead to a better 
understanding of key influences that determine market performance, and by 
extension, improved access to pharmaceuticals in rural settings. 
I am looking for volunteers to participate in the project.  There are no criteria (e.g. 
gender, age, or health) for being included or excluded – everyone is welcome to take 
part. 
If you agree to participate in the study, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire/ 
respond to oral questions, which will be tape-recorded The researcher is not aware of 
any risks associated with participating in this study. The whole procedure should 
take no longer than 30 minutes.  You will be free to withdraw from the study at any 
stage and you would not have to give a reason. 
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All data will be anonymised as much as possible, but you may be identifiable from 
tape recordings of your voice. Your name will be replaced with a participant number, 
and it will not be possible for you to be identified in any reporting of the data 
gathered. 
The results may be published in a journal or presented at a conference. 
If you would like to contact an independent person, who knows about this project but 
is not involved in it, you are welcome to contact Dr Bregje de Kok.  Her contact 
details are given below. 
If you have read and understood this information sheet, any questions you had have 
been answered, and you would like to be a participant in the study, please now see 
the consent form. 
Contact details of the researcher 
 
Name of researcher: Iornumbe Usar 
Address:  Research Student, Health Policy, IIHD 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh 
  Queen Margaret University Drive 
Musselburgh 
East Lothian EH21 6UU 
Email / Telephone: iusar@qmu.ac.uk / 0131 474 0000 
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Contact details of the independent adviser 
Name of adviser: Dr Bregje de Kok 
Address:  Lecturer, Sexual and reproductive Health, IIHD 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh 
  Queen Margaret University Drive 
Musselburgh 
East Lothian EH21 6UU 
Email / Telephone: clecturer@qmu.ac.uk / 0131 474 0000  
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Appendix 10 
Representative patent medicine outlets in Katsina-Ala LGC 
 
 
 
